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CONTENTS

PAGE

The Vision of God.....	R. Newton Flew	163
The Attack Upon the Social Gospel.....	H. Richard Niebuhr	176
The Ministry of Error.....	H. Wheeler Robinson	182
Is the Universe Friendly?.....	Oscar MacMillan Buck	191
The Minister His Own Theologian.....	Phillips P. Elliott	201
Jesus, Son of Man.....	Harold Cooke Phillips	207
The Secret of Jesus.....	J. Alexander Findlay	216
Thinking Through the Meaning of the Holy Spirit.....	Mary Frances Thelen	222
The Strategy of Christian Living.....	Allan Knight Chalmers	230
Achieving a Worldwide Fellowship of Christians.....	Kenneth Scott Latourette	243
The Communist Drum and Our Restless Feet.....	Allan A. Hunter	254
The Preacher and World Movements.....	Albert W. Beaven	262
"Brookings" Surveys and Suggests.....	Arthur S. Flemming	275
Prophet Versus Scholar—Luther and Erasmus.....	Cyril C. Richardson	285
Vilfredo Pareto.....	Edgar Sheffield Brightman	295
Book Reviews.....		304
Bookish Brevities.....		319

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The Vision of God

Is It for All?

R. NEWTON FLEW

A MODERN missionary tells a haunting story of a woman pilgrim on one of the great trunk roads of India.¹ He saw her measuring herself in prostrations along the ground. Through dust and torrid heat she moved onward, lying down, marking the farthest point to which her hand could reach—then rising, pacing onward, pausing again at that marked point to prostrate herself and reach forward once more. It would mean seven or eight hundred prostrations to cover a mile. The missionary asked whither she was going. She named a shrine in the distant Himalayas, where from some cleft in a valley a burst of natural gas would from time to time leap and take fire in the air and vanish; it was to the worshipers a fleeting manifestation of divinity. The pilgrimage meant a journey of a thousand miles. "Why was she going?" the missionary asked. And the woman made answer *Uski darshan*, two words and no more: *Vision of Him*.

The story reminds us, first, that when we say "Vision of God" our feet are on a well-trodden pathway. It is an age-long quest. An incurable hunger sends men and women to the road. He hath set eternity in their hearts, and so they are never altogether at home, never fully at ease, amid the things of time. Secondly, the story warns us that the very goal to which we are directing our steps may be mistaken, and our way of going on pilgrimage pathetically wrong. Every Christian can discern the pathos in the prostrate form of the Hindu woman. But it may well be that within the Christian Church the true goal has been often misconceived, and the method of reaching it hardly endurable, even fruitless. Perhaps no human yearning for God is ever entirely fruitless, but the way to communion with Him has certainly been made inordinately lengthy. Surely there is a swifter path, whether for Hindu woman or medieval mystic, to reach the feet of the Crucified, to find themselves at home in the Father's heart.

One of the chief tasks of theology today should be to throw more light on the nature of Christian spirituality, to trace out its history, to discriminate between the varieties which have marked its course, to disen-

¹The story comes from C. F. Andrews and is told in one of Dr. T. R. Glover's books.

tangle the false from the true in modern manifestations of piety within the Church. The supreme task is to study the goal. *Respice finem*. The great book of Professor Kenneth E. Kirk² has provided a mass of material for future students. Some of the chief problems have been defined by him, and in particular the problem which in a practical form confronts every pastor and evangelist. Is the secret of personal relations with God, which is the very heart of the evangelical message, the privilege of a few or the inheritance of all? Doctor Kirk is an enthusiastic admirer of Henri Brémond, and maintains with that brilliant writer, and against other interpreters of Catholic spirituality, that there is only one unitive way which leads to the goal of the Christian life, and that this way is for all. "The mystic," says M. Brémond, "is the ordinary worshiper perfected."³ Doctor Kirk's work has helped to remove a reproach which ought to be more widely felt by Christians outside the Roman allegiance. Hitherto there has been little scientific study by Protestants of that department of theology known as *theologia spiritualis* in the Roman Church. Dr. Kenneth Kirk is an Anglo-Catholic teacher, and therefore cannot be described as a Protestant. His book does not contain any sympathetic discussion of Protestant spirituality. But every Protestant teacher must acknowledge a debt of gratitude to this work of massive learning and sound scholarship. Let us hope that his example will be followed. Another, though slighter, work, by Professor Karl Heim,⁴ is now available for English readers. Here the true nature of evangelical Christianity is expounded by a master. Karl Heim sees that Catholicism is to be distinguished from Protestantism in its spirituality, in its way of approaching God, as well as in the doctrines taught.

The idea of "seeing God" is not unfamiliar to one whose soul has been nourished from boyhood on the hymns of the Wesleys. But in those hymns, as (I think) in the Christian tradition generally, the vision of God is the Beatific Vision which is reserved for the future life. Thus in the eucharistic hymn Charles Wesley sings:

"Our needy souls sustain
With fresh supplies of love,
Till all Thy life we gain,
And all Thy fullness prove,
And, strengthened by Thy perfect grace,
Behold without a veil Thy face."

² *The Vision of God*, 1931.

³ *Literary History of the Religious Sentiment* (E. tr.), i. 398.

⁴ *Spirit and Truth*, Lutterworth Press, London, 1935.

Doctor Kirk (p. 465) uses the phrase, the "vision of God," not only for the Beatific Vision, but also for the knowledge of God which we may be granted in the present life. Thus he finely says:

"In every such contact with whatever is true and honorable and just and pure and lovely and of good report the true Christian tradition allows, and indeed constrains us to recognize the first traces of the vision of God. What Christianity offers, with its fellowship and sacraments, its life of prayer and service, its preaching of the Incarnate Son of God, is the same vision in ever-increasing plenitude; vouchsafed in such measure as will avail against the worst temptations, the deepest sorrows, the most ingrained self-seeking, and will give constant and daily increase of strength, encouragement and illumination."

Most of us in the evangelical tradition have been wont to call the knowledge of God granted to us in this earthly life as "experience," in the sense of consciousness or awareness. There is ample warrant in the long tradition for such an usage. Cassian, for example, frequently uses the word *experientia*. No one would wish to enter into a dispute about mere words. But if we are to avoid unnecessary confusion, some discussion of terms is demanded. When we look at the biblical evidence adduced by Doctor Kirk, we notice that the metaphor of "seeing God" is comparatively rare. On the other hand, in the sections on the Mystery Religions, Philo, the Hermetica, the metaphor is frequent. This is a fact that calls for further investigation.

In the Old Testament there are two different conceptions.⁵ (1) The first is that God's face cannot be seen. *And he said, thou canst not see my face: for man shall not see me and live.* The prayer of Moses to be shown the glory of God cannot be fully granted. *Thou shalt see my back: but my face cannot be seen.*⁶ It was a primitive conviction in Israel that no man could see the face of God and live.⁷ (2) But side by side with this we have various expressions which seem to claim that in this life man may see the face of God. These may be classified under two heads. (a) Certain privileged persons see God either in a theophany or in ecstasy, or by a special vision. Thus in the very chapter of Exodus (33. 11) where it is expressly stated that no man shall see the face of God, there comes the verse: *And the Lord spake unto Moses face to face, as a man speaketh with his friend.* This may be regarded as a convenient hyperbole,⁸ to be explained by the final clause of the sentence, and not likely to be misunder-

⁵ Baudissin, *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, xviii (1915), 188.

⁶ Exodus 33. 17-23.

⁷ Judges 13. 22. Isaiah 6. 5.

⁸ So Eichrodt, *Theologie des Alten Testaments* (1935), II, 13.

stood in Judaism. Isaiah, in his account of his call, says: *I saw the Lord*. This is probably to be interpreted as a supernatural ecstasy,⁹ and not merely a clothing in the language of a vision of an experience normally open to all men. (b) In some of the Psalms the phrase is used: "to see the face of God." Thus in Psalm 63. 2 the poet recalls in a dry and weary land how he visited the temple. *So I have looked upon thee in the sanctuary, to see thy power and thy glory*. Here the seeing of God is to be interpreted of the lofty experience of corporate worship.¹⁰ It is a metaphor for the sense of the presence of Yahweh which to the writer was mediated through the cultus. "To see the face of God" means "to visit the temple," or "to come to the sanctuary."¹¹

In the New Testament a profound distinction is drawn between the faith-experience which is possible in the present life, and the full vision of the life to come. This will repay further discussion.

The Pauline view is governed by the sentence in 2 Corinthians 5. 7. *We walk through a world of faith, not through a world of visible form*.¹² In the light of this sentence we must interpret the difficult passage in 2 Corinthians 3. 18: *We all with unveiled face reflecting as a mirror the glory of the Lord, are transformed*. Whether this means "reflecting as a mirror," or "beholding as in a mirror," there is no direct or "immediate" seeing of God. There is a medium, and an ancient mirror gave but a faulty and partial view. So in 1 Corinthians 13. 12: *Now we see in a mirror, in a riddle; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I have been known*. "It is very interesting," says Johannes Weiss,¹³ "that the mystic Paul, however highly he may estimate gnosis, regards that knowledge as only partial, as a seeing in a mirror. There his eschatological conviction, which is wanting in Philo, breaks in. God at the end of the age will reveal himself face to face. Thereby the highest mystical vision of God will be transcended and made obsolete."

In the Epistle to the Hebrews (12. 14) we are bidden to make common cause with our fellow Christians in the pursuit of peace, and that "*holiness without which no man shall see the Lord*." In the light of 9. 28, which

⁹ Hans Schmidt, *Die grossen Propheten* (1923), 27.

¹⁰ Cf. Gunkel, *Die Psalmen* (1925), 113, 268; Baudissin, *loc. cit.*, 181; Duhm, *Psalmen* (1899), 123.

¹¹ Eichrodt, *Theologie des Alten Testaments*, II, 12.

¹² The meaning of *εἶδος* here is difficult. If it is translated as above, with Plummer (*J. C. C.* 151), the reference will be to the form which believers will have in the world to come: Kittel, *Theol. Wörterbuch* (1934), II, 372; Windisch, *Der Zweite Korintherbrief* (1924), 167.

¹³ *Der erste Korintherbrief* (1910), 319.

speaks of the appearing of Christ a second time for their salvation, to those who wait for Him, this must refer not to present communion but to the age to come.¹⁴

The Prologue to the Fourth Gospel ends with the Hebraic affirmation: *No man hath seen God at any time.* Surely this means more than that "God is invisible to the bodily eye."¹⁵ The evangelist is asserting that man cannot have direct and "immediate" knowledge of God in this earthly life, but God can be known through One who is in vital fellowship both with God and with man.¹⁶ In the First Epistle, the Johannine writer says: *We know that if he shall be manifested we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is.* It is certain that this manifestation is for the age to come. So in John 5. 37, the Lord says: *The Father which sent me, he hath borne witness of me. Ye have neither heard his voice at any time, nor seen his form.* On the other side there are passages which use the metaphor of seeing, but always with reference to the sight of Jesus in the days of His flesh. The cautiously worded first sentence of the First Epistle: *that which we have seen . . . concerning the word of life*—most naturally means the sight of Jesus, and the revelation of life. The other passages are John 14. 9: *He that hath seen me hath seen the Father*; John 12. 45: *He who seeth me, seeth him that sent me.* This spiritual vision of the revelation of God through Jesus is not to be identified with the full vision of God. But the "intent, patient, progressive contemplation of Christ"¹⁷ leads to the fuller knowledge which can only be given in the age to come.

One of the later passages in the New Testament (1 Timothy 6. 15, 16) well expresses the thought of God which governs the cautious language of all the writers: *Until the appearing of our Lord Jesus Christ, which in his own times he shall show, who is the blessed and only Potentate, the King of kings, and Lord of lords; who only hath immortality, dwelling in light unapproachable, whom no man hath seen nor can see.* George Foot Moore (*Judaism*, I, 431) has pointed out that corresponding expressions are frequent in the rabbinical literature.

I have left to the last the great Beatitude: *Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.* In the light of the foregoing investigation

¹⁴ The passages quoted in Kennedy, *Philo's Contribution to Religion* (1919), 192-210, bear a different sense from that of the passage in Hebrews. Hence I venture to differ from Moffatt, *Hebrews* (1924), 209, and follow Westcott, *Ep. Hebrews* (1889), 406.

¹⁵ Bernard (*I. C. C.* 1928), 30.

¹⁶ Westcott, *St. John* (1908), 14.

¹⁷ Westcott, *St. John*, 186.

we are almost certainly justified in interpreting the vision eschatologically, of the age to come. The numerous passages from the rabbinical literature collected by Strack-Billerbeck fortify this conclusion.

The way is now clear for us to advance to certain statements as to the nature of the Vision of God, the goal of Christian living.

I. In the first place, it is only given in its fullness in eternity. Our religion is out of focus unless its consummation is in the life beyond.

"Our blessedness, our being's heart and home,
Is with eternity, and only there."

It is strange that so devout a philosopher as Professor John Macmurray does not see that an essential element in Christian spirituality is its other-worldliness. In his latest book, *Reason and Emotion*, he describes mature religion as religion which will have purged out other-worldly elements. It is true that too often the other-worldly element in Christianity has been used as a way of escape from the tasks of the present. It is possible to misuse the truth of Charles Wesley's lines:

"Strangers and pilgrims here below,
This world, we know, is not our place."

But if the life to come is a fact, that fact will dominate the present, will help to determine conduct now and illuminate time with the white radiance of eternity. All merely humanist or naturalist ethics are weighed in the balances and found wanting, if this life on earth be a preparation for the vision of the holy God in heaven. Twenty years ago Lionel Thornton, one of our brilliant younger Anglican theologians of Cambridge, wrote a book *Conduct and the Supernatural*, examining the views of Nietzsche, H. G. Wells, G. Bernard Shaw, and other modern writers. He rightly singles out the "Other-worldly Principle" as essential and controlling in Christian ethics. "Morality, secularized and destitute of any eternal import, becomes a mere culture of this world." "For Christians the end is holiness, blessedness, a state of perfect communion with God." If man's chief end is to glorify God and to enjoy Him for ever, man's primary obligation here below is to surrender himself to the divine rule, which is the rule of love.

We must add to Mr. Thornton's analysis the reinforcement which comes from recent investigations into the meaning of the divine kingdom or kingly rule of God in the Gospels. That rule was eschatologically conceived. It embraced all life and all history. God's rule according to

Judaism was eternal. But it would only be fully manifested at the end of the age. The message of Jesus was that God's victory was already being won, that the new age was at hand. Already He was offering some of the spiritual benefits which in the prophets of Israel were associated with the Messianic age. Forgiveness of sins, a present communion with God, victory over the powers of evil, a new ideal to be realized by a new supernatural power—these were already His to give. But the full vision was for the pure in heart in the life beyond.

II. In the second place the goal of Christian living in this life is only to be attained by communion with God. This offer of a personal walk with God is His own gift, and involves on our part a faith-relationship.

The relationship with God, according to the writers of the New Testament, is communion, not union; fellowship, not deification or apotheosis. "When we open the New Testament we find ourselves in presence of a glowing religious life," said James Denney. "The soul which in contemporary literature is bound in shallows and in miseries is here raised as on a great tidal wave of spiritual blessing. Nothing that belongs to a complete religious life is wanting, neither convictions nor motives, neither penitence nor ideals, neither vocation nor the assurance of victory." All these are promised to those who live in communion with God through Christ. In these occasional writings of the first century we see language almost breaking down in the endeavor to describe what the Christian has found in Christ. As Dr. W. R. Maltby, in his own whimsical way, once said of Saint Paul: "Every preposition which can suggest relations between persons is used to describe the relations between Christ and the believer, and in the end every preposition is overworked, breathless, and strained at the joints." But even then, amid metaphors like *Christ in you*, or the believer is *in Christ*, the metaphors of union do not occur as they do in the classical mystics. The nearest approach to such a metaphor only proves how far New Testament spirituality is removed from the metaphor of being "oned" with God. Saint Paul, in one of his most exalted and impassioned utterances, cries out: *I have been crucified with Christ, and yet I live, and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me*. Can he be held back from claiming complete union with Christ? Yes, the next sentence is revealing. *And the life that I now live in the flesh I live in faith, faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself up for me*. In this relationship, so inconceiv-

ably intimate, Paul, though crucified, lives a life in the body. Paul is still Paul, though a new creation, and Christ is the Son of God. Paul is the saved and Christ is the Saviour. The relationship is one of faith.

We may, if we like, call this experience "mystical." But we should remember that it was so just as the experience of personal relations at its best is always mystical. The expression of a pure and passionate affection is the most difficult achievement of language. There is something in the meeting of spirit with spirit which defies words. But the miracle of the New Testament is that language is found; the experience itself is communicated in intelligible words. The "mystery" is revealed.

III. The third characteristic of the normal Christian experience in the present world is that the communion with God is mediated and not immediate, and therefore can be found, not in retreat from the visible and tangible, but in ordinary human life. This principle of Christian spirituality should follow naturally from a true doctrine of the Incarnation, but for centuries it has been neglected or obscured.

The normal Christian experience is not by way of visions. Saint Paul apparently had his own visions and revelations of the Lord. But it is only under extreme provocation that he is brought to speak of them. He recognizes that they are not for all. Perhaps it is this recognition that makes the word "vision" infrequent in early Christian literature. As we have seen, the metaphor of "seeing God" is hardly used at all in the New Testament for the experience open to Christians in the present life. The word *ὁρασία* is used four times in the New Testament, the word *οραμα* oftener, but both are always used of some abnormal spiritual revelation. The same use is found in the Apostolic Fathers and in the works of Justin Martyr. Irenaeus applies the metaphor of vision to the communion with God in the present life, in a famous sentence, *Vita hominis visio Dei*, but his use of the metaphor is far less frequent than might be expected, and he is careful to distinguish the visions of the prophets from the vision of God in Christ, and both from the beatific vision in the kingdom of heaven. So in the sixteenth century a great mystic like Saint John of the Cross is highly suspicious of visions unless they are the visions of the prophets or apostles.

Again, the normal Christian experience is not by way of detachment. Since the time of Origen and Saint Augustine, and under the influence of Neoplatonism, the goal of the Christian life has been conceived as attain-

able only by banishing all thoughts of this world, all images of temporal things, by an intellectual effort whose aim is the ultimate silencing of all the powers of the mind. So the soul may reach a state where even the thought of the Incarnation can profitably be left behind. Both Saint Augustine and Saint Bernard, as well as many mystics after them, take this view. Professor Karl Heim¹⁸ is of the opinion that such a picture of the goal still belongs to the inmost nature of Roman Catholic piety.

Set over against such a view of the soul's progress the authentic way of the New Testament writers. It is better described by James Reid,¹⁹ the Presbyterian Christian of the twentieth century, than by Saint Augustine, the Neoplatonic Christian of the fifth.

"We want people to come to God, but they do not come to God in general. They come through the sharp challenge with the call of God in it that is meeting them in daily life, or through some decision in practical things which throws open the choice between the darkness and the light. It is not a bit of use talking to people of a God who is in the skies or a God who is in a book, or even a God who is in their own hearts. That may be sheer unreality though it is true, of course, that God is in their own hearts. He is in their experience of life and its inward reactions, or He is nowhere for them."

This is the goal of this life, our destiny—to take the common things of life and walk humbly among them. And for the Christian the supreme crisis comes from the challenge of sin. In the heart of that crisis he may meet the Redeemer and find himself victorious by the grace of God.²⁰

IV. In the fourth place the goal of spirituality in this life is reached through suffering.

This is, of course, a necessary corollary to our third principle. If God is to be found in daily life, he is to be found in the pain of it, the grief of it. Being what we are there is no pain in the meeting. The classical mystics have held fast to a genuine New Testament principle in their insistence on the necessity of the purification of the natural man. The primary function of religion is not the consoling of the natural man as it finds him, but his cleansing. Such purifying can only come by effecting a cleavage and contrast between his bad false self, and his good true self. The saint who has

¹⁸ *Spirit and Truth* (E. tr. 1935), 105-108.

¹⁹ *In Quest of Reality*, 95.

²⁰ Karl Heim, *op. cit.*, ch. vii.

effected this cleavage may seem exceptional because he is rare, but in reality he is supremely normal. He embodies in an exceptional degree the deepest longings of us all. But the attainment of that normal life is impossible without suffering. Canon Lilley²¹ has pointed out that the most careful Christian tradition "has most consistently taught that the true attitude of prayer always includes a simple and even joyful acceptance of all the unavoidable pains and disabilities of our lives, as, if so accepted, richly ministrant and contributory to our spiritual growth. In other words, it has planted the cross at the heart and center of the prayer life." God's strength is made perfect in our weakness.

V. The fifth characteristic of the Christian goal in the present life is victory. *We are more than conquerors through him that loved us.* The victory won by Christ is reflected in the Christian consciousness. One of the fruits of the Spirit is joy.

It is worth detaching that characteristic for the moment if only to observe what an incomparable engine for moral progress it is. The New Testament writers take it for granted that their readers know what the Christian joy is. It enabled them to face the world with God on their side. They were able to look quietly at life and death and feel themselves in some sense above them both. This note is closely connected with the consciousness of belonging to a supernatural order. Even the satirist Lucian in the second century observes that these poor wretches have persuaded themselves that they are immortal and will live for ever, and connects with that conviction their utter self-devotion and steadiness at the prospect of death. The Christians had quietly annexed the whole continent of the other life. They were confident that nothing in time or eternity could separate them from the grasp in which they were held. In a word, they were victorious. Even sin had lost its power.

I have ventured to describe the "Vision of God" by using the word "experience" in preference to the metaphor of "seeing" God. Professor Kirk prefers the metaphor, but I think that there is no essential difference between the main conclusions of his work, and the principles barely outlined above. In the problem which remains, he follows recent writers, among them Garrigou-Lagrange and Henri Brémond, in maintaining a conclusion which we shall reach by another route.

Is this experience of God for everyone? This is another setting of

²¹ *Prayer in Christian Theology* (1925), 8.

the practical problem which confronted the preaching of evangelical religion in the eighteenth century. Can a man know that his sins are forgiven? The question was triumphantly answered by the Wesleys. But the old doubt now emerges in a new form. Men are infinitely various in temperament, it is said. And some men's temperaments are not religious. Communion with God is surely not for them. It is highly doubtful whether so gifted a religious thinker as Dean Inge really believes that anything like the message of the New Testament can really be received by most human beings. He writes that there are "good men and women who live ever in their great Taskmaster's eye, whose religion is a matter of duty and obedience, rather than of love and communing with God." Perhaps there is a false antithesis concealed in this sentence. Surely the offering of duty and obedience is a real act of communion with God. Through those daily acts of doing the Father's will, there is a conscious avowal of his presence to accept and to approve. But Dean Inge quotes Spinoza's conclusion that "all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare," and he adds: "A greater than Spinoza's does not encourage us to expect ever to see the larger crowd collected round the narrow gate."

To many a Christian this attitude must present itself as a temptation rather than as an answer to a problem. It uses a cry of our Lord as a pillow of acquiescence. It involves two difficulties at least: a low view of the capacity of human nature which we have good authority for believing was created by God "in the image of God"; and an implicit denial of the universality of the New Testament message. But the strength of such a view maintaining that communion with God is a privilege of the few, lies in the facts. Only a few at any period of time have ever entered into that privilege. Today the obstacles in the way of all evangelistic work seem so massive and insuperable that it is hard for any adherent of the evangelical tradition to hold to his conviction that the great secret is meant for all.

Our answer must rest, first, on the Christian revelation of God; second, on the nature of the response expected from the individual soul; third, on the possibility of offering all the activities of life and every relationship to God.

(1) The first Christian creed is *Abba, Father*. There can be little doubt that this goes back to Jesus Himself. The most radical critics do not hesitate to ascribe to Jesus the chief part of the Lord's Prayer. Even

Bultmann (*Jesus and the Word*, E. tr., 1935, p. 180) says that at least that prayer must be characteristic of Him. The word Father is enough for us. Jesus deliberately gave us as an image of God's dealing with us the picture of the best of earthly fathers with his child. What becomes of the view of "temperament" as disqualifying any human being from a love-relationship, a filial relationship with God? Suppose that a child by some mysterious defect of nature is born deranged, so that he is incapable of recognizing his father, or of trusting his father in any act of life. Whenever that fatality occurs in human life, it constitutes an intractable problem on any view of God. But it is not our business at the moment to attempt any solution of the problem of suffering. The point is that everyone recognizes abnormality and derangement in any child born incapable of recognizing a father's love. On the Christian view, every human being who cannot trust the heavenly Father is missing the secret of life. Are we to claim that the majority of human beings are temperamentally incapable of any such trust? Ultimately this contention is fatal to the truth of the Christian revelation of God. It is irrelevant to the argument that the majority of human beings are apparently missing their birthright, though it is not an irrelevant fact for the missionary or for any follower of our Lord. One tragedy of the Church is that so many who have left the far country are content to be hired servants when they might live at home as sons.

(2) The one response to the Christian revelation is faith. Faith is the human trust in the divine offer of communion which is ready every moment. And all men are capable of faith.

Jesus expects this faith. He upbraided His friends for the lack of it. All life in human society presupposes trust in one another. Even if that trust is often misplaced, the veriest cynic is forced to go on exercising faith. Now Christianity asserts that this inevitable faith may be raised to a higher plane through the committal of a life to God. Religion always comes to us through faith in good men and women. Professor H. R. Mackintosh quotes General Booth as saying that the first vital step in saving outcasts consists in making them feel that some decent human being cares enough for them to take an interest in the question whether they rise or sink. "Their faith in man has to be quickened; faith in God flowers out of that." What is true of moral outcasts is true of ourselves. Trust in a heavenly Father is the same attitude of mind as trust in friends. Only the object of that faith is different.

The next step in the argument is that it is the very nature of faith to be incarnate in an act. Our faith in the compiler of a time-table is shown by appearing at the station by the appointed time. Those who say they are men of a practical, not a mystical, temperament, are confuted at every turn. "Every day you have to make decisions, to do things. Could you not make those decisions and carry out those acts trusting in the Unseen Power to guide or overrule your plans and deeds? That would be religious experience. That is faith. And if the acts came from a genuine motive, that would be faith working by love."

A third characteristic of faith is that it is not merely one unbroken act; it is a succession of acts. Hence the Christian ideal is a "moment-by-moment" holiness. At any moment you may cease to trust God. There is no mechanical means, apart from faith, for keeping life permanently on that higher level. So we are not to think of Christian experience as a state. It is a succession of acts expressing the new God-given attitude of faith.

(3) The goal of Christian living is to meet God everywhere, to find in every happening of life an opportunity of fellowship. Surely this means that communion with God may be for all. The very comprehensiveness of the Christian experience argues that everyone is capable of it.

Toward the end of his noble book, Professor Kirk discusses the discord of the two ideals of "worship" and service. Undoubtedly he is right in his stress on the primacy of worship. But worship ought not to be regarded as one of two co-ordinate ends. It is the all-inclusive end. All the service of our fellows must be viewed in the light of it. If the goal of all life is the Vision of God, all our service of others is incomplete and transitory unless we include in our ideal the supreme service of manifesting to them the might of God. This was Archbishop Söderblom's definition of the saint: the man who manifests the might of God. It is the distinction of the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation that the divine might can be manifested in a completely human life amid all the ordinary happenings and encounters of human fellowship. The same distinction belongs to the Christian doctrine of holiness. It is to be wrought out, not in escape from human life, but in the heart of human life. Amid the actions and sufferings of mortal beings the redeeming might is manifested, and God is met and known by mortal men. Because this Christian experience is a real experience of a Divine Redeemer, it has right and it has might to rule the world.

The Attack Upon the Social Gospel

H. RICHARD NIEBUHR

THE question of the Social Gospel is explicitly or implicitly involved in a great deal of the contemporary theological and religious discussion. To exponents of the "application of Christianity" to social problems the new movements—neo-Protestant or Barthian, neo-Evangelical or Buchmanite and neo-Catholic or Anglo-Catholic—appear to be retreats from the battlefield of social life back to the line of individualistic and other-worldly Christianity. They believe that those who are influenced by these movements intend to give up the endeavor to influence group behavior as impossible in a world lost in sin or to devote themselves to the cultivation of a spiritual life in quietist isolation from a confusing civilization. Representatives of the post-liberal movements, on the other hand, are inclined to speak of the Social Gospel as though it were the epitome of all those humanistic, melioristic and anti-revolutionary tendencies in modernist religion against which they protest. They think of the Social Gospel as a message of self-help, as an optimistic faith that men can enter the kingdom of God without profound revolution, as the expression of cultural Protestantism which is more interested in civilization and its improvement than in God's judgment and love. Very important issues are at stake and it will not do to attempt a superficial synthesis of ideas which are antithetical, yet it seems to the present writer that the issues are still confused and that the debate may become more fruitful if certain distinctions are made. Above all else it seems that the issue of the objective should be distinguished from the issue of the means. The first question is whether the individual or society is the proper object of Christianity's mission; the second, whether the Church is to employ direct or indirect means.

I

The Social Gospel is characterized by the conviction that social units of every sort are the primary human realities to which the Church ought to address itself, or that, in dealing with individuals, not the isolated soul but the social individual—the citizen, class-member, race-member—should be regarded as the being who is in need of redemption. In this respect it is

the heir of sociological science rather than of liberal philosophy. It rejects the doctrine of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century liberalism which proclaimed with Bentham that "the community is a fictitious body" and which regarded all societies as based upon contracts into which independent individuals entered for the sake of promoting common interests. However true this liberalism may have been of a period in which new societies were being established, the Social Gospel has noted that it is not true of our time. Now, at least, society appears to precede the individual, to mold his character, to determine his interests, to bestow rights upon him. The individual is what he is by virtue of the place in society which he occupies; or, if this is too extreme a statement, the interaction between society and individual is such that an interpretation which always makes the individual the first term is manifestly wrong. The Social Gospel has seen sin and righteousness as characteristics of group life; it has noted that vicarious suffering is laid upon group for group rather than upon individual for individual; it has seen the problem of salvation as a social problem and it has worked for the conversion or "change" of societies rather than of individuals who, no matter how much they may be changed, yet remain bound by common social evils and participants in common social sin.

This social interest of the Social Gospel is as pertinent to our time as the individualist gospel was to the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In that earlier period Christianity confronted individuals who had been emancipated from political, ecclesiastical and economic bonds, who had sometimes also—as in the case of the American frontiers—been freed from the restraint which popular mores had imposed upon them. These emancipated individuals not only became perilous to one another but were in danger of losing significance from lives which had become ends-in-themselves. The bases of a new common life needed to be laid; the individual needed to be related to a source of meaning which transcended his particular desires and his selfhood; he needed to be given an inner discipline which would direct his new freedom; those who had become victims of the free egotism of others needed to be rescued from despair and its consequences. How well Evangelicalism (Methodism, Pietism, the American revival movement) met these problems, how splendidly it succeeded in supplying inner discipline in place of vanished external restraints, how effectively it related lives to a transcendent God, how genuinely it gave new faith, courage and zest to suppressed individuals—these facts are fre-

quently overlooked by men who regard the whole individualistic movement as an error which might have been avoided, or who note that the Evangelical answer no longer suffices in an age which poses a different problem. But it is possible to give all due credit to the effectiveness of the individualistic gospel without maintaining that it is adequate for our day.

It is true that every person has interests, problems and responsibilities as a self which is directly related to God; no full presentation of the gospel can ever leave these out of account. Yet it seems evident that in our time the doom and the salvation, the creation, sin and redemption with which men are concerned are social rather than individual in character. The emancipated individuals of our day are the societies, the races and classes which have made themselves laws to themselves; which commit crimes against other classes, races and nations and believe they will go unpunished; which suffer injustice and suppression as groups; which are faced with the problem of their own futility and emptiness. It is in this area that the reality of sin and hell, and the necessity of salvation have become most apparent. In that sense the modern situation is more like that of the Hebrew nation in the time of the prophets than like that of eighteenth-century individuals. The question of personal salvation is important but, as in the whole of Hebrew history, it is secondary to the question of social salvation. It is true that in this situation much can be done for men as independent individuals, and the Oxford Group movement has demonstrated something of the possibilities. But insofar as this movement deals with persons as the primary factors and tends to overlook the fact that the amount of honesty, purity and love which persons can exercise while they participate in the dishonesties, impurities and hatefulness of capitalism, nationalism and racialism is very limited, it will continue to be regarded with many reservations not only by exponents of the Social Gospel but by all who see the problem of society as the problem of the day. But it may be that this movement will not remain as individualistic as it now appears to be, while there is nothing in either neo-Protestantism or in neo-Catholicism which is inimical to the social approach. On the contrary the exponents of these movements may claim with considerable right that their return to sixteenth- and thirteenth-century modes of thought is due precisely to the necessity of overcoming the individualism of the more recent past. After all, both Catholics and Protestants were interested in the conversion of societies, in the ordering of social life, in the fate not only of men but

of humanity. It is certainly true that both neo-Protestants and neo-Catholics have a far more social conception of the Church than many even of those who represent the Social Gospel in its liberal form, for whom the Church remains too often a contract society. And both of these groups with their orthodox conceptions of original sin, of historic revelation, of general judgment and of the salvation of mankind are operating with ideas which have direct relevance to men's existence as members of mankind and its societies. Doubtless these ideas will need to be rethought, but there is nothing individualistic about them, and those who believe that in them the solution to the human problem is to be found not only can but must participate in the social direction of the Social Gospel.

II

It is at the point of the second issue that the real divergence of the day is to be sought. The Social Gospel has been directed not only toward the changing of social entities but it has largely sought to accomplish this end by indirect means, and by way of self-help. The means which it has employed are indirect from the religious point of view. It has used political and economic means to gain the end. Its exponents have sought to influence legislatures to enact laws, schools to teach attitudes, political parties to adopt programs. Or it has sought to work through the labor movement, using economic means for the purpose of changing society. It has worked for international peace by trying to influence governments to adopt treaties or by writing to congressmen with requests to vote for this or that law. Such measures are doubtless good in their place but as used by the church they represent the strategy of indirect action. They are not only efforts to get some other organization to do something about the intolerable situation but also presuppose the convictions that religion as such has no direct bearing on social life, that prophetic and Christian analysis of the situation with corresponding direct religious action are unimportant and that the analysis of society in terms of its political and economic arrangements is fundamental.

In the second place the strategy of the Social Gospel has largely been a strategy of self-salvation, or of salvation by works. It has tended to speak of social salvation as something which men could accomplish for themselves if only they adopted the right social ideal, found adequate motivation for achieving it and accepted the correct technical means. The social ideal has been regarded as the product of men's independent ethical insight, the

knowledge of correct means as the product of social science, and religion has been looked to for the motivation. God, in this theory, becomes a means to an end; he is there for the sake of achieving a human ideal and he does not do even this directly but only through the inspiration which he offers to those who worship him. The failure of this whole scheme of social salvation has driven many Social Gospel advocates to look for non-religious motivation in the self-interest of classes or races, in which case even the last vestige of a religious strategy has been given up.

It is against this indirect, self-help strategy, rather than against the social objective of the Social Gospel, that the major protest of the day is being made. There are significant differences, of course, between neo-Protestant and neo-Catholic movements, but they seem to agree in this: that whatever place be given to the indirect strategy the primary attack of Christianity upon the social situation or the social individual must be direct, not via governments and economic units, but via the Church or the word of God. They agree in the second place in regarding salvation, whether social or individual, as a divine process, not as something man can achieve by moralistic means.

From the neo-Protestant point of view the strategy of the Social Gospel rests upon a false analysis of the social situation, and the false strategy results from this false analysis. A true analysis will see that our social injustice and misery cannot be dealt with unless their sources in a false faith are dealt with. So long as the faith of man remains "capitalistic," that is, a faith in the security which can be given economically, so long the profit-system and the system of private property cannot be budged. So long as any sort of this-worldly security remains the object of confidence our nationalisms and mammonisms will flourish. Both just and unjust live by faith, though by different kinds of faith, and our social no less than our individual lives are an expression of these faiths. From the neo-Protestant point of view repentance for the *sins* of social life is not enough; there needs to be repentance for the *sin*, for the false faith, for the idolatry which issues in all these sins. Men will be ready for no radically new life until they have really become aware of the falsity of the faith upon which their old life is based. But an attack upon faith requires the direct action of the Church rather than indirect action.

In the second place neo-Protestantism's analysis of the situation in which social groups live runs counter to the analysis upon which the doc-

trine of self-salvation is based. The Social Gospel is related to the neo-Protestant movement somewhat as Utopian Socialism is related to Marxism. Utopianism also believed in the saving power of the ideal, motivated by sympathy and love of the good. Whatever the quarrels may be between "deterministic" and "synergistic" Marxians they all recognize the priority of the historic process to which the party must adjust itself; Marxian salvation at least is not self-salvation. In another sphere, with a far more profound analysis of the total situation than Marxism offers, neo-Protestantism would base its strategy on the priority of God—not as a human ideal, or the object of worship, but as the moving force in history—who alone brings in His kingdom and to whose ways the party of the Kingdom of God on earth must adjust itself. But strangely enough the Social Gospel, when it recognizes the inadequacy of Utopianism, tends to accept Marxist rather than Christian determinism as offering the correct analysis.

The strategy toward which neo-Protestantism is feeling its way is not only the direct strategy which attacks false faith and proclaims true faith, or the strategy of action corresponding to the way of God in history as revealed in the event Jesus Christ, but for both of these reasons it is also a revolutionary strategy, which regards the death of the old life as inevitable and as necessary before a new beginning can be made.

Our interest here, however, is not that of trying to set forth the strategy of an orthodox Christianity which is thoroughly alive to the problem of the day. The development of this strategy still lies in the future. The question is rather whether such a strategy does not need to be developed. The issue between the Social Gospel and the new movements lies here, not at the point of social versus individual salvation.

The present situation may be compared to that which existed at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The rationalist effort to deal with the problem of emancipated individual life in terms of moral self-salvation and by means of indirect and melioristic action through education and reason failed. Then came the direct, revolutionary Evangelical approach based upon a theory of salvation in which—whatever the differences between Calvinists and Arminians—the adjustment of human ways to the way of God as revealed in Jesus Christ was demanded. The new movements in Christianity, it seems to the present writer, must not be interpreted as reactions to Evangelical individualism, but as efforts to discover in our own day the social equivalent of the Evangelical strategy.

The Ministry of Error

H. WHEELER ROBINSON

CAN error have utility at all? John Morley, in his well-known book on *Compromise*, denies this: "Erroneous opinion or belief," he says, "in itself and as such, can never be useful" (p. 45), though "errors in opinion and motive . . . are inevitable elements in human growth" (p. 65). He is arguing chiefly against the position of a supposedly enlightened minority which is content to leave the majority in error for their own good. With that application of his argument there need be no quarrel; the position could hardly be taken by a genuine lover of truth. But Morley himself admits in regard to error (1) "the possible expediency of leaving it temporarily undisturbed" (p. 47) and (2) "the abundant instances in history in which it has seemed to be a stepping-stone to truth" (p. 59), though he would explain these away by reference to the truth latent in the error. Do not such admissions really point beyond themselves, and can such hard-and-fast distinctions of truth and error ever be more than pure theory, unrelated to the life we know and share? Where is the absolute standard by which such contemporary distinction can be made? Morley's argument, however sound as a rebuke of cynical indifference to truth, seems to ignore the service to man's historical development rendered by all those religious ideas and institutions which a subsequent generation may come to call error. We do better to recognize what Lord Acton called "The mysterious property of the mind by which error ministers to truth, and truth slowly but irrevocably prevails." To hold this is not to compromise with error, but to acknowledge the fact of its ministry, as when Mary Slessor was converted by a belief in the physical fires of hell which few would share today, and which she herself outgrew.

I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION INVOLVES ERROR

If we accept the principle of historical development at all, we must admit the universality of error. Historical development implies degrees of truth at successive stages of the development. But degrees of truth are only the other side of degrees of error, and partial truth may itself mislead by its partiality. Even if a religion claims to start with a deposit of abso-

lute truth given through Moses or Christ or Muhammad, the truth given must be historically apprehended. It is significant that all three religions have found it necessary to formulate a theory of oral tradition, to adjust the fixity of the "absolute" truth to the developing need of successive generations. But partially apprehended truth means partial error. John Robinson's farewell words to the Pilgrim Fathers of the *Mayflower* are often quoted, though not always correctly; he was very confident, reports Winslow, "the Lord had more truth and light yet to break forth out of his holy Word." That was a prospective admonition to keep an open mind as to new and truer interpretations of Scripture; but obviously it has a retrospective application, and implies error in the past. For all who interpret the Bible historically, it suggests that error will be mingled with truth all along the line of its growth. We cannot, for example, dismiss Jephthah's vow in the manner of a minister to whom as a boy I once referred it; "It teaches us," he said, "not to make rash vows." We must face the issue that what was wrong for a subsequent age was right for Jephthah from the standpoint of his age, and that his sacrifice of his daughter illustrates the ministry of error to religion.

The relativity of truth in its historical growth may be illustrated by the *lex talionis*. In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus condemns it without any qualification. But the *lex talionis* of the book of the Covenant (Exodus 21. 24) itself marks a great advance in social morality over the unrestrained blood-revenge of the desert, reflected in Lamech's barbaric song. In many instances the development consists not in the gradual restraint of an evil, such as that of unrestricted revenge, but in the gradual liberation of a truth from some accompanying error, which served as its matrix. An example may be found in the sense of corporate personality which extends so widely in the ancient world, and is illustrated in the Old Testament by the fate of Achan's family. The growth of the idea of individual responsibility which may be seen in Jeremiah and Ezekiel ultimately led to the rejection of the old idea of the group; yet the group idea itself expressed, however imperfectly, that sense of social solidarity which our modern individualism has had to rediscover for itself. Indeed, it may be said that all our conceptions of truth have this accompaniment of error. Error is like the alloy in Browning's figure of the ring which he applies to the story of "The Ring and the Book"; the pure gold of fact in the ancient story is worked up by the alloy of his imaginative construction of the events into a finer shape and

a fuller beauty. The alloy of error is an inevitable and constant factor in the whole process of the development of truth, theoretical or practical, because of the very nature of the time-process.

Another aspect of our many-sided theme is seen in the disparate development of religion and ethics. We need not consider the frequent existence of a high grade of religion in association with a low grade of morality. The great line of development seen in the Bible has so associated religion and ethics that we almost instinctively measure the worth of a religion by its ethical products. But the other combination does concern us—that of a relatively low complex of religious ideas in association with a relatively high grade of morality. Here we readily recognize the practical worth of the religious reaction as a whole, even though it seems to us to be based on erroneous ideas of religion; we admit that the spirit is right though the form of its conception may be wrong. The Osiris myth of ancient Egypt is clearly the personification of a nature-cult directed to the Nile; yet that myth is the cradle of a great ethical development, and Osiris, in the course of many centuries, becomes the great moral judge of men. The companion myth of the Sun-god is even more obviously rooted in primitive conceptions of nature; yet we know to what lofty heights of religious faith the worship of Aton could bring a Pharaoh, making his hymn the probable source of the 104th Psalm. We are not likely to accept the faith of Muhammad that the angel Gabriel dictated to him the suras of the Kur'an; yet we cannot doubt the ethical truth of the eightieth sura, where the prophet acknowledges the divine rebuke for his rough treatment of a blind man seeking instruction, while he was engaged in conversation with one of the chiefs of the Kureisch.

II. PARTICULAR CONTRIBUTIONS OF ERROR TO RELIGION

So far we have merely illustrated the universal presence of error as a concomitant of growth into religious and moral truth. We have now to consider more precisely the kind of service rendered by error to religion and morality. Three aspects of this may be distinguished, namely, the sharpening of the intellectual apprehension and definition of truth, the moral discipline and social progress through conflict with error, and the pedagogic value of beneficent illusion.

(1) Lord Acton once wrote of the need for the student to get the inner point of view of ancient systems of thought. That applies equally to

the work of the teacher and preacher of a religion. He must himself feel the force and strength of the error he would replace by the truth he himself holds. A good illustration of this is supplied by George Fox, who was once tempted to believe that all things come by nature without God. Later on he saw the value of the experience when facing some who held that view. In the whole development of doctrine, it is a commonplace to note how much the heretics have contributed to that which afterward was recognized as truth; the prophets of Israel are among the most obvious examples. But heresy has contributed to truth in less direct ways, even while remaining heresy in the subsequent judgment of men. Whatever the Christian theologian of today may think of the Chalcedonian definition and of its positive contribution to a Christology, it is clear that the clash with views there rejected did define the issue and so far advance the truth. Even a theologian of such broad sympathies as Schleiermacher recognizes the great value of negative definition in the pursuit of truth. In an early section of *Der Christliche Glaube* (par. 22), he describes four heresies—the Docetic and the Ebionite, the Manichæan and the Pelagian—as virtually exhaustive of the possibilities, and as forming limiting ideas in regard to Christology. The first pair, the Docetic and the Ebionite, represent the exclusive emphasis on the divine and on the human respectively in the Person of Christ; the second pair, the Manichæan and the Pelagian, represent human nature either as beyond salvation or as able to save itself; a true statement of the Christian faith must avoid all these extremes which rule out either a Saviour or salvation. The positive value of a faith is seen by the negatives that would take away its foundations.

(2) The second contribution of error worthy of notice is through the struggle which it forces on truth both to discover and to maintain itself. The value of this moral discipline is clearly independent of the precise issues:

"Rightly to be great
Is not to stir without great argument,
But greatly to find quarrel in a straw,
When honor's at the stake."

(*Hamlet*, IV. 4)

It is sufficient, so far as moral discipline goes, that men should stand for that which they hold to be truth against that which they hold to be error. But clearly the assimilation of truth, the effort and struggle to make it ours,

are essential to all progress in religious truth. This is the law of life which the biologist finds working everywhere. The struggle to survive has again and again led to the evolution of new capacities and attainments. The same law surely holds of life on its higher levels. It is recognized in the New Testament, when Paul says to the Corinthians (1 Corinthians 11. 19): "There must also be heresies among you, that they which are approved may be made manifest among you." Aquinas comments on this passage (Summa, II. 2, Qu. XI. ad 2) that this gain to the faithful is not to be reckoned to the heretics since it is far from their intention. But it *is* a gain, as we may see repeatedly in the history of the Church—in its ancient clash with Gnosticism, or in the Counter-Reformation within Catholicism which was provoked by the Reformation.

It must not be thought, however, that the moral discipline of the individual or the group comes simply through the clash of parties or institutions in Church or State. This might serve merely to buttress prejudice or to arouse the worst passions of men. No small part of the moral discipline comes through the disguise of error through which the truth must be recognized. This is the contribution so finely set forth in Browning's "A Death in the Desert," where it is suggested that the certainty of truth in the first disciples of Jesus has been replaced by the challenge of subsequent uncertainty in order that truth might be sought and loved for its own sake, and maintained by a personal struggle which guaranteed its quality:

"truth, deadened of its absolute blaze,
Might need love's eye to pierce the o'er-stretched doubt."

"God's gift was that man should conceive of truth
And yearn to gain it, catching at mistake,
As midway help till he reach fact indeed."

(3) The quotation just made introduces a third aspect of the contribution of error to religion, namely, that there may be a pedagogic value in error, a beneficent illusion. Frederic William Robertson has a notable sermon on "The Illusiveness of Life," based on Abraham's unfulfilled expectation of the possession of Canaan. He illustrates the illusiveness of life by the way in which we are deceived by our senses in regard to distance, shape and color of objects, the anticipations of life unfulfilled in its course, the eschatological hopes of the Church. Yet, he argues, by such things

we are led on step by step, as the schoolboy by the prize he seeks, into the real gain of knowledge. Moreover, there is a deeper reward in the process than in the imagined goal, and in that which we become beyond all that we hoped to get. We are reminded of the closing proposition of Spinoza's *Ethics*, namely, *Beatitudo non est virtutis praemium, sed ipsa virtus*. Perhaps there could be no simpler illustration of the pedagogic value of error than that supplied by idolatry. A second-century writer (Maximus of Tyre, quoted by Dr. E. Bevan) wisely distinguishes between those who do not, and those who do need images, according to their powers of mental realization. The image, he says, is like the copy traced by the teacher of writing, which the child's hand follows under the teacher's—"a leading of men by the hand along the way to mental realization." With that sympathetic attitude, we may fitly compare the act of Stephen Grellet, that charming combination of French aristocrat and American Quaker. He was visiting a convent in Naples, and noticed a number of the girls kneeling before a Madonna, nominally engaged in their devotions, but actually laughing to one another. A little later, he had an opportunity of addressing them, and the first thing he did was to rebuke them for their irreverence. There is something spiritually fine in that rebuke from a Quaker for the failure to be reverent toward what to him was an idol. He recognized the worth of devotion even in a form he condemned; he admitted the truth of beneficent illusion.

The fact of beneficent illusion is not less apparent when we take long perspectives of the history of religion. Mythology has been the foster-nurse of religion, as alchemy of chemistry and astrology of astronomy. Plato in the *Republic* argues for the use of fiction in persuading men to accept that which is good for them, yet that which is beyond their power of comprehension in its purer shape (III. 414ff). Whatever we may think of the deliberate use of deception, there can be no question that life does deceive us and often for man's good, as well as for his hurt. The cry of the prophet Jeremiah, "O Lord, thou hast deceived me, and I was deceived" (20. 7), is echoed by the deeper agony of the Cross of Christ in the cry of dereliction. Yet through Jeremiah's experience of divine deception came some of the greatest spiritual truths of Israel and the richest development of its lyrics, while the desolation of the Cross, with its unfulfilled hope, has become the central point of the Christian contact with God.

Such life-experiences as these remind us how far removed we of the West are from the *Maya* of the East. To us the world in which we live is a real world, even though its apprehension is subjectively conditioned by error; the illusion of life is a necessary element of a process in which something is actually achieved. But to the Vedantist the sole reality of the world of phenomena is that of a dream, from which deliverance comes when the sleeper awakes. There is a significant story of the saintly Markandeya, rewarded by the promise of whatever he asks, and his request is, "to look upon the Magic through which the world with its guardian gods imagines a distinction in being." So one evening there arises a great wind and a great flood, reducing the seeming cosmos to chaos. At last he sees Krishna as a babe, who absorbs him like a gnat by drawing a breath. Then from within the god he sees cosmos once more, time displayed as though it were real, till the child's breath expels him once more into chaos. A moment after and chaos itself disappears, and Markandeya is back in his familiar place in that world of illusory cosmos which he has seen from within the god. So a dream within a dream has revealed the truth of things, and that dream within a dream is *Maya* (Barnett, *The Heart of India*, p. 65f.). But those whom the Bible has taught to regard life as the actuality of will, not the illusion of thought, can think of its partial illusions as but stepping-stones from the reality of the soul to the reality of its God.

III. SOME CONCLUSIONS

If then error be omnipresent in our religious thought and life, and yet may serve, in its own subordinated manner, as a twin ministrant with truth to man's growth in religion and morality, what conclusions may we draw from this ministry? (1) The constitution of life as we find it, the conditions under which we must necessarily live, do not suggest that the attainment of intellectual truth is the primary end of religion. The liberating knowledge of truth which the New Testament offers is itself very far from being an intellectual attainment; it goes back to that knowledge of God in the Old Testament which is an attitude of the will more than an effort of the intellect. We are here to be and to do rather than to know, and our knowledge is subordinated to our being and doing. Only so can we reconcile the fact of religious and moral gain even in association with intellectual error, which has been so widely illustrated. The differences of intellectual truth possessed by religion at its various levels are reduced

to a small measure in comparison with that between them all and the truth as it is to God; yet most of us feel that there is a fundamental difference between right and wrong in act and deed that sets us on God's side or against him. This I take to be the deep meaning of Wittgenstein's profound aphorism: "We are conscious that even if all *possible* intellectual questions are answered, our problems of life still remain untouched. Certainly, no further question then remains, and in this very fact is the answer. The solution of the problem of life is seen in the disappearance of this problem" (*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, p. 186).

(2) Yet the admission that the attainment of intellectual truth is not the primary end of religion does not exonerate us from seeking truth, and fighting for truth, however relative. To do this is not simply a matter of social obligation, which can be delegated to others as professional combatants; it is the essential condition and test of individual growth in intellectual truth, which always must condition individual growth in religion. This bears directly on the practical question of propaganda and mission. Can a man be sincere in his religious faith if he does not seek to impart it, at least in what he regards as its essentials, to other men? As with the individual life, so with the race—"the battle, that solves every doubt." As John Stuart Mill says, in his discussion of *Liberty* (p. 86): "Truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a question of the reconciling and combining of opposites, that very few have minds sufficiently capacious and impartial to make the adjustment with an approach to correctness, and it has to be made by the rough process of a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners." Who shall be confident, in any such conflict, that God's truth is not greater than that of either side, not in the sense of being their synthesis, so much as of requiring both in their very clash to accomplish his purpose? "Art thou for us, or for our adversaries? Nay, but as captain of the host of the Lord am I now come."

Very difficult questions are raised by the relation of individual attainment to the goal of human history. Our own growth seems bound up with the growth of others, in our relation to them, and their relation to us. Sociality is as much a part of personality as individuality. Yet we cannot think of individual attainment as postponed to some remote and doubtful epoch of the history of the race when all our social aims shall have been realized; we find on the contrary that the drama of a single life is equally worked out to success or failure in different generations of very different

cultures. Here is one of those many dualities which seem to be unified in the good life, however difficult they are to unify in thought. In the good life the man forgets his own possible gain in the gain of others, and so the gain of earth becomes heaven's gain too. "If any man loseth his life, he shall save it."

(3) This seems to bring us to a Kantian, rather than a Hegelian conclusion: "A good will is the only absolute good." The Hegelian synthesis of opposites—truth, error, higher truth—does not suit that way of looking at life which the argument of this article has suggested; we should still be left asking about the value of the whole process, and still be left to explain how error, as well as moral evil, could appear at all in such a scheme of things. But though Kant does leave us with many problems, his fundamental emphasis on the good will as our contact with ultimate reality harmonizes with the principle that intellectual error can be the minister of religion.

Is the Universe Friendly?

OSCAR MACMILLAN BUCK

IS THE universe friendly? This is the primary question. It provides the setting for every other question which man asks. It determines the sequence in which he asks them. All other questions flow from it and refer back to it. It distinguishes the human from the subhuman, and joins the human to the superhuman. No other question is so profound or so constitutive. It pierces to the very central essence of all things, and then reverses its direction and explains and interprets all motion and unfolding.

Man thinks spatially. The human and the divine are contained within the universe. The universe is the stage upon which the procession of all life moves and has its being. Whether it be the sky-bound universe of the ancients and the primitives, or the modern universe or universes of the physicist-astronomer, or the unseen universe of the philosopher, human life is lived within it, is subject to its laws and developments. It is not the size of the universe, whether large or small, nor its constitution, whether matter or force or mind or spirit, that is our first and main concern, but its relation to us as living human beings. Is the universe—however we may conceive it—friendly to our desires and interests? Does it foster and abet us, or does it merely give us a chance, if our knowledge is sufficient and our luck holds good, or is it utterly indifferent to our needs and welfare?

The question is primary and practical. Everything in life as we know it flows from and depends upon the answer. Certainly the very nature of religion is determined by it. Certainly all religious developments in doctrine and institution and ritual and preparation for man's ultimate destiny are offshoots from a central stock of basic interpretation of the universe.

The answer to this question has its own emotional accompaniments. In fact the real answer for our human living is not in thought at all but in emotion. It is the rich response of the whole man who lives by it, not the partial man who thinks and knows but does not feel or act. All the way from confidence to fear, and from fear to confidence, the man is driven according to the answer. He lives superbly by his assurances that the

universe is backing him up and will not betray him treacherously, or he lives by the terrors of uncertainty—death or disaster always just behind the next tree, hidden with the next fortnight or twelvemonth, or baying like hounds upon his trail. According to the answer it is done unto a man. Failing health and business reverses may be the final proof of a heartless and irresponsible universe, and a smoking pistol the way out. Or, on the other hand, man may learn to live by every word which proceedeth out of the mouth of science and religion. Admiral Byrd, frail and alone, in his little shack farthest South, trusts his life calmly and confidently to beneficent and orderly processes in nature. Intrepid fliers over the vast Pacific, in utter fog and darkness, flash out their faith over the radio-waves: "God bless these instruments." They have become the modern version of the rod and staff wherewith man is comforted when he passes through valleys of shadow dark with death.

These contrasted attitudes toward the universe release different energies. Fear seeks for the protective, trust for the progressive. Fear casts up defense-works and accepts a state of siege; trust takes the offensive and carries the advance and the adventure of control over environment into the open.

Great civilizations grow out of primitive cultures as suspicion yields to confidence. An essentially unfriendly universe kills great art, great literature, great music, great building. Human achievement bears a direct relation to human trust in land and sea and air and men and God. "Why were ye fearful?" becomes a question with implications that reach beyond a single storm and a dozen men and a lake in Galilee. No more important question for human welfare or destiny has ever fallen from the lips of man.

Is the universe friendly or unfriendly? Perhaps the question itself is presumptuous. Celsus, who criticized Christianity so severely in the second century, ridicules the race of Jews and Christians and compares them all "to a flight of bats or to a swarm of ants issuing out of their nest, or to frogs holding council in a marsh, or to worms crawling together in the corner of a dunghill, and quarreling with one another as to which of them were the greater sinners, and asserting that God shows and announces to us all things beforehand; and that abandoning the whole world, and the regions of heaven, and this great earth, he becomes a citizen among us alone, and to us alone makes his intimations, and does not cease sending and

inquiring, in what way we may be associated with him forever." (*Origen against Celsus*, Book IV, Chapter 23.)

But the religions of the world have taken it for granted that man may be presumptuous and look for an answer from his environment. They have taken it for granted that their main concern, their very *raison d'être*, is to provide an answer to this first and searching question, asked by the clinging infant in its dawn-flushes of consciousness, and asked by prostrate old age when its soul "lifts wings against the nightfall" and "takes the dim leagues" of an uncharted ocean.

In general—using the charcoal crayon and not the etching pencil—three answers have been given by the world's religions:

First. The universe is essentially unfriendly to man, but has friendly aspects or phases. It is night, but stars are shining in the sky.

Second. The universe is essentially friendly to man, but has unfriendly aspects or phases. It is day, but clouds are in the sky which sometimes hide the sun.

(Of course these two may approximate each other, but the first is darker in its total effect, and the second is lighter. For the first, the sun has set but light can be found; for the second, the sun has risen but darkness still casts its shadows here and there.)

Third. The universe, as we know it, is altogether unfriendly, but there is a friendlier world to which man may climb even in this life. Only on some high mountain of attainment or achievement can man pass from utter darkness to utter light.

I

The first answer—unfriendliness, but with friendly gestures; a hostile country, but with sanctuaries—is man's earliest, and at the same time, strangely, man's latest answer.

The so-called primitive religions and cults all face in this direction. In the beginning there is a sense of "aliveness" everywhere, which pays little regard to man's interests. When sharpened into the conception of *mana* it becomes a dangerous force or energy or power which destroys the unwitting. When conceived of as spirit-stuff—animism—these multiplied spirits become a "terror by night" and a "destruction that wasteth at noon-day." The dangers are multiplied. Animals prey upon man—of their own instinct, or are driven to it by spirit- or demon-possession. Men fight one

another in intertribal war, organizing their hostilities. Men and women dabble illegally in *mana* and spirit-control and work black magic and witchcraft for evil and unsocial purposes, bootlegging the true magic of the medicine man or witch doctor who is deputed to manipulate the spirit-world for the welfare of the tribe. The world of the primitive and animist is dark. He is still living in the shadows of the cave or the forest, long after he has built his hut or kraal or tepee on the savannah or the plain.

But man does not surrender easily to fear or black despair. There are kindly lights amid the encircling gloom. The totem animal enters into alliance with him for mutual welfare. Charms and fetishes provide defensive armor. Ancestral spirits and departed heroes, if cared for, keep the family or tribe within their concern. The Creator God, though distant and removed, is friendly toward His creation. Great nature deities, as they take over from local and tribal spirits, provide the seasons and the fertilities and the successes in war. And in and between these more religious conceptions and forces lie the friendly and homely comforts—each of enormous social significance—of domesticated animals and birds, beginning with the dog; of the development and enrichment of language, providing increasing capacity for human association; of the monogamous family, regulating sex and the production and care of children within the religiously constituted clan and the politically constituted tribe; of fire, the “red flower,” with its warmth and tastiness of food; of the shelter of the natural cave or of the artificial cave or hut; of the bow and arrow, and the hammer or tomahawk, providing not only for protection and for attack but for enlarging the source-areas of food and clothing; of the drum and its incitements and its far-flung messages; of the dance which quickens the whole tempo of human life, and as symbolic magic increases the fertility of the soil; of the clay pot with its manifold devices and uses; and of the hoe which breaks up the stubborn earth and makes what we call agriculture possible.

In this group which live by the first answer must be included not only the animisms and shamanisms and polydemonisms, but also the fear and superstition levels of the great religions: all the mother-goddesses and godlings that infest popular Hinduism; Lamaism and its terrors in Tibet and Mongolia, which are a travesty upon the Buddhist gospel; popular Taoism in China with its devil-expelling processions and geomantic hocus-pocus of *fengshui*; much that is fearful in Islam; and all the “vale of tears” and purgatory-hell psychoses in Christianity.

Those who look out upon their universe and call it evil still constitute a large proportion—possibly a majority—of the human race. And to these must now be added the neo-pessimists of our day, who call themselves ultra-modern—the prophets of the new unfriendly universe of mechanistic and deterministic science. We are chance sports of evolution, children lost in a great forest, with no reason for being here, no sense of direction, no freedom of motion, no outlet, and no home. “Ours is a lost cause and there is no place for us in the natural universe, but we are not, for all that, sorry to be human. We should rather die as men than live as animals.” (Joseph Wood Krutch: *The Modern Temper*, p. 249.) Even this new darkness has a sliver of a moon.

II

The second answer—the universe is essentially friendly, but has unfriendly aspects or phases—is the characteristic answer of the ethnic religions. All the higher religions become higher by their confidence in the world about them. Forces have been at work clearing out the darkness of despair and of defeat. The great nature deities—the kindly sun, the fructifying storm, the dawn releasing from the imprisonment of night, the winds that cool and bring the rain clouds, the undergirding fertility of mother-earth, the overarching beneficence of father-sky—become clearer. Tales about them become mythology. Men face them with awe and reverence and gratitude, which are the true religious emotions. Men depend upon their orderliness and their loving-kindness. Allied to these in their influence upon development are the ancestral spirits, better cared for and more responsible for the welfare of the family on earth.

Again, making for confidence, is the civilization which grows out of trust in dependable nature deities and ancestors. Trade and politics and art and armed defense and irrigation and better agriculture and animal husbandry not only transform religion, but are increased by religion. The State and the religion together beget and bear the State-religion, which orders the attitude to be taken toward the universe. As the State inspires confidence, the religion acquires confidence, which, in turn, issues in more inspiration and more acquisition, and so on until some great national calamity or disaster halts the process of gathering confidence by compound interest.

The third justification for confidence in the friendliness of the universe lies in the development of kindlier heavens after death, which correct and

undo the manifest injustices and evils of the present life. After death—in the next life—man's utmost desires will be abundantly fulfilled. Meanwhile, he walks by faith in, if not by sight of, the friendliness which provides these eternal paradises.

So it comes to pass that out of growing confidence in his total environment the great civilizations of human history arise. In the structure and texture of these civilizations are imbedded the historic religions, sharing in and ministering to—though in different degrees—the sense of assurance that inspires the society of which they are a part. They are not heathen, for “heathenism” implies darkness, and these peoples live and achieve by the light that is in them, and not by the darkness.

The great civilizations of the Far East can never be understood apart from the gospels of friendliness with which their religions have imbued them. There is the friendly Tao of Taoism:

“The Tao, engendering all things, nourishes, develops, fosters, perfects, ripens, tends, and protects them.

“Production without possession, action without self-assertion, development without domination—this is its mysterious operation.” (Tao Teh King 51. 3, 4. Tr. by L. A. Giles.)

There is the kindly Heaven of Confucianism:

“Mencius said, There is a nobility of Heaven and there is a nobility of man. Benevolence, righteousness, self-consecration, and fidelity, with unwearied joy in these virtues—these constitute the nobility of Heaven.” (Analects of Mencius 6. 1. 16, 1-2. Tr. by James Legge.)

There are the friendly nature-deities and powers of Shinto—the *kami*—whose delight and responsibility it is to defend the welfare of Japan. There are the ancestors—imperial and domestic—whose helpfulness constitutes the cult of high and low alike.

This is not blind optimism. The Far East has known war and plague and famine and flood and disease and pain and neglect and corruption of the heart of man. The eternal forces of the world are twofold: *Yang* and *Yin*—light and darkness, energy and inertia, good and evil—but in Far Eastern thought, the *Yang* is superior and determinative. Heaven uses them both for its high and moral purpose. One cannot go here into Far Eastern philosophy. But even the accepted neo-Confucian doctrine as found in its principal exponent, Chu Hsi (1130-1200), admits in its twofold universe of the material (*ch'i*) and the rational or ethical (*li*), inseparable.

ably associated, the functional priority of *Li*. Wang Yang-Ming (ca. 1472-1528), the other great name, goes farther and builds all knowledge of, and, therefore, interpretation of the universe out of man's consciousness and conscience. One may in the Far East trust the bases of life. The bridge of human existence rests on sustaining piers—this is original and indigenous to China and Japan.

The religions of the Indo-European peoples—speaking the Aryan languages—invaders of India, Persia, Greece, Italy, northern and western Europe—tell the same story of the gaining of confidence. More crudely in the Celtic and Teutonic cultures, with force and persuasiveness in Zoroaster, and with elegance of diction and power of reasoning in the great Greek philosophers, poets, and dramatists, faith is asserted. The grip of Fate is slowly broken. Mythologies arise, man organizes his deities for his own purposes and his societies for greater stability, projects his own desires and then his own nobilities into the world of the superhuman, and opens friendlier heavens and destinies after death. But the Indo-European is not permitted to complete his testimony. Before he is finished he has surrendered to the all-conquering Semitic monotheisms of Christianity and Islam, or to the climate of India which changes the happier Rig Veda to the gloomy Atharva Veda and the Upanishads.

It is the Semitic religions—Judaism, Christianity, Islam—that have specialized, as it were, in the knowledge of friendliness within the universe. No longer is it scattered here and there and everywhere—to be found by search or by chance—but comes to an overpowering concentration in the One Sovereign Creator and Sustainer and Redeemer of the Universe. There it may be found—always and only. It is the same deity, though under different names: Yahweh, Allah, the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ—a God of mercy and indulgence and loving-kindness. Jews and Christians and Moslems have no right to be pessimists. Their God is in His heaven, and some day all will be right with His world.

The curtain opens—in what Scripture they all accept—in a story of creation wherein "God saw everything that he had made, and, behold, it was very good." (Genesis 1. 31.) Through the long centuries Judaism, Christianity, and Islam still maintain, on the whole, this earliest judgment of God on his created world. They struggle with the inconsistencies and denials of it, but account for these in more or less profound ways, and con-

tinue to insist that the world within which man lives and moves and has his being, is made well, because it is the making of a good and friendly God, and that it will end well, for the same reason. The Babylonian exile, Job, Golgotha, the Coliseum, the destruction of the Temple, the flight from Mecca to Medina, the slaughter of Husain—in all these, as they rise to the height of a great argument, man

"May assert Eternal Providence
And justify the ways of God to men." (Paradise Lost I, 25, 26.)

III

The third characteristic reply is closely related both to the first and the second. It emphasizes simultaneously the darkness of the first and the light of the second—the unfriendliness of the world as we know it and the friendliness of the world we ought to know but do not in our daily human living. These religions which answer thus find their release from darkness into light not after death but here and now, provided knowledge and discipline lead the way thither. The world of light is not diffused throughout the world we know, but withdrawn from it within its own vacuum. This world is but the shadow of its brightness. By the ladder of discipline, physical and mental and moral, and by the trap-door of knowledge—not derived knowledge but intuitive—any man or woman, alone and unaccompanied, may achieve the consummate bliss.

It is a gospel of release "from the unreal to the real, from darkness to light, from death to immortality." It is not from terror but from futility that one escapes, not from fear but from sorrow—and the experience has nothing to do with space or time. A friendly world offers itself to the bold seeker, but friendliness without any definition or content, without spatial connotations or any experience of succession within a flight of time.

This is the promise of Hinduism in its philosophies: the Upanishads, the Vedanta of Sankara or Ramanuja or Madhva, the Samkhya-Yoga, and the Bhagavadgita. This is the proclamation of Gautama the Buddha and the Buddhism which rests back on his experience and his organization of doctrine and law and brotherhood.

To all of these, unfriendliness lies in the inherent structure of the universe we know. Change and ignorance and illusion and rebirth into

existence after existence, and the law that every action necessitates further action (karma) so that there can be no cessation of action, and the sorrow consequent upon all of these are built into the very constitution of the universe that we approach and experience through our physical senses. If there be friendliness at all it must lie beyond all these and the universe which contains them.

The discovery of the Upanishads is the friendly "Brahma world":

"Over that bridge there cross neither day nor night, nor old age nor death, nor sorrow, nor well-doing nor evil-doing. All evils turn back therefrom, for the Brahma-world is freed from evil." (Chandogya Upanishad 8. 4. 1, 2. Tr. by R. E. Hume.)

The discovery of the princely Gautama—which made him a Buddha—is the friendly Nirvana world, calm and unruffled by any breeze that blows from any quarter. Here there is no change, for one is outside of all becoming; here the thirst of desire never tortures; and rebirth is at an end.

But Buddhism and Hinduism can never hold consistently these distant heights, so far-removed from daily living, so difficult to reach. Friendliness must be brought nearer to man as he is, and not as he might come to be by Yoga or the Noble Eightfold Path. A new Buddha of kindness—Amitayus, Amitabha, Amida—brings friendliness nearer, making it more comprehensible and more attainable. New gods of kindness—Vishnu, Rama, Krishna, Siva—in *bhakti* or devotional Hinduism bring light into this unfriendly world. But in this *bhakti*—Buddhism and *bhakti*—Hinduism Buddhism and Hinduism have crossed the line into the group that lives by man's second answer to the ancient query of the friendliness of man's total environment.

Where then is the uniqueness of Christianity in this matter of man's attitude toward his world? What has Christianity to contribute to man's living in any century—in this century—which no other religion or irreligion can contribute? (The contribution must of necessity be by life that is lived, not merely by doctrine that is taught.) How then does Christianity rise above the mountain-range of which it seems a part? Does it lift any high summit that is Everest amid the Himalayan rampart of belief and trust that runs across all human history?

Is not the answer clear? Unless Christianity has faith in a friendli-

ness that is utter and not partial, that is different in quality as well greater in degree, we have no message to the non-Christian and scarcely any mission, except that of charity: of helping him in his need, even as we need help in our need.

Has the Christ any significance for Christianity and Christians in this first and fundamental question which men must ask and answer before they go very far with living? "Give us this day our daily bread. . . . Behold the birds of the heavens that they sow not, neither do they reap nor gather into barns; and your heavenly Father feedeth them. . . . Be not anxious for the morrow. . . . Be not anxious for your life. . . . If ye then being evil know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more . . . Fear not, only believe. . . . Be not afraid. . . . Why were ye fearful? . . . Where is your faith? . . . Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing, and not one of them shall fall to the ground without your Father. . . . The very hairs of your head are all numbered. Fear not, therefore; ye are of more value than many sparrows. . . . Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit. . . ."

Can we maintain these words when men all around us, when men among us who are distinguished as Christian scholars and interpreters of Christian truth to our generation, surrender them to the starker realism of hunger and anxiety and fear, of fallen sparrows and "being evil," of vast numbering of human heads for mass programs of economic exploitation or national greed, of premature and tragic commending of spirit on the part of heroic and dying youth? Can it be that these words and the Life that matched them really challenge us to go ahead, when so much in all sane reason would halt us, and live believing that we cannot exaggerate the friendliness of the universe when once we enter our claim to be sons of God, joint-heirs with Jesus Christ, and live sincerely and humbly and proudly by these patents of nobility?

Unless Christianity means something like this, the science of Comparative Religion offers it continued influence in certain lands and regions, but denies to it universality.

The Minister His Own Theologian

PHILLIPS P. ELLIOTT

THE minister has lost in recent years a number of his former functions. He is no longer the community teacher, the town adviser and general arbiter that we are led to believe he was in colonial days. By the growth of the school system, by the increase in civic officials and courts, by the added opportunities for social fellowship and the exchange of ideas, the parson has been deprived of many duties and prerogatives that were his.

He does not regret this, for most of these interests were not, strictly speaking, in his line. Their going to other hands is no loss to him or to the cause he represents. There is, however, one loss that has set in upon him more recently which is genuinely dangerous. It is the loss of his confidence in his own thoughts; the weakening of his intellectual self-reliance. Once persuaded of his own mental trustworthiness, he is certain no longer. A group of men have arisen to whom the prerogative of thinking must be surrendered. They are professionals in thinking; they are theologians. They teach theology, and compare theologies one with another, and out of the comparison they find material for further books on theology. To them the function of thinking about the basic questions of religion has on the whole been handed. They have accepted the responsibility, and are doing their best. The parish minister, having yielded the responsibility, turns to his daily chores relieved yet humiliated; with more time for his definite tasks, but with a lower estimate of his own capacity, and less sure of the real necessity for his calling.

Of course he is not relieved of all thinking. There are little things that must always be thought about. Problems of adjusting personalities, of planning for the future, of putting people to work, of watching their development and aiding in it—these things take thought, and the minister thinks about them. He has a right to think about little things. But not about the big things. For thoughts, respectable and trustworthy, about God, or Christ, or immortality, he must rely upon the theologian's word. The theologian will supply whatever intellectual basis is needed for the

minister's work. The minister is too busy to think about God—he has no time to detect the finer shadings of the Divine Nature and Will. The theologian, having leisure for study and thought, will think about God for him. The minister will hold up his thoughts about God until the theologian's book is published. So with Christ. So with all the truly important issues of faith.

If this seems strained, I would ask that you think of the form the discussion of religion usually takes when ministers come together. "What do you think of ——'s latest book?" "I see —— is publishing a new book. I wonder if it's worth buying." "Did you get much out of such and such a book?" So the conversation goes, from one theologian to another, comparing, admiring, condemning, yet always recognizing that the prerogative for furnishing the ministry with an intellectual framework is in their hands, and not in the hands of the minister himself. Discussing theology means, therefore, the discussing of other men's ideas, and the implicit acceptance of their right to speak with authority.

This has resulted in a strange reversal in the type of conviction the minister expresses. His sermons will more often breathe a clear note of social reform than of intellectual conviction. He will speak for himself on the question of war, and on the profit motive; on the question of God he will speak for his favorite theologian. His convictions on pacifism he will defend to the last; his conviction on God he will defend only feebly because it is not really a conviction, but only a quotation. And about no quotation ever quoted will a man say "We will be true to thee till death."

Of course some progress has been made when ministers quote from the theologians. For they at least are in the same general area as are the parish priests. There was a dark age, not far removed, when the minister surrendered his intellectual independence not to the theologians, but to the scientists. He awaited their words and their verdict with genuine anxiety. Would they or would they not let him believe in God? The decision came from Mr. Jeans and Mr. Eddington: "Yes, it will be all right to believe in God." O joy untold! From a thousand pulpits there thundered the quotations. Jeans and Eddington say that we may believe in God!

This, I think all will now agree, was one of the lowest points theology ever touched. We have by now been safely delivered from a scientific religion, and we are duly thankful. But it is almost from the frying pan into the fire, for the professional teachers of theology now stand in the way

of restoring religious thought to those to whom it belongs—the ministers in the active work of the church—and instead of quoting the scientists we now with equal confidence quote the writers on theology.

The people in the churches are not deceived, I am sure. They can tell a second-hand dealer when they see one or hear one. And second-hand goods are still second-hand, whether they come from the laboratory or the classroom. The minister stands in the position of the clerk in a chain store handing out butter which he had no part in churning, and eggs which he had no part in laying. And it is hard to make a clerk look like anything but a clerk, or a second-hand man look like anything but a second-hand man.

This willingness to take the part of errand boy on behalf of those who do the heavy thinking of religion is due to a number of factors, one of which is the habit which some ministers have developed of keeping files of clippings, with a view to their possible use at some future time. Most of these times are very future, and the clipping of 1925 may have no call made upon it until 1935. When it does appear, it is easily recognizable as being just what it is—a bit of knowledge or data on which the minister has spent no more effort than to skirt its fringes with the scissors. The second-hand sign is easily visible. So the minister regards the work of organizing ideas as being simply the organizing of clippings, and he is thus prepared from the very start for a position of intellectual subservience to those upon whom the burden of theological thinking has fallen, and who have readily, and in increasing numbers, taken the burden up. The minister is content if his theological overlords issue a book frequently enough to keep him in both clippings and ideas.

I will leave it to those who read to verify this. Here is a call to lead a meeting—not a sermon this time—but a discussion on “Our Idea of God.” What will we do? In all likelihood go to the shelves, and pull down any books we have on the subject of God, or any theological textbooks with chapters on God, and then from these authoritative documents we draw up the notes for the discussion. All the material is displayed; God as immanent; God as transcendent; God in history; the mystical experience—everything anybody has written about God is put out before the group, and the discussion waxes eloquent and even heated, and we congratulate ourselves on leading so stimulating a forum, while down below there lurks a fear that someone will suddenly break through the barrier of authorities and will say, “And what, Dr. Blank, is *your* idea of God?”

I knew a man who would never or could never answer such a question. He was a layman but kept fully abreast, as we say, of the current literature of theology. I would defy anyone to find out what that man believed. Ask him what he believed, and he would tell you what an authority believed; ask for his thoughts and invariably you got the thoughts of someone else. No plagiarism there, for the credit of authorship was always given, but either consciously or unconsciously, I could never determine which, he had walled himself in with books and authorities until it was apparently a psychological impossibility for him to express a conviction that he himself honestly held. His authorities at every point stood squarely in the way, and for all his knowledge, he was a pitiful prisoner of those to whom he had committed his power of independent thought.

It is not overdrawing the picture to say that the ministry stands on the brink of such a fate. The minister may yield almost every other function to the many agencies devised by an ingenious society, but this he must not yield. He must preserve the autonomy of his mind; he must insist that it is his special and unique and permanent privilege and duty to do the basic thinking that is done in religion, and that to no one else can this right be yielded. The minister must be his own theologian.

This is not to minimize the place and work of those who teach and write on theology from the quiet shades of a campus or college hall. We know these men, and they have our respect, even as we regret their choice of profession. But they and we have made the mistake of assuming that theology can be developed by the conflict and comparison of ideas. We have mistakenly believed that it takes quiet and leisure and a library for a man to think about God. But it takes no such thing. Thinking about God must come from the area where God is present, at work, active, alive, struggling, suffering, defeated and triumphant. The further one gets from that the less accurate and trustworthy are one's thoughts about God. And the deeper one is in the stream of life as it throbs by, the surer one's insights and the truer one's thoughts. Better one idea about God from the midst of the fray than twenty ideas from a rustic bench by the river, or from the seat before the fire.

This may seem to disparage the distinctive use of the mind; it is rather to exalt it. There have been many minor—or perhaps major—tragedies when men of large mental stature were called from the active ministry into the cloistered halls. The brains still work, their products are good; but

they lack the authority that comes when man's thoughts about God are born in the surge and stress of God's struggling children. Once the time to think is given, thought languishes; once the leisure is available, the mind has lost its glow and might.

This, then, should affect the minister with a double influence. For one thing, it will persuade him of his right and duty to build from his work the intellectual foundations for his own life, which alone can honestly be passed on to others. He will attempt to reclaim the function of thinking about basic themes which he has given over to his academic cousin. This is not to have any illusion about the creative ability of our minds, or the mind of the average parson. But whether our minds are good, bad or indifferent, we cannot leave the thinking to someone else, for no one else is in this unique position, of standing full in the stream of activity, yet eager to draw its deeper meanings from it. Here we are, for better, for worse, and if new thoughts about God are to come, they must come here, yes, even from us. This will mean a willingness to trust our minds more fully than before; to trust them not only with little ideas, but also with big ideas. What an enormous sense of relief comes when a man trusts himself to the current of his own thinking; believing that he is sufficiently sane, or insufficiently insane, so that when his mind is working it will touch at least the fringes of things as they are.

Moreover, the minister is encouraged to be his own theologian because he sees that what people want is to have life, as they know it, interpreted for them. That interpretation can be given, not by one who looks at life, but by one who lives it as they live it. No one outside can do it, and by outside I do not mean a monastery on a Mediterranean isle, but simply the living away from the problems and lives of grocers, bankers, relief workers, and stenographers. The interpretation must be done by the one who is right there, of whom people can say "He's one with us." Otherwise, the interpretation, however brilliant, will not interpret. The acting and the interpreting go together, useless each without the other. And there is no one in all the gamut of society today so uniquely qualified to tell men the meaning of these things as the minister, who is in the stream of life, yet in a sense not of it; feeling it and living it, yet above it and regarding it; such a man can tell people, if any man can, what and where God is, and why Jesus came into the world.

"Behold, I send my messenger." That is what the minister is. A

messenger of God. He has instead become a messenger carrying telegrams from the thinkers to the people; gathering the ideas of a professional group and diluting or compiling them so that his congregation may understand what the qualified thinkers have said. That messenger service must be discontinued, and the other resumed. The message is carried from God to man. It is found in the minister's own life and work and fellowship and prayer. All the common ways and works are filled with the truth which this authentic messenger is to deliver. Thus will the ministry regain its intellectual independence, trusting its own thoughts, interpreting its own experience. We have made a fetish of books on theology. We will read fewer of them, lest we think that saying we've read a book should take the place of our own thoughts about God. Better than the books, even by our best friends, and may they forgive us these words, is this material in our world and in our work. We will meditate upon that; and trust the fruits of our meditations in the midst of our crowded days. The world will thank us for these fruits. And incidentally we shall stand on all fours intellectually with any professor of theology who ever assigned his class the chapter on "The Attributes of God."

Jesus, Son of Man

HAROLD COOKE PHILLIPS

THERE are three terms applied to Jesus in the New Testament—Son of God, Son of Man, The Spirit.¹ They have come to represent, broadly speaking, three aspects of His personality: the divine, the human, the dynamic. If frequency of usage may be made a criterion, then it is fair to assume that the term, "Son of Man," was the one that Jesus preferred, since it was not only self-designated, but occurs some sixty-nine times in the Synoptics, and twelve times in John.²

In all personality there is an element which eludes us, and which no one title completely expresses. If this is true of personality in general, it is especially true of the unique personality of Jesus. Matthew Arnold hinted at this when he said that Jesus was above the heads of His reporters.

It would be difficult, for example, for anyone as he thinks of the life of Jesus to say, "Now He is acting in human fashion," or "Now His deed is divine." "The Word became flesh, and dwelt among us" in a life that has shown us the humanness of the divine, and the divineness of the human. "Jesus, divinest when Thou most art man." To speak of the Son of man as if He were quite independent of the Son of God would be misleading. To speak of Christ the Spirit, divorced from the rich content of His earthly life and ministry, would be inadequate. "Behold the man!" said Pilate. We may discuss the life of that man from three different angles, but we must remember that these are merely three ways of thinking of a life in whom the elements so blended that they may be separated merely for purposes of discussion.

I am well aware that the phrase, "Son of man," raises many historical and critical questions about which New Testament scholars do not agree. It is not my purpose to deal with this aspect of the matter.³ I shall take the phrase at its face value, as indicating the human aspects of Jesus' life,

¹ 2 Corinthians 3: 17.

² The term "Son of David" is of course also applied to Jesus in the New Testament. This was quite natural, for in the Jewish tradition the promised Messiah was envisioned as a Davidic King. As one would naturally expect, this term, "Son of David," is used most frequently by Matthew, where this tradition was strongest. While Jesus did not disclaim the title, he reinterpreted it, and filled it with an ethical and religious content which robbed it of its traditional meaning.

³ A very illuminating treatment of it is to be found in Professor E. F. Scott's *The Kingdom and the Messiah*, pp. 188ff.

broadly speaking. This procedure is, I believe, justified. What we are concerned about is a life, not a title. "Is not the life more than meat . . .?" Certainly it is more than a phrase.

With this qualification in mind let me suggest three lines of approach along which the meaning of our subject might be explored. First, the personal; second, the social; and third, what I am inclined to call the cosmic. First, then, what does this concept of Jesus as Son of man mean to the individual in his own religious thought and experience?

Do not misunderstand me when I say that Jesus as Son of man has humanized our whole concept of religion. He has shown us that no one can be in right relationship to God unless he is in right relationships with his fellow men. He has made the supreme test of religion not merely right belief or right thinking in the abstract, but right living. And right living to the Son of man was something inseparable from one's relationships with the sons of men. No gift brought to the altar of the Son of man is acceptable if the giver is not reconciled to the sons of men.

See how He has done this. For one thing, Jesus has put His own personality at the center of our religious thinking. Socrates once said to his followers: "You, if you take my advice, will think little about Socrates but a great deal about truth." Jesus said just the opposite. "I am . . . the truth," "Come unto me . . .," "Follow me . . .," ". . . learn of me." The ultimate fact about our religion is not a set of teachings in the abstract, nor a set of ideals, however lofty, but a man that so lived what He said, that He was what He said. "The Word became flesh . . .," and as Mark Rutherford once commented, "How well that it did not become a book."

This is no small matter; indeed, it is one of the unique distinctions of our religion. As a celebrated Jewish preacher, Dr. Solomon B. Freehof, has put it, ". . . No Moslem ever sings, 'Mohammed, lover of my soul,' nor does any Jew say of Moses, the teacher, 'I need thee every hour.' . . ." When those early Christians went out into the pagan world the heart of their religion was loyalty, devotion to a personality. "We preach Christ . . .," they said. ". . . I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me." ". . . looking unto Jesus," "consider him . . . lest ye" It can further be stated as an historic fact, that whenever our religion has become revitalized, the movement has sprung from some new discovery of the personality of Jesus. So men like Walter Rauschenbusch, in our own

generation, rediscover Jesus and new life flows into the Church. Men like John Wesley in the eighteenth century rediscovered Him, and the dry-as-dust formalism of the English Christianity of Wesley's time is vitalized. So men like Saint Francis in the thirteenth century rediscover Him, and the life of the Church is cleansed.

But Jesus has humanized our religious thinking also by showing that loyalty to His personality is meaningless if it does not express itself in respect and reverence for every human life, even for "one of the least of these my brethren." It may be argued that He gives us little or no light on our metaphysical problems. However, He gives us nothing but light on our human problems. Was there anything that He stressed more than the supreme value of human life? "The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath." Always the human element was the controlling factor.

For example: To a shrewd lawyer who would trap Him in discussions about neighborliness He tells the story of the Good Samaritan. Not in abstract thinking about neighborliness, but in the meeting of a human situation, lies the test. The author of the fourth Gospel, in his interpretation of the life of Christ, tells us that to a woman of Samaria who would engage Him in theological discussions about worship He presented the personal problem of her own moral life. When He wanted to tell men what the kingdom of heaven was like He took a little child and set him in their midst. When He sought to make men realize what was involved in loving and serving God, He painted a graphic picture of the final judgment. "Lord, when saw we thee an hungered, and fed thee? or thirsty, and gave thee drink? . . . Or when saw we thee sick, or in prison, and came unto thee? . . . Verily I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me." The two commandments which He said fulfilled both the law and the prophets were, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God . . . and thy neighbor as thyself"—God and thy neighbor, inseparably bound, in any act that is genuinely religious. John is voicing accurately the essence of Jesus' thought when he tersely says, "If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar. . . ."

The fact that Jesus by His life and teaching has dignified man by linking him with God in his religious thought and experience, simply cannot be overemphasized. Its bearing upon the life of the world today is obvious.

Any philosophy of life, political, racial, social, economic or religious, that disregards the eternal worth, significance or value of human life, is at heart unchristian. It stands condemned in the light of Him who has interpreted and expressed our profoundest religious concept in terms of respect, service and love for one's fellow men.

Now let us look at the social aspect of our theme and ask what this concept of Jesus as Son of man means to the world. If there be one truth in our religion which we cannot surrender without hopelessly dwarfing it, it is this: there is something universal about the life of the Son of man. "And the glory of the Lord shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together," "I am the light of the world," "the field is the world," "God so loved the world. . . ." A Christ divorced from the challenging and expanding horizons of the world is not the Christ of the New Testament.

In the first-century world, Christianity had to make its choice between being a little, petty, provincial sect within the racial and social confines of a religious movement, or being a world force, limited by no barriers geographical, racial or social. Christianity made that choice, and it has been made once and for all. Those who are inclined to think that what is familiarly known as "the social gospel" is a kind of illegitimate child for whom one must be constantly apologetic, have to bear the burden of proof. If there is not at the heart of the Christian religion a broadly and deeply social meaning and message, how does one explain the crucifixion of Christ? How does one explain the fact that the early apostles were so constantly getting into trouble with the political and religious rulers of their age? How does it happen that Paul and his followers were referred to as those "who turned the world upside down"? Indeed, the thing the early apostles were doing could not be done "in a corner."

"Where cross the crowded ways of life,
Where sound the cries of race and clan,
Above the noise of selfish strife,
We hear Thy voice, O Son of man!"

We may say then that if Jesus as Son of man has humanized our thinking, He has also socialized our attitudes.

The word "socialized" as I am now using it has no necessary connection with "socialist." The latter suggests an external political organization of society. Jesus, however, was primarily concerned not with changing the organization of society, but the organizers of society. It was only on the

assumption that one had new wine that the old wineskins became inadequate. Jesus' primary emphasis was always on inwardness. It was the imperative necessity of socializing our attitudes that He stressed. Let us listen to the voice of the Son of man as it speaks on some of the pertinent and pressing social problems of our age.

Take for example the acquisition of wealth. It would seem as if one had a perfect right to the unrestrained expression of his acquisitive instinct. But Jesus told a story once about a rich man who prospered, so much so that he pulled down his barns and built greater; and His comment was, "Thou fool!" Why was he a fool? Because he prospered? No, but because his prosperity rested upon an entirely anti-social principle. In this rich man's soliloquy there are sixty-one words. "I" occurs six times and "my" occurs six times. "What shall I do . . . ?" "My barns," "my goods," "my soul." Jesus, on the contrary, said to His disciples: "When ye pray, say, 'Our . . . ,' "our Father," "our debts," "our debtors," "give us," "forgive us." In many of His parables, indeed, in most of His teaching, He aims to show the personal and social inadequacy of unmitigated selfishness. "For even Christ pleased not himself." He has revealed the love which "seeketh not its own."

Take another example, His concept of power. The only kind of power the world into which Jesus came could recognize, was that which was founded on brute force, and was expressed in terms of overlordship. Rome was a symbol of it. Nietzsche's philosophy is a modern expression of it. Men quite naturally assumed that the great was the powerful. Rarely did it occur to anyone that the powerful had any other obligation to society than that of bestriding the narrow world like a Colossus.

This concept, too, the Son of man has socialized. The greatness He has revealed is the greatness of soul. It is based not on might, but on right; not on power, but on principle. It expresses itself not in overlordship, but in service. "Whosoever of you will be the greatest, shall be servant of all." Paul is being true to the thought of his Master when he says, "We then that are strong ought to bear the infirmities of the weak. . . ." No one who truly shares this spirit of the Son of man could ever cherish the delusion that the great nation is that which has the largest armies, or the heaviest tonnage. Moreover, to the enlightened, the bully, whether he be a political group, an economic group, a social, racial or religious group, has lost every particle of heroism he ever possessed. For the

Son of man came to seek and to save, not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give His life. He was among us as one who serveth.

Take a third illustration—race. Whatever we might say about this gospel of racial superiority which is so prevalent in the world today, one thing can be confidently said about it. It certainly is not original! The world into which Jesus came was a world whose whole habit of thinking was anti-social and unfraternal. It divided men into all sorts of classes and castes. One of its supreme virtues was exclusiveness. It was rife with bigotry. The age was expert in reading labels, but was incapable of understanding life. Some were labeled Greeks, and to them the rest of the world were barbarians. Others were labeled Romans, and they naïvely assumed that those who were not citizens of Rome were necessarily their inferiors. Even the Jews, a subject people, did not escape this unfraternal attitude, for they had no dealings with the Samaritans. It was a world replete with national, racial and social Nazareths out of which, so it was thought, nothing good could come. Such a world could not but be hateful, suspicious and proud, because these labels had become barriers to that deeper understanding of life from which alone sympathy and co-operation spring.

Into that world came the Son of man. And what was His attitude? He saw through the artificiality and injustice of the whole business. "He hath broken down the middle wall of partition. . . ." Do I need to remind you that the hero of one of the greatest stories He ever told was an outcast Samaritan? Do I need to remind you that it was of a hated centurion He said, "I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel." That He befriended the publicans and sinners? In fact, I think it can be confidently said that some of the most revealing and valuable contacts Jesus made were made with those very individuals and groups whom His contemporaries had branded as social, racial, or religious inferiors.

What does this mean? Does it mean that Jesus was simply an uncritical, soft-hearted sentimentalist? That is precisely what the world of His day thought it meant. That is precisely what the world by and large today thinks it means. But if I am certain of anything it is this: we are the sentimentalists, and Jesus is the world's greatest moral realist. For what, after all, is the principle that lies behind this fraternal attitude which He preached, lived, and for which He died? Is it not simply this: that races and nations and classes must learn to co-operate, that we shall have to learn to

live together if we are going to live at all? Anybody who, knowing what has happened to this world during the past few years, and seeing what is happening now, still regards Jesus' plea for co-operative goodwill as being an impractical illusion, is either wickedly stubborn, hopelessly stupid, or both. We are told that we must be realistic, and face the facts. Well, pray what are the facts? The facts are that every attempt to build a world on anti-social, or narrowly nationalistic principles, is self-defeating and ends in unspeakable tragedy—economic catastrophe, political unrest and moral chaos. "And whosoever shall fall on this stone shall be broken: but on whomsoever it shall fall, it will grind him to powder." Those are the facts, and we had better face them.

Moreover, if this plea of Jesus for a world of co-operative goodwill was pertinent 1900 years ago, it is infinitely more so now. Once it may have been optional, now it is imperative. For science has given us a world in which it is utterly impossible for us to get out of each other's way. Science has made all talk of national isolation, or economic independence, a pleasant myth. Distances are no more, and geographical boundaries are merely figments of the imagination. The world is no longer an organization; it has become an organism, so delicately articulated that whatever happens in one part of it sends its repercussions through the rest of the body corporate. We are somewhat like Alpine climbers roped together. We may rise or we may fall. But this seems certain, whatever we do, we shall do together. In short, the world is now a neighborhood, and the only principle that will work in a neighborhood is the principle of brotherhood. Anyone who in the face of these facts still thinks that his nation or race or class can work out its destiny independently of the rest of mankind is indulging in sheer sentimentalism. He is living in a land of fantasy, far removed from the world of realities.

This then is what I mean when I say that Jesus as Son of man has socialized our attitudes. If someone should say that it is not Jesus who has done this, but that the co-operative principle is nothing more than the unfolding of a purely human process, arrived at through trial and error, then the answer is that we are merely catching up with Him. For He saw clearly long ago that in the acquisition of wealth, the concept and use of power, the relationship of national, racial or social groups, the principle of co-operative goodwill was not a fiction, but one of God's immutable laws for the social life of man. He has shown that the abundant life is not the static

prerogative of any favored few, but rather a progressive experience whose very nature demands expanding fraternal relationships.

I am not saying, of course, that the acquiring and applying of social attitudes can be achieved overnight, or without the necessity of facing great problems which will tax our intelligence, patience and courage. But I am saying that every step in that direction, however painfully slow and halting it may be, is sheer gain.

I mention one more thing, namely, what the phrase, "Son of Man," meant to the Son of man Himself. Let Him answer the question: "And he began to teach them, that the Son of man must suffer many things, and be rejected of the elders, and of the chief priests, and scribes, and be killed, and after three days rise again." It meant a cross. It is here that the Son of man and the Son of God meet in a unity so strong that by no process of thinking can they be separated. His enemies thought that they were merely putting to death an unimportant and troublesome Galilean peasant. But later they discovered their mistake. "Truly this was the Son of God," they said. It was at the cross that God's saving love met man's stupidity and sin. It was here that human darkness met the divine light, in a life that was at once victim and victor, a life that in the same act suffered for man and revealed the sufferings of God. The cross has therefore given reality to the gospel of the Son of man. It has shown us that love is not merely a soft sentiment; on the contrary, "Christ crucified . . . the power of God, and the wisdom of God." It has shown that love is not an accident in the universe, but reveals the very nature of ultimate reality. Such at least is our faith.

What, then, is the unique thing about the cross of the Son of man? Is it merely the fact that it glorifies sacrifice? Not at all. Millions have sacrificed their lives. Millions may do it again. The unique thing in the cross of the Son of man is not the fact that He was willing to die. It was rather the moral discrimination and spiritual insight that motivated His death; not the fact that He died, merely, but the values for which He died and the motives that led Him to Calvary. We die to gain. He died to give. We die for hate. He died for love. His life was not taken. He gave it. He died not in an effort to save Himself. In some mysterious way He died to save me. He died not to save His home. He died to save every home. He did not die to defend His country. He died to save every country from the enemies of mankind. He did not die merely to save

Palestine from the power of Rome, but to save Palestine and Rome and the world from the power of ignorance and sin. And whenever any God-like soul today so transcends self that he rises to the heights of such sacrifice, we instinctively feel that he has become heir to the fellowship of Christ's suffering and will know the power of His resurrection.

The personal and social consequences of this are tremendous. Every nation of the world is laboring under the terrific illusion that its enemies exist across some geographical boundary. Whether or not we have the insight to see or the courage to accept it, Jesus by His cross has shown that that concept is false. We do not slay our enemies when we slay our brothers, we merely multiply them. By the sword we slay each other. By His cross the Son of man attempted to slay the real enemies of all the sons of men. Those enemies have little to do with race, geography or class. "We wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against . . . the rulers of the darkness of this world. . . ." Hate, fear, ill-will, greed, ignorance, pride, racial and nationalistic bigotry—these are the real enemies of any country and every country. The cross of the Son of man therefore has shown us that a man's foes are they of his own household; that the real battlefield is not Flanders Field, but the human heart, and that the real weapons are not bullets and bayonets, but intelligent sacrifice, co-operative good will and redeeming love.

We may say, then, that if the Son of man by His life and teaching has humanized our thinking and socialized our attitudes, by His cross He has vitalized our life. He has brought us in contact with a dynamic and universal principle. Emerson said rightly that the name of Jesus was not so much written as plowed into the history of the world. But His cross is not merely historic. It is prophetic. It reveals a principle of life which may be vitally operative here and now. It is a principle which we believe has cosmic significance. It is "the eternal purpose which God purposed in Christ," in whom "ye that were once far off are made nigh," who "came and preached peace to you that were far off, and peace to them that were nigh."

This is no cheap or easy peace for cowardly hearts. Its sign is a cross, a cross of wounds: but a cross whose wounds are for the healing of the nations. That cross represented infinitely greater courage, vision and heroism than the flashing Roman armor that surrounded it. It is as we strive to share in the eternal purpose of that cross, the cross of the Son of man, that its saving and healing ministry will be mediated to our troubled world.

The Secret of Jesus

J. ALEXANDER FINDLAY

IN HIS great book, translated into English under the title *The Mediator*, Emil Brunner argues with great power that the Jesus of history could not, in the nature of the case, put the secret of His Person into words: "Even His teaching . . . is . . . simply an indication of the existence of this mystery, whether it explicitly deals with it or not. He does not say the word; He is the Word." The story of His life, death, and resurrection provides us with the one unsolved, and perhaps insoluble, riddle of history, just because the historian, if he is not also a believer—and qua believer, he must cease to be a mere historian—has no measurements by which to assess His place in the pageant of historical development. Jesus is either "God manifest in the flesh," or His recorded words and deeds are no better than an accumulation of unrelated paradoxes. So the "scientific" historian takes refuge in the assertion that the Gospels are the creation of the faith of the Church, that they have no relation to actual history, and so on; he does not and cannot tell us how the Church came to worship this Jesus, because, in the nature of the case, he cannot. In the end he has to violate his own canons, leaving the faith which conquered the ancient world suspended in mid-air, an effect without a cause.

He is, of course, right when he tells us that we must begin with the epistles, that not only the fourth Gospel, but the other three as well, are documents of faith. Even though one of them, the "Gospel according to Matthew," was written in reaction against, if not in opposition to, some forms of Paulinism, it is true of this Gospel, as of the others, that it assumes—indeed, is meaningless apart from—the belief that Jesus was "the Christ, the Son of the living God." If He was that, in the sense in which the Church declares He was, Eternity has broken into time and there is an incalculable factor in the equation, which the historian cannot resolve. So he ascribes everything except the bare fact that Jesus lived, and was crucified under Pontius Pilate, to "the faith of the Church"; in other words—wonder of wonders—Peter, or Peter and Paul together, created Jesus!

Any simple believer who has undertaken to read through such books as Schweitzer's *Quest of the Historical Jesus* or Bultmann's *Jesus and the*

Word must have felt his heart sink as the relentless knife of the critical historian cuts away section after section even of the Gospel which he had been taught to regard as the earliest and most trustworthy of the four, that according to Mark, until it seems that nothing is left. Then out of the meager remainder—smaller in Bultmann even than in Schweitzer—he watches the building up of a portrait of Jesus which has “feet and hands to carry a man away with,” which sets his soul on fire. No other books, ancient or modern, have been subjected to such searching analysis; every word has been weighed, every possible discrepancy or incoherency exposed. To some of us this seems a veritable vivisection, and we are inclined to say with Canon Ainger:

“With eager hands that oft have sliced
At Gentile gloss or Jewish fable
Before the crowd you laid the Christ
Upon the lecture-table.
‘From bondage to the old beliefs,’
You say, ‘our rescue must begin’—
But I—want rescue from my griefs
And saving from my sin.
The strong, the easy, and the glad
Hang, blandly listening, on your word—
But I am sick and I am sad,
And I need Thee, my Lord.”

The really amazing thing is that the thing of shreds and patches left after the critic has done his worst is “alive and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword” to strike at and pierce our souls. Cut these books to shreds, and every mutilated remnant comes to life; that is because God is in them, and no critical process can affect their life-changing power.

But, if God is incarnate in the Gospels, as in no other books known to man, we cannot hope to say beforehand, as the “scientific historian” does, what is or is not possible in a book written in the first century. We must expect to find a core of mystery which will not allow itself to be assessed by any standard learned from the study of contemporary literature. And this mystery will be most apparent when we consider the hints and suggestions which Jesus gives about the nature of His own inner life. Probably the ultimate reason why He chose to speak in “parables” was that He could not put the mystery of the Kingdom, which was His own inner life with His Father, in plain words: as Brunner says, He had, like the rest of us, to wear

a mask which only His intimates, and they only seldom, could penetrate. We talk of the humanity, the realism, of Mark's portraiture of Jesus, but all the vivid homely touches discernible by the careful reader—and how many and how precious they are!—do not really disclose His personality to us, as Shakespeare reveals Hamlet. That is not because of any defect in the evangelist's art; the impossibility of presenting a realistic portrait of Jesus lies in the nature of the subject-matter. In Mark 4. 11ff. Jesus is made to say that "those who are outside" can only "stare and stare, and never see," while to His disciples it is given to "know the mystery of the Kingdom," but later we are told (Mark 8. 17) that even the disciples, having eyes, saw not. What could they not see? They were alarmed because they had brought no bread with them, and did not realize that in this familiar Companion they had the God with them who could keep them alive without bread, if need be, for "man liveth not merely by bread, but by obedience to every word which passes God's lips." The feeding of the multitude should have taught them that when man is obedient to the Father's will, and only then, can the economic problem that casts its shadow over his history be solved; for then there will always be enough food for all and to spare. All other needful things will be added when he has learned to seek first the kingdom of God.

We must look, then, for a clue to the secret of Jesus in His obedience. The story of the temptation, which must have come from Jesus Himself, centers around His refusal to go one step beyond His instructions. To the temptation to solve the economic problem, for us and for Himself, by turning stones into loaves, we might think of various plausible answers; Jesus has only one. Whether it would be good for men to be able to live without working for their living—there are at least two sides to this question—it does not occur to Him to discuss. It is enough for Him that, if His Father had meant Him to turn stones into bread, He would have told Him so. Much the larger proportion of the human race, now as then, live on the land, and are of necessity chiefly occupied with the problem of bare subsistence. The rest are living in great cities, and consequently crave not only or chiefly for food, but for excitement; "*panis et circenses*"—the dole and the cinema—are still the chief concern of the vast majority of men and women. So the second temptation is to impressive advertisement, casting Himself down from the temple before a crowd of admiring spectators. As this might have less appeal to a philanthropic mind than the first temptation, it is reinforced

by an appeal to the Old Testament; it is important to observe that Jesus thought in Old Testament terms. From the verse of the psalm quoted "in all thy ways" is omitted, perhaps because to cast Himself down from the temple would have been to go out of His way. Again Jesus does not discuss the ethics of advertisement, but answers that He will not play tricks with His Father, and see how far He can go without getting hurt. "Then, if You will not go the high way of power, if You will neither feed nor overawe them, You must go the low way of compromise," the tempter says, and with this unmasks himself. "I know who you are now," says Jesus: "be off with you, Satan!"

The fourth Gospel brings out the obedience of Jesus in a score of ways. "The Son can do nothing but what he sees the Father doing"; "Your time is always ready" (you can work to schedule, and make engagements beforehand). "My time is not yet come" (I have not got the signal yet, and consequently cannot make up My mind till I get the word). Not only His death but even His resurrection is the outcome of obedience, for "I lay down my life that I may take it again; *this command* I received from my Father."

The difference between Jesus and all the rest of us then is not to be looked for only or perhaps even chiefly in His will to obey, but in His direct and unmistakable knowledge of His Father's purpose, in His consciousness of guidance. He can see the Father doing things, hear Him saying things. Many of us feel that we should be ready enough to obey, if we could be sure what the will of God is. Nor does the knowledge of Jesus concern merely the general trend of His life, what we should call the once-for-all surrender which involves a change of direction, but each particular moment, every detailed choice. Perhaps even more than the reinforcement of our purpose of obedience, we need the opening of our eyes and ears. No degree of pressure which we can put upon ourselves can achieve this illumination; it must be a gift of grace; it must be given by a Mediator.

Can we be more specific in our description of the gulf that separates our earthbound minds from His? Our very prayers betray that it exists. We pray to God to intervene to help us to save the world, to bring the Kingdom in, as though God were not there already. The great achievement of the prophets of Israel consisted in the fact that they learned to see God at work, making even "the wrath of men to praise him," even when there was nothing doing, or things seemed to be going from bad to worse. We have lost this sense of the sovereignty of God; we cannot see Fascism or Communism

being used as instruments of His purposes. Jesus and His disciples lived in different worlds because they thought the kingdom of God meant a world remolded to their hearts' desire, and they thought that Jesus was to be God's agent in bringing that kingdom in, while for Jesus the task of life was not to strive so much as to see, and then to "receive the kingdom of God." "Unless a man is born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God," said Jesus. So to the last they hoped against hope that Jesus was mistaken, that God would not let Him die upon the cross, that He would intervene as "a god out of a machine." Only after His resurrection could they see that God could not intervene, because He was there, on the cross, already. It is still the same with us; Jesus is a "stranger" still, because we ask God to come in and help us out of the confusion of our lives and of the world we live in, and we have not learned to see God in the situation as it is. "What happened at Pentecost" was that the disciples realized that God had come down to stay. Pilate was still in Jerusalem, Herod undisturbed in Galilee; not one of their former dreams had come true; but no matter, they saw Him doing things, and here and now, because they saw and felt Him working upon and among them, they were irresistible.

The process began when after His resurrection they "worshiped Jesus." For them He was now what He had always been, a heavenly Being clothed in human flesh and blood. Now and again their eyes had been half opened: when, for instance, He rose from His sleep and rebuked the wind and waves, and they said, "Who is this?" when He came walking on the water, and looked as though He would *pass by them*. (Mark 6. 48.) They caught a glimpse of His transience then, that His real home was not here, but there. Peter made a valiant attempt to "walk on the water" with Him; because he did so, he qualified to become the first "son of the Spirit," the rock on which the unconquerable Church is for ever built. At Caesarea Philippi and on Mount Hermon he had his reward, but his earthliness came back as the mountain-mist sweeps over the summit again, and hides the seldom-seen view of far distances. After the resurrection for a time "their eyes are holden" still, but now they are at least ready to listen without interruption. They had hoped "that it would be he who should redeem Israel," but those expectations are things of the past; His own word had come true, when He said, "In that day you shall ask me no questions." He is still transient, come from God and on His way back again, for we are told "he

made as though he had further to go." He has come out of the everywhere into here, and now is returning home, binding this world and that together. He is to be our forerunner, our representative there; the Holy Spirit, God manifest in the Spirit as He had been manifest in the flesh. He is to be His representative here (I still think "representative" the best translation of "Paraclete" both in John 15. 26; 16. 7, and in 1 John 2. 1). That is why Mary must not cling to Him, and "immediately" the two disciples at Emmaus recognize Him He vanishes "out of their sight."

Yet if He is to be a real "Mediator" He cannot be altogether and only a stranger. If He is always to be in the world where God is at work already and we are in another world into which we hope and pray that God will some day come, our world which is real enough, God knows, will be closed to Him; there will be a region of our experience which He cannot enter, and therefore cannot redeem. We get glimpses of His world, but the mist rolls over the mountain again, and we must walk "by faith, not by sight." The divinest thing about the Gospels is that we can see Him catching a glimpse of ours, a world in which prayers seem not to be answered, a world in which God is not. So in Gethsemane and in the forsaken cry on Calvary He who was God and man in one visits our darkness and redeems it by His coming. But, whereas with us earthliness comes back, with Him heavenliness comes back, and the path from one to the other is still obedience. "Not my will, but thine be done," He says in Gethsemane, and "Father, into thy hands I commend my Spirit," He says on the cross. The way to illumination must then be still obedience; "If anyone willeth to do his will, he shall understand the teaching" (the secret of Jesus), for "whoever does the will of my Heavenly Father, he is brother, sister, and mother to me." We cannot "love" our enemies until we see the Father sending His rain and sunshine down upon all men, whether they obey or disobey His will. When we can say every day to our risen and ascended Lord, "What wilt thou have me to do?" He will give us eyes to see, even in the present state of Church and world, God at work, bringing, not our, but *God's* Kingdom in. We shall not need any longer to bring men to God, but shall by our very presence show Him to them; we shall be like Jesus "sons of" our "Father in Heaven," heavenly beings too. The way, and the only way, to learn the secret of the obedience of Jesus is worshiping obedience to Jesus.

Thinking Through the Meaning of the Holy Spirit

MARY FRANCES THELEN

IN THE current reinterpretation of theological doctrines in terms of their vital bearing upon life, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is one which has not received its fair share of attention. The neglect of it seems surprising, for there is no lack of general interest in the subject of religious experience, which is the area to which the idea of the Holy Spirit is supposed to be relevant. We are all desirous of more religious power, more vitality, more warmth of devotion for ourselves, and of "another Pentecost" for the nation. We are willing to try every clew to the understanding of the work of the Spirit, whether it come from psychology, from biology, from sociology, from the lives of the mystics, or from mental hygiene. Why should we not at least try the clew from theology and biblical experience and see whether there is not fresh insight to be had from the thought that God's dealings with creation (and hence creation's "experience" of God) fall into three significant divisions—the work of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit?

The scarcity of really clear and concrete discussion of the work of the Holy Spirit in relation to that of the Father and the Son, in the face of the promising character of the clew, is rather mystifying until one begins to read the literature in the field and finds that not only do the theologians disagree in their conception of what the Holy Spirit is, but their discussions seem not to meet one another. This second difficulty, however, is less of an obstacle than it appears; if one persists even a little time in his reading, he will find that when arguments miss one another, they have simply passed on different planes. For some theories of the Trinity, and hence of the Holy Spirit, are speculative in type, some are cosmological, and some are experiential. Hence definitions may fail to meet by serving different interests; furthermore, arguments may be confusing because the authors have moved back and forth between different planes without giving warning. If one will but classify as he reads, he can keep his sense of direction and have his material ready at the end for comparison and judgment.

I. A sampling of representative discussions of the meaning of the

doctrine of the Holy Spirit would probably begin historically with the speculative trinities of the credal period, during which the nature and relations of the three Persons were construed in the likeness of distinctions within a self-conscious individual or of relations within a group of persons. The rather badly named "Social Trinity" suggested by Augustine among other analogies from individual activity is the best known of these today. In the amended form described by W. R. Matthews in *God in Christian Experience* it characterizes God the Father as forthgoing love and proceeds to identify the Son with that perfect *persona* in the Godhead which must exist in order to receive the complete love of the Father. The Holy Spirit it then sees as the relation of mutual love which exists between the Father and the Son.

Another early example of a speculative Trinity is the frankly pluralistic or tritheistic conception which declares the three *personae* to be centers of complete self-consciousness, mutually cognizant of one another.

Probably the freshest attempt at a speculative interpretation of the Trinity offered within our own day (and one which includes also an experiential discrimination) is that of K. Kirk, in his essay in *Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation*. Doctor Kirk feels that the original meaning of *persona* is to be recovered by thinking of a center of functioning which is yet less than a complete personality and points out that Christian experience reveals three such ways in which God's activity toward us is organized. When we know ourselves to be the *δοῦλος*, the slave, it is God the Father upon whom we are dependent for our creation and redemption. When we walk in the steps of the Author and Pioneer of our faith, it is Christ with whom we have fellowship. But when we are recipients of virtue, power, human friendship, and other gifts over and above our creation and redemption, it is to the Holy Spirit that our thanks are due.

II. The second plane upon which discussions of the Trinity have been conducted is what we may call the cosmological—the type of approach which takes the whole of the universe as the arena of God's action within which the Persons are to be located. Within this group two general schemes present themselves, one which identifies God with the spiritual aspects of the universe, and another which, taking the universal Spirithood of God for granted as implied in his personality, tries to find divisions within his work in the world which may be assigned to the three Persons.

Spirit as the equivalent of God, the first scheme, appears in a number

of theologies. Greek philosophy, with its bifurcation of the world into the realm of unchanging reality and that of contingent particularity, led up to Johannine and subsequent Greek theology, in which the Divine, the realm of Spirit, of eternal life, and of the essence of immortality, was set over against the realm of our finite mortality. Again, Hebrew philosophy, if one can follow H. Wheeler Robinson, in *The Christian Experience of the Holy Spirit*, in making explicit what in the Old Testament is only implicit, originally took its cue from psychic life and thought of the Spirit of God as the source and breath of all that was alive, but after the teaching of the great prophets and the Exile identified God's Spirit with spirituality ethically conceived. Today the major interest of such writers as Doctor Robinson and the authors of the opening essays in Streeter's anthology, *The Spirit*, is essentially in the Spirithood of God, which they regard as a conception covering all God's activities which because less metaphorical than Fatherhood or Sonship should be far more useful in interpreting his work in the world to our generation.

The other cosmological scheme, that which tries to find distinct aspects of God's work which may be assigned to the various Persons, has found at least two recent adherents. Dean Mathews suggests equating Christ with the final cause, the end of creation, and the Holy Spirit with the efficient cause, the *nisus*. Archbishop Temple, in *Nature, Man, and God*, proposes that we recognize as the Word all expression of God save the response of finite spirits, and that we denote by the Holy Spirit all responsive appreciation of finite spirits—a mode of God first recognized as distinct with the coming of the Paraclete after the death of Jesus but subsequently read back by reflection to apply to more-or-less similar experiences before the Christian era.

III. The third plane upon which the attempt to differentiate the Persons of the Trinity has been made is that of human (religious) experience. The simplest strand in the New Testament thought of the Holy Spirit is of this sort. The author of Luke-Acts, Paul, and John in his conception of the Paraclete were agreed that whatever else the Holy Spirit might be or do, it was a Spirit which came upon a group of disciples after Jesus' death and was to continue among them the same type of work which he had begun. (The predictions that Jesus himself would return in their hearts simply stand parallel to and unreconciled with those concerning the Paraclete; by the time the Church was troubled by the duplication and

forced to make a choice, the Logos Christology was so firmly in the saddle that she chose to assign the continuing ministry to the Risen Christ and the Pre-existent Logos rather than to the Holy Spirit, and thus left very little concrete content for the latter.)

Possession of the Holy Spirit knit the Christians together in a Fellowship; it gave them the sense of the presence of God through Christ; it conferred upon them power to do that which before they could not; it stimulated them to missionary endeavor; and it gave them heightened insight into the meaning of the spiritual truths which Jesus had sought to impart to them. In the earliest days of the Fellowship speaking with tongues and other ecstatic manifestations were considered the chief marks of its presence; subsequently we have 1 Corinthians 12-13 and such statements as that "the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, self-control" (Galatians 5. 22); and we perceive that the experience of the Holy Spirit in the New Testament underwent the same shift from the abnormally superhuman to the ethically superhuman as it had done in the Old Testament.

The New Testament experience of the Holy Spirit is continuous with the Old Testament experience of the Spirit of God in the association of both of them with revelation, heightened power, and even the sense of the presence of God (Psalm 51). Two new conceptions are introduced by the New Testament: conformity to the character of Jesus, and the tendency to create fellowship among those receiving the Spirit. Of these characteristics the latter has been regarded as the most important of all by a major strand in Christian theology. Thus Schleiermacher defined the Holy Spirit as the Divine Nature united to the Church in the same way in which in Christ the Divine Nature had been united to Jesus of Nazareth. According to him there could be no Christian experience except within the fellowship of the Church. Since the one case of Jesus, God has not come to any individual alone, but comes to the individual incidentally to coming to the whole body of Christ. If Schleiermacher seems extreme in his position, it must be remembered that he is but setting forth the reasoning underlying the Catholic and high church contention that outside of the Church there is no salvation.

Schleiermacher's exclusive position concerning the Holy Spirit is having its following in contemporary theology and will hardly be avoidable in many circles in the near future as collectivism and nationalism become

habitual modes of thought. If, however, we go for a picture of contemporary experience of the Holy Spirit to what is always the best source—the hymns which we are singing in church—we shall conclude, I think, that the predominant conception is of a Bestower of gifts, especially that of warmth of devotion of fervor, and that the best synonym would be “sense of the presence of God,” whence comes the heightening of spiritual faculties. In this interpretation we shall find ourselves supported by Bishop Gore, whose exclusive theological position would then seem to be based upon a departure from simple piety:

“And up to a certain point there is a more or less general agreement among seriously religious people as to the meaning of life in the Spirit. It is to be possessed, and feel ourselves to be possessed, by an inward power and presence greater than ourselves, a power and presence which we acknowledge to be God working in us, to give us spiritual enlightenment as to the purpose of life, and the knowledge of himself, and personal guidance, and power to control our passions, and the pre-eminent gift of love.”¹

When we have completed our survey of some of the representative interpretations of the Trinity and of the work of the Holy Spirit and turn to weighing and judging, seeking to determine what an acceptable concept would be, we find that happily we are still aided by the figure of the three planes which helped us to group the theories. The figure helps us to formulate two axioms of method with which to press further: the demand of intellectual thoroughness that all three planes be included in the solution, and the demand of economy that if possible a single definition for each of the *personae* be found which can be carried through on all three planes.

With these formal requirements for the ideal theory in mind, let us take up the various possible positions, bringing in such other criteria of usage, experience, and taste, as may prove necessary. And first, as to the three speculative theories, we see that the Group Trinity cannot be given any meaning which will relate its three Persons to members of economic trinities given in the cosmos or in religious experience. Furthermore, this Trinity, Augustine's Trinity of love, and Robinson's Trinity alike are undercut of Doctor Tennant's demonstration that the description given by the Creeds of the *personae* as being of one substance are verbal formulae to indicate entities intermediate between subjects and attributes, to which

¹ *The Holy Spirit and the Church*, p. 2.

nothing real corresponds.² (Perhaps Robinson has hit upon something real in between, but if so, it turns out to be something suspiciously like what psychology knows as split personality!) Thus Tennant shows that we must choose between tritheism and monarchianism, of which the Church has always preferred, and we too must prefer, the latter. But this is the same as to give up the notion of an ontological trinity.

There remain for us then the cosmological and experiential trinities. The first group of the former, which identify the Holy Spirit with the Spirithood of God, we shall have to set down as really abandoning the endeavor to formulate a trinitarian conception. The Spirithood of God is true but tautologous, and to identify the Holy Spirit with it is to slight the problem of the Paraclete and to surrender the possibility of finding any different phases or aspects of divine activity which are to be denoted as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. We must seek to find a way of focusing the Spirithood of God in the Holy Spirit of Pentecostal experience as we do the Christhood of God in Jesus of Nazareth.

Of the second group of cosmological theories, Mathews' giving over of form to Christ and activity or matter to the Holy Spirit must fall before the charge of leaving nothing for God the Father to do. Similarly Temple, in keeping God the Father remote from the world, unexpressed in it save through the Word, seems to violate the religious feeling of anyone whose piety centers in the Father and who has rejected the Greek bifurcation of the universe and the resulting Logos theology for a conception of God as Moral Will who may himself become immanent. Nevertheless, Temple's Trinity makes important contributions toward an acceptable solution at two points: in dividing God's activity into that which is immanent in the response of finite spirits and all other he has made a distinction which is at once important and illuminating in both cosmology and religious experience. And in defining the Holy Spirit as something first recognized at a point after Jesus' death but subsequently legitimately acknowledged elsewhere, he has at once stayed close to the facts of Christian experience and done justice to the best experience before and outside of the Church.

As moderns who accept the Greek Logos Christology may follow Temple despite the remoteness of his God, so those wishing a very high ecclesiology may choose to follow Schleiermacher in what I have called the

² *Philosophical Theology*, Vol. II, p. 263.

experiential group (although in staying close to the historical unfolding of Christian experience Schleiermacher arrives at a Trinity which is useless both in cosmology and as a way of explaining the different modes of God's activity within contemporary experience). His theory is logically self-consistent, gives account of all three Persons, and allows for the conformity of the Spirit to Christ, the stress on fellowship, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Where most of us will agree that it falls short is in disparaging individual experience, especially outside the Church, and in neglecting to yield any contemporary usefulness.

As none of the views included in our survey seems to be wholly satisfactory when put to the test, I should like in conclusion to sketch two theories which are drawn upon lines similar to that of Temple's, but which reject his Greek separation of God and the world and give a major place to the work of God the Father. Both delineate the Persons in terms which have application within the *cosmós* at large and within religious experience; they move on both the planes which we have found left to us after eliminating the speculative. I shall make no secret of the fact that I prefer the second, finding it fitting in better with other thinking and opening up more vistas of usefulness; nevertheless I set both down together with the interests which they serve and leave it to the reader to balance the alternatives for himself.

The first theory is intended to appeal to those who are concerned to make clear the difference of Jesus from all other men and who consider the influence of the Risen Christ an experience of major importance. It assigns to God the Father the authorship of creation and of our lives and makes him the initiator of revelation, the source and objective of religious experience. "Christ," in this theory, denotes Jesus of Nazareth and the Risen Christ, the Christlike influence on the lives of people which sprang from Jesus. The Holy Spirit is the active motivation of God in the lives of all people and is immanent in nature as the ground of progress.

The second will make its appeal to those who wish to emphasize the calling (however impossible of achievement) to each one of us to become an *alterum Christos*, another Christ. It agrees with the view just described in making God the Father the Author of creation and revelation. It differs, however, in pronouncing all openness and loyalty of finite creatures to the good to be Christlike and attributing it to participation in the second rather than in the third Person of the Trinity. The Holy Spirit it then

reserves for the experience of fellowship and love, with the resulting gift of power and others, which arises when the good is consciously given a religious interpretation, is recognized as containing the presence of the Christ-like God. As Christlikeness was first given content and definition by the life of Jesus and only subsequently and fragmentarily extended to lesser incarnations within and without the Church, so the Holy Spirit was first recognized as a distinct mode of God's activity with the coming of the Paraclete and subsequently interpreted as present to some degree in all religious experience in which God is thought of as loving.

I like to recommend the second view for its generosity toward the religious values implicit in "merely" ethical and pagan religious experience and again for its ability to handle the often-heard question, "When is an experience religious?" It is able to say that all experience is religious to some degree in that God the Father is exercising the Divine Initiative through it, calling to his children, however unresponsive and deaf they may be. But experience in which there is some loyalty to the good, even if it is not seen to reveal God, or is had by an unbeliever, is more religious; for then Christ is at work in the character of the individual concerned as well as God the Father's being in the presented good. Finally, however, experience in which a sense of fellowship with God is added to the other two is alone fully religious, for then the Holy Spirit also is present and is able to add his distinctive gifts.

The advantage of the first view, on the other hand, is that while it may have begun with the desire to exalt Jesus as a great source of religious experience, it fits a trifle more smoothly into contemporary philosophy of religion and the interest of Doctor Robinson and Canon Streeter. If one wishes to extend the immanence of God in human spiritual purpose downward to the most embryonic forms of agency within nature, it is less bizarre to ascribe such immanence to the Spirit than to Christ; even though it is true that there is precedent for the latter in some forms of the Logos doctrine.

Finally, while an advocate of the former might accuse the latter of not being sufficiently historical in its treatment of Christ, the latter may accuse the former of the same in regard to the Holy Spirit; and the observer seeking to formulate his own theory may take note that one or the other is the price of departing from Schleiermacher's historicity in the interests of a greater and more humble broad-mindedness.

The Strategy of Christian Living

ALLAN KNIGHT CHALMERS

SIMPLIFICATION—which sounds as if it belonged in the Mock Turtle's famous list of higher mathematics: Distraction, Uglification, and Derision—is one of the sins of the preacher. It ought to be viewed with mistrust by everyone who recognizes sentimentalism as one of the major sins of the Christian Church. As dangerous as a surgeon's scalpel in the hands of a child is the habit of man to solve his problems with a nice, neat phrase.

"The trouble with the world is—" we say smugly.

"What the world needs is—" we bring in our neat conclusion.

I care not how true is the statement of solution, simplification has too sharp an edge to be swished around in the state of confusion which ordinarily rules the mind of man.

Memory goes back to a man I met in my youth whose experience with the difficulties of a black race in a white and only sentimentally Christian world were such that I thought, in my innocence, I might learn from him the solution of the race problem (horrid word—but it is a problem however we try to skip around it by euphonious phrases). "What, in your opinion," I asked, "is the solution of the race problem?"

Leaning forward and fixing me solemnly with an Ancient Mariner eye, he said, "We must put the love of God into the hearts of men."

Just as solemnly I leaned forward and said, "That's just bunk! Love, of course that is the ultimate. But it is not the immediate. What I want to know is what love means as the next practical step. When I'm up against a difficult situation, how do I know what next to do?"

I chased him around for three quarters of an hour trying to pin him down. He had no idea of what the solution was. He was all entangled in the invisible and unconscious complexities of his simplification.

But if solutions cannot be simply stated in the higher mathematics of the spiritual world, problems can. I do not need to be too worried about the infinite series of continuing fractions which is the approximation of π to truth, to know that it is necessary to have some practical idea of how big

a space one has to work with before starting to build even a chicken-coop on a plot of ground.

And so it is not a false simplification to say that the problem of the local church, and the minister as the director of its spiritual energies, could be implied in this question, "*How do you plan things so that what you have to use will accomplish what you want to do?*"

When your church needs paint, and your choir needs new voices, and your trustees need spiritual literacy, and your deacons need faith in man, and your ladies' aid needs a new carpet and a new program, how, with what you have available, do you do this job you are set to do? How do we remain unconformed to this world, and keep our people from being conformed to it, so that the Church will be that transforming agent effecting on this earth the kingdom of God, and producing those worthy of calling God—Father?

This is "The Strategy of Christian Living."

I did not like the word at first—"strategy." It sounded too cold, too mechanical. I tried to find another phrase and found many, but they did not say what was needed.

"Methods of Church Work" was not the phrase. The connotation in my mind was systems, organizational set-ups, schemes. It took me back to a conference of some three hundred theological students who had asked me to lead a discussion on "How to Become Effective Leaders of a Great Church." I had the greatest difficulty in getting them to talk about anything but methods of recruiting new members, keeping people busy, giving them something to do. "A busy church is a happy church," they quoted smugly. "We want to know how to make a church grow in numbers and budget until it becomes successful—great."

I defined a great church with these words: "A great church is one, large or small in numbers, that helps the members who compose it in their personal and societal relationships to grow constantly in two things: the ability to see—clearly and accurately—and the power to walk—strongly, steadily—the way that is Christlike."

They told me that was not practical; that the Church, to be a power, must be built like a business. They gave me the impression that the Church was a factory. Its members were its products to be counted like so many clothespins, little two-legged figures with neat round heads on them. Ministers were the general managers with the job of speeding up production.

How many gross of Christians did you produce last year stamped with the denominational trade-mark?

The word "method" made me remember the minister who proudly said, "There isn't a night in the week that the windows of my church aren't lighted. We have a seven-day-a-week church."

The poor man was nearly crazy. Committee meetings and conferences, circular follow-up letters rolling off the mimeograph, wheels within wheels.

"I'm writing an article for *Church Management*," he said, "on 'The Efficient Church Office.' Let me show you my card catalog filing system."

I excused myself.

You have all come out of the whirl of a large factory with its buzzing machines, to the comparative quiet of the streets. You know how I felt as I left that church. Its juggernaut wheels still haunt my sleep.

In a "great" city church, I picked up this bulletin one day. It was produced by the young people, and this was the lead editorial:

"Let us not allow the meeting to drag *one minute* tonight. Such awful pauses give strangers a poor impression of our meeting. Let us have more to say than there is time in which to say it. If we haven't something to say, let's say something anyhow. If you can't figure it out in any other way, it's good practice in public speaking."

Isn't that a terrible indictment of Christianity? "If you haven't something to say, say something anyhow." The Church is in danger of doing just that. Activity, its chariot wheels of progress dragging Christ a captive behind it.

No, "Methods of Church Work" did not mean all I meant.

"Techniques for the Parish" had an interesting sound to it. I'm keen on techniques. Most of us are not good workmen with our tools. We botch too much material because we have no skill. It is a valuable spiritual "retreat" for a minister, every once in a while, to watch a skilful surgeon perform an operation. We can learn much from the sight of those sure hands, that purposeful procedure. There is an order to an operation which is very stimulating. Each movement follows rightly the one preceding it. It is "begun, continued, and ended," to use the words of the old prayer, and, once begun, it must be finished.

How many sick souls are buried in spiritual graveyards under the dull clods of our sentimental good intentions because we neither rightly

diagnosed nor skilfully excised the evil growth that was there. We need to learn to handle our tools—and we shall come back to this point.

Yet technique is not enough. It does not say all we mean.

"Strategy" is the word which comes insistently to mind. It *is* strategy I mean. How do you plan things so that what you have to use will accomplish what you want to do? This is "The Parish Problem."

Strategy implies more than method or technique. It suggests that one holds in one's mind the object of the journey, as well as the knowledge of the trail and skill and stamina in traversing it. Strategy is an inclusive word without losing the sense of effectiveness.

Out of this background in which we have tried to make clear some things that strategy is not, we begin now with what it is.

Obviously, in the brief space of a magazine article, one has to assume some things.

This is one of them: We are going to assume that there is a body of opinion, sufficiently accepted for substance of doctrine, which is the material in which we work. The knowledge of this content of religion is a major responsibility. So many of our fine Christian people are spiritually illiterate. There *are* things we know. We cannot stop to argue that. We must assume it, dogmatic though it sounds.

A few examples are required:

We know that this life, over and in which the God and Father of our Lord and Master, Jesus the Christ, is existent, is, in intent and possibility, a universe, not a chaos. You can find many who will disagree, but these do not belong in the Christian Church.

We know that truth is one, not many. Therefore we are not afraid to face any fact. Whenever an old concept has been proven false, we should rejoice as a scientist does, not weep the way a priest does, for we know that in the discovery of error we are that much nearer the truth.

We know that love is a unifying force and hate a chaotic one. Since we know that, we must not pretend that we can reach the goal of a universe by using the weapons of its denier.

We know that this mysterious entity known as man is a personality of incalculable worth and unbelievable spiritual capacity. We marvel at the tensile strength of his matured and tempered spirit. Oh, yes, it snaps at times, either because man loses faith and hope in the purposed goal or

because he is afraid for himself. But Angela Morgan's thrilling verse, called "Faith," is a part of our knowledge:

"Though a thousand times I feel the thrust
Of faith betrayed, I still have faith in man,
Believe him pure and good since time began—
Thy child forever, though he may forget
The perfect mould in which his soul was set."

Obviously we do know—must know—certain things of which these are examples. For the purpose of this article we must assume that there is a conceivable body of opinion upon which we could agree, or at least upon which we, as individuals, would stand—alone, if need be.

Yet it is not the content, but the necessity of having it, that concerns us now.

The strategy of Christian living needs, first of all, that we have "defensible frontiers." This is a queer metaphor for a pacifist, taken as it is out of military strategy. But Jesus said one day in a parable, misunderstood as much if not more than any other, that the children of this earth are often wiser in their generation than the children of light. If the militarists have discovered a truth about the nature of life, we should be glad to learn by their wisdom.

Empire builders have always known a truth about empires. It was Lord Curzon who stated the principle when he said that no empire could endure which did not have "defensible frontiers."

The phrase is obviously true. We must make it vivid. I find myself, when I hear those words, standing once more in the Great Fort Douaumont on Verdun's hills looking out of that narrow observation slit toward the German lines. There in the mud of the shell-chewed hillside I could see the flags which marked the place where that German fell who came nearest to the fort on the whole segment of that front. It was a wavy line. As the waves of the ocean beat against a headland, so the German shock troops pounded that citadel. They never submerged it. Up, up, they came—receded; built on preceding waves the way an ocean does until one wave ran far up on the shore—receded. Up—up—up again—and left their futile highwater mark lined in red upon the mud of those fields.

The storm ended and the fort still stood. As long as any men were left to stand there, even as Horatius on the bridge across the Tiber, or as Leonidas at Thermopylae, it could not be taken.

This is a lesson the Christian needs to learn. There are theoretical absolutes, of course; and about them it is possible to have long arguments. But there are certain practical absolutes, as well. Times and places where a man says with Luther, "Here stand I, God help me, Amen." And about these there is no argument. You make your choice and stand.

To have knowledge that nothing is able to separate you from certain ideas and attitudes: that neither death nor life, nor angels nor principalities nor powers, neither things present nor to come, neither height nor depth, nothing can drag you below a standard you have set. To know that apparently for all time certain temptations are safely held in their excluded place by the tensile strength of one's own spirit, is one of the great joys of life. To be not afraid when temptation recurs, knowing that you have a life too full to allow it to enter, this is to have, in the empire of the spirit, defensible frontiers.

It is the empty life—the life filled with an unsure hope—that has room for the seven devils to come in. The Christian life must be rooted and grounded in great convictions. Not ideas wistfully used as possibilities but convictions which have become an indivisible part of one's nature. We must know that in which we believe. It is important to be sure about that.

But your trouble and mine is not so much that we do not know enough. We know enough—enough to take us far along the way. What holds us back is that we are not good workmen with the tools and material we have.

In this lies the second necessary word to be spoken. Strategy implies not only material—defensible frontiers in the content of belief—but also tools, precise, tempered, effective. Obviously, no form of Christianity is intelligent which does not have at hand and know how to use keen-edge tools.

This means that there must be in our perception and presentation of the truth of Christianity an exactness of understanding and a sharpness of action that cuts. The Christian life needs a cutting edge. This is what Jesus told us clearly in that statement, often wrongly used by militarists, who are such literalists. He said, "I came not to bring peace but the sword." Read in its context it is evident that Jesus was talking about the divisive character of the truth. "I came to divide you from father and mother, from son and daughter, from all your loyalties and responsibilities, if need be. This is the supreme loyalty—to let the knife edge of truth fall where it should, cost what it may." Let us take one manifestation of this truth.

Any life which has in it a redeeming quality—redeeming of itself and redemptive for society—must have in it a program of discontent. (The phrase is Whitehead's.) This is essential to any sane strategy of Christian living in such a world.

Now discontent, like satire, is a dangerous instrument. In blundering or unskilled hands it can destroy rather than cure a sick world. So conscious am I of the responsibility of that cutting edge that I have at times watched and waited (I'm thinking of a particular parish problem) three months before saying a single sentence. I knew what that sentence was. It took exactly two seconds to say it. But it could not be borne by the one who was to hear it. Poison would have spread throughout a life if the incision had been made before its time. When the time came, that spiritual operation had to be performed with the keenness of exact knowledge and the skill of long practice in thinking it through. One chance I was to have. Just one. A life depended on whether I did my job perfectly; not well enough, perfectly.

I think again of the hands of that surgeon moving. Just so, and a dangerous growth is removed. Just so, the fingers move, the knife cuts. Just so.

It took two seconds, and that sick soul was healed. Two seconds, but what an eternity between them. God may in His wisdom forgive us, but how can we forgive ourselves that we blunder so often?

But with all that necessary caution about its possible destructive effect, the statement still stands. It sounds queer, doesn't it? The hope of salvation for the world lies in a program of discontent. Yet this is the only possible attitude for a religion of perfection. This, strange as it sounds, is the reaction of the optimist. They are the pessimists, not believing in any deep foundational sense in themselves, or man, or the world, or the God whose holiness they profess, who stabilize life at arbitrary values. Cheerfully content are these, satisfied, in such a world as this, to give one tenth of their income, and to go to church twice a week, and to keep within the laws. This is no world in which a decent man has a right to rest content. The contented man is fundamentally a pessimist.

It is the optimist, believing fundamentally, positively, hopefully, in beauty and truth and the perfect life, who remains forever discontent with this life we know until the Kingdom comes.

Do you remember the first time you realized that men, women, and little children were caught in the relentless grinding of a machine-like industrial system which had power in abundance to take from the backs of struggling humanity the burden of poverty? Caught not because it was necessary in nature, but because some were afraid of losing their privileges, and, in their unwillingness to use their power, created an artificial scarcity in the midst of plenty to sustain, or to attempt to recover, a false prosperity? Have you become so used to it that you say, "Oh, well, that's the way of the world," or are you still searching with a hurting sense of your own sin to discover the processes by which our power may become the door of opportunity to the abundant life for everyone?

The strategy of Christian living requires that our religion shall use knowledge as a keen, precise, tempered tool.

But the strategy of Christian living also needs method.

Strategy implies technique. What we have said so far was necessary lest anyone say that we were expecting Christianity to arrive by techniques which were not rooted and grounded in meaning. Now, however, we ask ourselves, "How do we affect the lives of people and the life of society so that Christianity is effective?"

From now on we turn the pages of a clinical note-book, grouping actual problems and the techniques for their solution under the heading of the principles that give the techniques meaning.

There are two natural divisions, now, of our topic, and there is space to treat only one.

This is the general division of "Personal Religion and the Life of Devotion," to use Dean Inge's title, where we can look at the therapeutic power of freedom as a curative principle affecting the life of an individual.

There is also the second conventional division of Christianity, the Social Gospel, where, if we had space, we would look at some experiments with the power of fellowship, or, to use the old expression, the Communion of Saints.

But we must concentrate for the purpose of this article only on the first division, and think in particular of the therapeutic power of the principle of freedom.

Freedom is a fact according to any conception of the world which gives man dignity. The world could be quite glorious for Somebody or some

Thing without freedom for man coming into the picture. God could still have a kind of glory which He doubtless could enjoy for what it was worth. But a world becoming at last the kingdom of God wherein man had no choice would be a hollow triumph for a God worthy of man's adoration. Browning expresses the fact when he says:

"God who brought man into being,
Stands, as it were, a handbreadth off,
To give room for the newly made to live
And to look at Him from a place apart,
And use his gifts of brain and heart.
Given, indeed, but to keep forever."

Granted, of course, that freedom has very obvious limitations, and granted, furthermore, that the man who imagines he chooses may find himself at the end to be but a puppet on the strings of God.

Nevertheless, we must posit in any reasonable concept of liberal Christianity, the fact of freedom.

Now mark you, I'm not saying "probably we have no freedom, but let's live as if we had it." I am saying that freedom explains better than any other theological principle I know the facts of the life about us. This is not, however, an argument about freedom. It is the assertion of the principle under which Christianity operates. Certainly it is implicit in Jesus' revelation of God.

Not only is freedom a matter of fact, however. It is also a principle of action. We must not give it just lip service. A pretty good practical definition, by the way, of a principle would be that oft-heard statement in which we say, "I believe in the idea, but it won't work in this case." With peace, it is always after the next war. With adventure, it is always for the next chance. With the kingdom of God, it is always the job of the next generation.

But if the principle is true, it is workable, and we must work it beyond the edge of the surety of success. We must try it in those specific instances where with courage we risk everything personal to ourselves upon it. Here again an element of danger comes in. Freedom is a power so great that men are quite right in questioning, "But will not man with such freedom destroy himself?" It is possible. The prodigal in Jesus' story about God might never have returned from the far country. But Jesus knew that God does not cheapen man's relationship with Himself by compelling man to

choose His way. A love compelled is a tyranny, be it of God or man. The only life worth living is one free to destroy itself, which chooses not to do so.

Freedom is the chance God took when He made man; and freedom is the chance man must take if he is to be like God.

Let us illustrate now from what a doctor might call the clinical notebook. Obviously, I must use the device of all who speak from the doctor's consultation room or the minister's confessional, and change names, dates, and irrelevant details to protect identity. These incidents might have happened in any one of four pastorates, plus any one of twenty-one different young people's conferences. In no case is an essential element in the problem changed.

I can establish the principle with a story, clear-cut in problem and results. A girl who had been at one of the summer conferences, and who had laid hold on a new conception of life, found herself back in an environment which did not know that she had been away, and certainly had neither understanding nor sympathy with her vision splendid. She kept herself from the more obvious extravagances of the group for a while, but not many months went by before there came from her this letter: "The old gang is going out for a week-end party and wants me to go. There will be both boys and girls, no chaperones, plenty of liquor." Then in one sentence she summed it up: "It's going to be wet and wicked." She continued: "I'm scared. Write and tell me not to go."

What would you do? Obvious, it seemed to me, to tell her to go. "I'm not afraid for you; but in any case you must not use me as a policeman against your real desires. Since you are afraid, you ought to go." Something like that was what I wrote her. The letter I received back was almost damp with fearful tears. "My blood upon your head," and all that.

But I was not afraid for her. She went, and was as safe there as if she had been in church. A glass of gin in her hands. It was as if my hand had placed it there. She could not drink it. I had trusted her with it. Out of that party (she saved one other girl) came only two that were not "both wet and wicked," to use her expression. Then, having seen the party for what it was, she wrote me: "I see what you mean. Now that I am no longer afraid I need not go again."

"But listen," some people say. "You sent that girl into temptation."

Not at all. She was already in temptation. I sent her out of temptation when I sent her to the place where her fear could be faced and exorcised.

Don't misunderstand the situation. My advice to girls who want to be strong characters is not "Go to a wild party, young lady." That would be ridiculous. Remember that I was talking to one I knew, who had had a vision of truth and who needed to know how strong her vision really was.

Now on that principle let us look at a more complicated history out of the clinic of sick souls. It began in Monday's mail, a letter almost any minister could reproduce, for substance of doctrine, and signed "A Prodigal Daughter." Fished for on three occasions, at last the anonymous person is revealed, and the first interview is held.

Let us admit at once that there is a certain kind of emotional dynamic in what Sinclair Lewis would call the come-to-Jesus appeal. The prodigal daughter could have been approached as a sinner and the attempt made to detach her life from its unity around sin to a unity around goodness. There is a spectacular simplicity about this solution. Only the processes of salvation are rarely that easy. Something more lasting than an emotional repentance was needed.

Religion, as you and I conceive it, begins in a disordering, rather than a simplifying, process. Religion made life far more complex for her than before. Life had been fairly well unified around a pagan ideal. Her past had been a philosophy of "Take what you can get. The only sin is to be caught." Then fear of pregnancy and horror at a loathsome disease sent her in distress to God. A fall removed one fear and a careful diagnosis of a more reputable doctor showed the first doctor's statement on disease to be wrong. Fears removed, she could have renewed her old way of living were it not for this new idea—an idea without authority of command.

This idea became for her, after awhile, clearly to be a choice. She could go back to the far country if she wanted to, but she knew now, in choosing that, she chose not to be at home.

It was the principle of freedom that held her. She was always hoping, she later confessed, that I would command her so that the issue might be settled by her refusing to obey.

You might be interested in a special service of purification which I had for her, illustrative of a possible service for many such troubled souls.

She wrote me once a many-paged account of her past, saying that if I "knew all" I would no longer believe in her. For that we held an individualized service of purification in the chapel. Before the altar I arranged a brass bowl and a kneeling stool. In the baptismal font water was ready.

On the altar, candles burned. I put on my robe to emphasize the sacramental in the service.

She was not to come forward unless she wanted to, but when she did, with Scripture and prayer the service began. As nearly as I can reproduce it, the prayer was as follows:

• • • • •
"O hungry heart, be still. Be still in God. Out of the depths I cried and He heard me. He heard me. Though I cry from the deepest hell, He hears my voice. Though I feared to look toward His holy temple again, felt myself shut out by the barriers of flesh, closed in the grave this earth had made about me, yet out of the pit Thou didst lift my life, O my God. In Thee have I put my trust: I will not fear what flesh can do unto me.

"Thanks be to Thee, O God, thanks be to Thee, that nothing can forbid Thy love. Reject Thee we can often—do often. Betray Thee we can often—do often. Deny Thee we can often—do often.

"But still with unhurrying chase
And unperturbed pace,
Deliberate speed—majestic instancy,
Come on the following feet
And a voice above their beat:

'Lo, naught contents thee, who contents not Me.'"

"O Lord, our God, we deserve no other chance from standards of the world. The dingiest clot of earth unworthy of any love, we sometimes feel ourselves to be. Our lives entangled in the web of past mistakes; or held impotent in the inertia of our fears; or weak and worried by the limitations our flesh puts upon us. Then wonderfully, purifying comes Thy voice once more, unwearied, unworried, 'Rise, clasp My hand, and come.'

"We know not how it can be—but life depends upon the truth that it is so. *De profundis clamavi ad te, Domine.* And He heard our cry."

Then with the words of the sixth chapter of Isaiah on my lips I offered her a flame from off the altar, with which she ignited the first sheet of her confession, and dropped it into the bowl. One by one the others followed. A little crackling noise, a burst of flame, and all was still.

After a moment she put out her hand and touched the bowl. It was cold. I moved away to the baptismal font and waited. After a moment she came and knelt, and the baptism of the new birth of the spirit was symbolized with cleansing water.

It seems queer that anyone should so misread Jesus' story of the prodigal's father that he would not see how essential to his spirit is that freedom for the sons of men that was necessary for her coming-to-herself.

We must see that there is a queer sort of unauthoritative inescapability about life which must be trusted without limit if it is ever to win in any time.

In this one history is revealed the power of the principle and the practice of freedom as a part of the strategy of Christian living.

If we are true to the Christian vision of man, we must stand for the perfect life. You mean perfect? Yes. Why not? Why should we people who profess Christ's way stop always with the cross of failure? We almost glory in it. We should be disappointed *if* we did not have failure to prove how glorious is our faith. We have our minds adjusted to failure. It justifies the largeness of our claims about the infinite truth of Christianity.

We make a false valuation on the Christian life—that it is a rare and difficult achievement. But Jesus never taught that. He said we were to be perfect even as God is perfect. One of His great interpreters described the perfect life of word, thought, and deed which Jesus demanded, as the reasonable life.

And the point is that it does not seem as unreasonable, after all, if you do go after it as a scientist searches for an answer or as an engineer builds a bridge. Begun, continued, and ended, from the known to the unknown continually.

There are certain things in which you are perfect now. You would not rob a crying baby of its crust of bread—I begin very low. You would give up your life for your friend. That seems like a big jump? But there are no jumps in the perfect. Not stealing the baby's crust and unreservedly letting your life-blood flow out for a friend, are in their own narrow ways perfect. The imperfection is outside them in snatching your own security from babies whom you never see, or letting men die—men who might have been saved by your life, although you have not called them friends.

But the strategy of Christian living affirms it is not impossible to widen the circle of your intimate concern, and in areas where it does not now operate, to do what you now do perfectly in these narrower circles of your own personal concerns.

To discover how to plan things so that what you have to use will accomplish what you want to do is "The Strategy of Christian Living."

Achieving a World-Wide Fellowship of Christians

KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE

NOT until the close of the eighteenth century did Christians of the Protestant tradition begin in any large numbers to take seriously the task of bringing the gospel to the non-Christian world. The missionary awakening among Protestants coincided with the opening of a new era in the expansion of the Occident. The nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth century were marked by the rapid extension of the economic and the political control of European peoples over those vast portions of the planet which were not already within their sphere of influence. Following that extension came the collapse or the profound alteration of non-European cultures and the adoption of Western ideas and institutions. Hand in hand with this expansion of the West, and, indeed, as an integral part of it, went missionaries. They not only sought to win converts to their faith and to call into existence Christian churches, but were pioneers in introducing certain phases of Western civilization which they believed would be of use to the peoples among whom they lived. They founded and maintained many of the first schools and hospitals of a Western type, and aided or took the initiative in famine relief, public health education, and, latterly, in rural reconstruction. The new cultures which are emerging in Asia, Africa, and the Islands of the Pacific owe to missionaries a great debt. The last twenty years, however, have seen profound changes. The tide of Western political and economic control is receding. Only in Africa is it continuing to advance. Although European civilization is still being avidly adopted, it is desired largely as a tool for emancipation from the economic and political domination of the Occident and for acquiring those material goods which that culture has given to Westerners. Except in Africa and part of the islands in the Pacific, the Westerner is being deprived of his lordship. He is being expelled from some places, in others is being strictly controlled, and in still others is allowed only on sufferance or is being retained merely as an adviser. Where Western control persists, it is being threatened. In Asia at least, Occidental imperialism is in

process of liquidation. Moreover, the West, weakened by the late war, internal strife, and the present depression, and preoccupied with fear of another war and defense against it, is in no position to reestablish its waning power. In this altered position of the Occidental the missionary from Europe and America inevitably shares. Except in Africa the day of his prominence is passing. No longer can he pioneer as he once did in introducing the Orient to new phases of Western civilization. Even in the churches he has established he must step out of positions of leadership.

Under these circumstances, if Protestant Christianity is to go on, to continue to spread, and to have an increasingly useful part in Asia, it must be through the churches which the missionary has been the agent of establishing. Even in Africa this stage is probably only postponed and in some sections is already upon us. Yet in most places these young churches are very small, even though growing, minorities. The minorities, moreover, are broken into many ecclesiastical groups, most of them built on inheritances from Europe and America. Under such conditions, the younger churches are in danger on the one hand of becoming small encysted bodies, clinging tenaciously to what the missionary fathers taught them but out of touch with the currents of life about them and having no effect upon the nation as a whole, or on the other of so adapting themselves to the national culture as to break completely with historic Christianity and to lose their distinctively Christian life and message. In either case Christianity would more or less rapidly die out. If this fate is to be avoided, the younger churches must be greatly strengthened. It is obvious, too, that they must be knit into a world-wide fellowship and must be conscious of being parts of the Church Universal.

Fortunately we are seeing a growing effort to bring into being, in churches of the Protestant tradition, a realization of this world-wide Christian community. Faith and Order, Life and Work, the World's Student Christian Federation, and, notably, the International Missionary Council and its constituent bodies are movements, none of them more than a generation old, in this direction. Here is something new in the history of Protestantism. Bodies in the Protestant tradition, or, as in the case of the Anglican Communion, with a strong tincture of Protestantism, are feeling their way toward some sort of effective realization of their unity in Christ. Protestants, by their history and tradition indefinitely fissiparous and servants of nationalism, are seeking to realize a fellowship which shall

be inclusive and supra-national. Upon their success in this endeavor would seem to depend not only the continued growth but the very existence of Christianity of the Protestant tradition in the lands of the younger churches.

As we seek to attain this goal, we are immediately confronted with the question of the nature and the function of the Church. The differences in the convinced answers given by Christians to this question constitute some of the greatest obstacles to the realization of this world-wide fellowship. Any attempt at bringing the dream of unity out of the stage of vague platitudes and dreamy aspirations into actual being must at the outset and for many miles along its way wrestle with this problem. It is quite obvious that, at least for generations to come, those holding to any one of the existing conceptions are not to succeed in winning all the others to their convictions. Anglicans cannot at best hope to win to their view of the Church more than a minority of Lutherans or of Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Baptists, or Friends. Lutherans must not expect to win over the Anglicans, Presbyterians, or Friends, nor will either of the others win over all the rest. If the prayer, *ut omnes unum sint*, is to be answered, some other way, perhaps quite novel in Christian history, must be explored.

He would be a bold person who would claim to have a final solution for a problem which has engaged through the ages so many of the finest Christian spirits. It may, however, be of aid, if some of the most prominent means by which unity has been sought are outlined, some of the obstacles which these present to unity are frankly recognized, and then a suggestion or two ventured as to the way out.

First of all two continuing facts of Christian history must be noted—the longing for unity and the quarrelsome divisions which have prevented its realization. As far as we can go back into the past of the Christian community we find a desire for an inclusive fellowship of all followers of Christ. Paul spoke of the Church as the body of Christ, as a living organism in which every member has an important and vital part. He deplored those factions which tend to divide it. He endeavored by gathering a great collection among the various local churches to which he was related for the benefit of those in Judea to hold together the Jewish and Gentile wings of the Church Universal. The Jerusalem Church, strongly Jewish though it was, sought a *via media* for the solution of the differences over the observance of the Jewish law which made for division.

Ever since then Christians have striven for unity and have been uneasy over their divisions. In spite of all the many groups into which Christians have formed themselves, they have never lost the aspiration for unity or for a body which includes all who name the name of Christ.

Yet no other of the religions of the world has developed so many distinct and autonomous groups. No other has had so many and such bitter quarrels within its own household. It is a saddening and sobering fact that a religion which has love as its major ethical tenet should have shown, in its organized expressions, so much of hatred and strife. Christians have professed to believe that "by this shall all men know that ye are my disciples if ye love one another," and yet no other religion has been so provocative of divisions, reciprocal denunciation, and recrimination, within its own ranks. Through the centuries the critics of Christianity have pointed the finger of scorn at this contrast between professed ideal and actual achievement. In this, we cannot but believe, they have been substantially right.

Into this failure of practice to correspond with profession many factors have entered. Some of them are inherent in sinful human nature. The work of God's grace and of His Spirit in the hearts of His children does not immediately eliminate all traces of their evil past. Some of the bitterest strife, the deepest gulfs between professed Christians, and the most flagrant denials of the commandment of love have been within groups which organizationally and creedally were and are one. Suspicion, envy, pride, the love of power and preëminence, conflicting wills, and incompatible temperaments have given rise to some of the fiercest struggles in human history within the boundaries of existing orders and branches of the Church. One has only to recall the many dissensions within the fold of the Roman Catholic Church to be clear that external and formal unity does not insure unity of the spirit. It is noteworthy, too, that no body within that Church has had a more stormy record of quarrels, secessions, and persecutions than has that of the Franciscans, the "Order of Little Brothers," whose very official name incorporates the ideal of humble love. Nor have Protestants any ground for self-righteousness. The course of Protestantism has been marked by strife, not only between denominations, but even more within them. No, the seeming union which is one of organization and creed may and usually does serve only partially to hide those gulfs of the spirit, those violations of love, which are the real and the only real denial of the kind of union

envisaged in the Christian ethic. It may even accentuate the difficulty of attaining that union.

One of the greatest causes of the conflict has been the difficulty of reconciling the ideal of an inclusive fellowship, the universal body of all Christians, with the consequences of the belief in the continued presence of the Holy Spirit. The doctrine and experience of the Holy Spirit have often meant in practice that large numbers of Christians have believed that they have direct revelations from God. These revelations have not always agreed. Each who has experienced what he has regarded as a revelation naturally tends to hold that it has universal validity and must be binding on all his fellow Christians. Some of the strongest of such inspired individuals have persuaded a larger or a smaller group of followers to agree with them and have been prone to anathematize those other professed Christians who would not accept them.

Even apart from the belief in the guidance of the Holy Spirit the aspiration for unity has heightened the bitterness of the separations. If Christians had been willing to accept divisions in their fellowship as inevitable and had not sought for unity, we would not have seen such efforts to coerce others into agreement and such animus against those who refused to comply. National, regional, and even class groupings of Christians are natural. Strong men attract groups of followers. It is the resistance to these divisions which has been responsible for some of the sharpest and most prolonged controversies in Christian history.

Any attempt at an inclusive and world-wide fellowship of Christians must, if it is to have any hope of success, take into account all of these factors which have made for division. They have been with us from the beginning and, so far as we can see, are to be with us through a very long future.

A second set of facts which we must note is that none of the roads which have been tried so far in the effort to arrive at Christian unity have led to that goal or give any prospect of doing so. All have fallen short. If we are to come any nearer to the attainment of this age-long Christian objective than did they, we must either find and follow some fresh road or pursue with more success than has attended our predecessors those already traversed.

Often we have seen tried the formulation of a creed or statement of Christian belief as a means of reconciling differences and of expressing

common convictions. This was a road traveled by the ancient Church. That may have been due to Greek influence—the attempt at unity by agreement on a philosophic formula. The historic creeds were efforts, some of them noble efforts, in that direction. The Nicene Creed, for example, in the form in which we know it, was an adaptation by the first great ecumenical council of a confession of faith already in use in the effort to provide a statement of belief which would be standard and authoritative and on which all true Christians could unite. In Protestant circles we have again and again witnessed a similar effort. Repeatedly a denomination has drafted a statement of belief on which at least all its own members could join and on which it believed that all Christians should agree.

It is important to notice, however, that creeds and statements of faith have usually been provocative of divisions rather than a means of healing them. To be sure, the vast majority of Christians have acknowledged the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds as expressions of their common faith. But for them or documents like them we would probably have had far less unity among Christians than we have witnessed. Always, however, minorities have existed who could not or at least did not accept these creeds. Among these minorities were men and women of undoubted Christian character. We may well remember, for instance, that Ulfilas, the rightly famous missionary to the Goths, was an Arian and did not subscribe to the creed of Nicaea. Sometimes, indeed, creeds have been framed partly in an attempt to shut out from the fellowship of the Church those who were held to be corrupting the purity of Christian faith. From history it is perfectly clear that all who profess and call themselves Christians can never be induced to unite on any one verbal formulation of the Christian faith. Even though the majority may be persuaded to do so, a minority will always exist which will feel that it cannot honestly subscribe. Some of that minority, to be sure, out of reluctance to stir up strife or from fear of being read out of the Church, may give their formal assent, but they will do so either with damage to their own consciences or by an interpretation of the document which does violence to its clear meaning.

Moreover, it is important to recall that agreement on formulations of faith has not prevented division. The Eastern Orthodox Churches are one in their creeds, but separated by deep gulfs of nationalism. The Anglican and the Roman Catholic communions subscribe to the same historic creeds, yet seem far from even outward accord.

Another road toward unity which has been explored, but never with complete success, is that of an inclusive organization. Usually, although not always, this has been associated with unity of creed. The historic episcopate, traced back to the Apostles, has been the form most generally tried. It must be gladly admitted that the historic episcopate has greatly assisted unity. In the Anglican Communion, for example, many and widely variant temperaments, convictions, and religious traditions are to be found, and an important means of cohesion is the episcopate. Yet also, as a matter of plain fact, deep gulfs not only of spirit but of organization have been and are present between Christian groups who acknowledge the validity of apostolic succession. Witness, for instance, those between the various Eastern Orthodox Churches and between the Roman Catholics, the Anglicans, and the Orthodox. Unquestionably the Papacy has been a source not only of unity but of division. It seems fantastically out of accord with the experience of the Church to hope that even those who assent to the historic episcopate will ever find in it a means to outward or inward unity. Still less is there likelihood that the many ecclesiastical bodies who do not assent to the principle will find common ground in it.

Closely allied with creed and organization have been the sacraments. In one form or another a larger proportion of Christians find common ground here than in creed or organization. Even many who cannot subscribe to the historic creeds and who reject the historic episcopate will gladly admit that baptism and the Lord's Supper go back continuously to the very earliest days of the Church. However, differing conceptions of the significance of the sacraments have been a fertile source of disagreement and separation. Moreover, some bodies which contain unquestionably Christian spirits, notably the Friends and the Salvation Army, do not have the historic sacraments. It must be sadly noted, too, that the Eastern Orthodox Churches agree on the sacraments, the creeds, and the episcopate, and yet are separated by wide chasms.

Another way, and that pursued by most Protestants, has been emphasis on the Bible as the authoritative standard for Christian life and belief. More than one great denomination has striven hopefully for union on that basis. As one of them declares, "Where the Scriptures speak we speak. Where the Scriptures are silent we are silent." Here again has been a source both of fellowship and of division. In the Bible all Christians find common ground and a tie which helps them to a common language. The

acceptance of that book as authoritative has been a factor in giving to all branches of Christians a family likeness whose importance it would be hard to exaggerate. Yet the belief in the Bible has not prevented division. The varying interpretations given it have even been a source of division. Those groups which have sought to unite all Christians on it have been forced to interpret it and have ended by themselves becoming new sects.

Still another basis of fellowship has been a common religious experience. Those, for example, who spring from what historically is called the Evangelical movement find here a bond which transcends denominational barriers. Pietists, Moravians, the Evangelicals of England and the Dominions, and the many in the United States who emphasize the new birth from sin to righteousness and eternal life by the accepting of God's grace offered in Christ and mediated through the Holy Spirit have had much in common. They came out of one historic movement. It is on the basis of the Evangelical faith and experience that much of the coöperation among Protestants and especially among those engaged in foreign missions has been built. Here, too, however, as a plain matter of fact, only a minority, although a large minority, of Christians have come together. Nor does there seem to be any hope of a majority here finding common ground.

These traditional ways by which Christians have sought unity have not only fallen far short of complete success but have become barriers to the attainment of the goal. They certainly have prevented many divisions. But for them Christians would probably be very much farther from unity than they now are. For them all Christians should be grateful, even when they cannot subscribe to them. Yet the very adherence to one or the other of them is today one of the obstacles to unity.

Part of the difficulty is that Christians hold to such variant conceptions of the nature and functions of the Church. To many, perhaps to most Christians, it is an institution of divine origin, in which the Holy Spirit continues to dwell and through which the sacraments are administered, men taught and admonished, and having visible and continuing expression in the episcopate. That Church, although divided, is now the most hoary and widespread of the institutions existing on this planet, rich in tradition and in the lives and sacrifices of the saints. To other Christians the Church is made up of voluntary associations for fellowship, worship, and union in common tasks. Some would ascribe to these divine sanction or would claim for them validity on the ground that they follow New Testament models.

Others regard them as due to human initiative, of worth only because of what they make possible and possessed of no abiding validity. It is highly unlikely that all Christians, or even an overwhelming majority of them, can be led to adopt any one belief about the visible Church. Judging from its past history, Christianity, so long as creative spirits continue to emerge in it, will continue to develop new organizations and to witness fresh divisions.

Is, then, the dream of Christian unity never to be realized? Is the aspiration which Christians have had from the beginning always to be denied? It must be said at once that the situation is by no means as hopeless as the facts so far given might lead one to believe. There are other facts which must be recognized if the picture is not to be a distortion of reality. One of these is that very desire for unity. Christians are dissatisfied with their divisions and long to be one, even when they most bitterly differ as to the means of attaining the goal. Christians believe, moreover, that unity is the Will of God and in accordance with the mind of Christ. Vast numbers of Christians, moreover, hold that the Church of Christ is far more inclusive than is any existing organization. The Anglicans speak of the Church as the "Mystical body of thy Son, which is the blessed Company of all faithful people." Even the Roman Catholic Church holds that there are many who belong to her soul who are not yet of her body. It must be possible with this longing for unity and this belief in a mystical, never fully visible body of Christ, to make progress toward unity.

If we are to make progress toward unity, we must have clearly in mind the kind of unity which we desire. We must not place our primary emphasis upon creed, organization, the sacraments, the Bible, or any one type of religious experience. We must seek to follow the road which seems to have been that which Our Lord traveled. We must seek a unity which is primarily of the spirit and which is violated not so much by divisions into separate bodies holding different creeds, varying conceptions of the sacraments, differing interpretations of the Bible, and diverse religious experiences as by suspicion, jealousy, rivalry, and hatred. We must search for a way of unity which bridges the chasms which exist not only between organizations but within them. We must seek for a unity which cuts across all existing ecclesiastical boundaries and which is as inclusive as that Church of Christ which is never comprehended by any one visible body. We must search for unity by a means which does not attack existing

organizations or creeds and will include those who honestly hold to them. We must allow for diversity, and possibly increasing diversity, realizing that as a matter of history the Church of Christ is richer for all the various ways in which the Spirit has had to find expression through varying and usually imperfect and sinful human beings.

That basis of union must be sought in the principle which our Master said was primary, namely, love—love for God as revealed in Christ and love for man. That love will show itself in community of worship. It is encouraging and surprising to realize how many diverse groups will agree to have fellowship on that basis. In recent years we have seen it again and again. Sometimes all join in a new form of worship, or in quiet meditation. Sometimes those of varying traditions hold services in the forms to which they are accustomed, inviting other Christians to be present. That love, too, will show itself in fellowship, with an attempt at understanding what the varying historical traditions to which each has been accustomed have meant to those who compose the members of the group. Sometimes that love will show itself in joint action to eliminate some evil or to relieve some want—the struggle against war, against slavery, against the opium traffic or against famine or disease. We must never let the means become ends in themselves or allow them to obscure the true union, that of the spirit. That union can at its best only be aided by them. They, like their predecessors, may hinder it. True union, that realization of the oneness of the great Church of Christ which is never fully tangible and which, in its widest reach, includes those who have passed out of our present sight into what we call the Church Triumphant, must be sought by the way of prayer, of mutual forbearance and trust, and of devotion to our common Master.

This may seem a most disappointing end to a paper which began by propounding so important a set of problems. Nothing very new or very definite has been suggested. No blueprint has been offered, no detailed specifications for a larger union. Such a concrete picture is impossible. It is attempts to draw them which have been the source of much of the disunion in the past. We must be prepared to accept only rough sketches and to let them be varied to meet new conditions and fresh leadings of the Spirit of God. Any organization must be flexible and no one verbal statement of faith regarded as final. We must always put first that unity which is of the spirit. Here as in so much else in the Christian life we turn aside into by-paths when we pin our faith on the visible. The things which

are seen are temporal. It is the things which are unseen which are eternal. Knowledge in the form of confessions of faith and creeds passes away. It is faith, hope, and love which abide. On these we must focus our attention, our efforts, and our prayers.

What does this mean for Protestant missions, the problems of which led us to begin this paper? We are under the necessity there, as we have seen, of realizing a world-wide fellowship, especially for the sake of those bodies which we now call the "younger churches." The need, it must be noted, is fully as urgent for those bodies which we denominate the "older churches." Here is no easy task. To the historic difficulties of differing types of ecclesiastical traditions inherited from the West others are added. There is the natural reluctance to be regarded as "younger churches." There are the many problems of nationalities and of varied cultural traditions. The obstacle of communication is real. Here, however, the International Missionary Council offers a promising instrument. Bringing together as it does those of many ecclesiastical, racial, and cultural backgrounds without questioning the validity of any of them, it points the way. It must be strengthened, but it also must remain flexible. It must not be allowed to harden into a new institutional orthodoxy. Then, too, we must continue the flow of life from the older to the younger churches through those whom we have chosen to call missionaries. We must also discover ways for increasing the flow of life from the younger to the older churches, from younger church to younger church, and from older church to older church. It is in reciprocal sharing in faith, in worship, in effort, and in experience that we build the ties which make for fellowship and true union. We must feel ourselves on the threshold of a fresh stage of the old adventure of Christian fellowship which would be largely curtailed by the attempt to map out final programs. We must welcome any experiment in fellowship conducted in the spirit of love. We can be at the beginning of a new age in the history of Christianity, when the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace is to be realized as never before, not by the ways which have been honestly tried and found faulty but in fresh ways which will place greater emphasis on love and the trust which goes with love. Never has the world stood so greatly in need for the Church to be united in this fashion. Never have we had a greater opportunity for realizing such a united Church.

The Communist Drum and Our Restless Feet

ALLAN A. HUNTER

THE Communist may not ask for a new heaven but he demands a new earth. "Drop your sectarian prejudices," he passionately cries, "and join with us in a united front to rid the world of poverty and war."

Shall we of the cloth thus co-operate in what seems to be a sincere drive toward a new earth? A professor of Christian ethics in a leading theological seminary now heads an organization in which avowed Communists participate if they do not dominate; he asks us to combine with them in their struggle against imperialist war and Fascism. Last April thousands of young Christians joined with the more or less Communist-manipulated National Student League in an impressive strike against "war" (class war of course was not banned). The Moscow drum is making campus feet restless. "The Communists seem to be the only group that are really doing anything!" The girl who recently made this confession is not of the so-called radical type who smoke a packet of cigarettes a day and announce to their parents, "Thank God, I'm an atheist!"; she is a conspicuously devoted worker in her church. And she represents the feeling of what seems to be a growing number of young serious-minded people. A retired Baptist minister who went to jail during the war as a conscientious objector and who now goes about speaking in behalf of joint action with the Communists, can generally count on some applause from both old and young when he declares, "I had rather be in hell with the reds than in heaven with the yellows." The call to a united front is plausible. What is the appeal?

For one thing it gives you the feeling of motion, of glands satisfactorily functioning. The Nazis have it. The Russians have it. Why shouldn't we? your white blood corpuscles ask impatiently. If you swing into line with the marchers on the left, the sensation is of going somewhere and not just twiddling your thumbs in an ivory tower. One-two-three- . . . You do *this* today and *that* tomorrow and you have the herd satisfaction of knowing that others like-minded are doing the same. It is so glowingly

concrete and sacrificial. Why, you can see the whites of the enemy's eyes. Maybe they'll find my body by the wall. This war is different. It's a defensive war. We're defending the downtrodden from the exploiter.

Such was approximately the logic of a friend who vehemently believed in collaborating with the Communists. I shall never forget the decisive snip-snip of her scissors as she talked without interrupting her work. She was cutting up old clothes and converting them into blankets for the hunger-marchers. Only two years before she had been a director of religious education, so surprising conservative that she was a little shocked at the social gospel emphasis of a young people's religious conference she attended as a leader. Upon marrying a young minister whose church was in a poor section of the city, she found herself getting more and more indignant over the conditions that cried for collective treatment. Before long her husband and she were adding Unemployed Council activities to their parish duties. Her mind as yet had not joined the Communist Party, but her heart was there and the determined scissors were eloquent of the fact. In the front yard of the tiny shack a goat browsed. Having resigned from their church, they could not afford cow's milk for the eight months' old baby.

Leaving that scene of sharp-edged dedication I had an uneasy conscience. Here was I, a minister of the gospel for the disinherited. At night I most emphatically had a place to lay my head, and during the day three square meals. My two children had an abundance of vitamins and shelter. But these Communists who burned with a passion for sharing privileges, what did they care for comfort or security? They gave one a sense of the concrete, the dynamic; and also the heroic. One could understand Canon Charles E. Raven's appreciatively writing of a Communist friend: "Black-listed and deprived of any possible employment, imprisoned, driven from the country miserably clad, he yet speaks and thinks and acts like a Christian gentleman. And his only crime is that he cannot endure in silence the oppression and wastage, in which his fellows have to live. . . . He is a bigger person than I am, opinions or no opinions: and that he is very near to God, I have no doubt at all." We ministers would better not stand in the temple smugly proclaiming, "I thank Thee, Lord, that I never get emotional about social injustice the way that radical does."

But humility in the presence of these crusaders whose self-forgetful lives often refute their professed materialism, need not blind us to the implications of their creed. One implication is the war method. This fact

ministers contemplating a companionate with the Communist Party, or any of its affiliates, should frankly face. In a debate on the issue of pacifism a Communist of high standing declared in my hearing: "We Communists are not pacifists. We believe in learning how to shoot. Then when the time comes we'll shoot in the right direction." Not long ago Stalin, in the name of "security," officially approved of France's gleaming sword. Communists in France must now stop attacking large military budgets. To Lord Morley, Clemenceau once confessed his faith that the force of high explosives is the ultimate power. Years later, the Communist International, with which the Communist Party in the United States is definitely connected, reaffirmed this faith, announcing "to the millions of workers of the whole world that there cannot be genuine working class unity without a struggle for the violent overthrow of the whole existing capitalist order, or the establishment of proletarian dictatorship." Recent official utterances may be more soft-voiced, but they do not alter this fundamental implication.

On the surface and over a short span of time the Communist commitment to the war method may seem to involve very little overt war action. For every ten thousand persons killed in our capitalist war for democracy, only one, according to Sherwood Eddy, was killed in the Marxist October Revolution for social justice—a smaller toll than American automobiles take every month. But is that the end of the story? Apparently not! Hidden in this seemingly pacific process which is really committed to the war method are the germs of future violence which may cause incalculable tragedy. For example, nobody knows how many Russians died as a result of what William Henry Chamberlin calls an organized famine, ending perhaps two years ago. Sherwood Eddy, in his last booklet, estimates the total as "more than a million." The fact that Hearst and other spinsters who every night look under the bed for a Communist, luridly exaggerate the duration of this famine and the number of fatalities from it, is no reason why we in pious reaction should sentimentally deny that Communism can ruthlessly freeze out farmers who object to being collectivized. Even were Fascism right around the corner, that should not obligate American liberals to imagine that Russia and democracy are synonymous, and that intellectuals over there who talk too freely never go to Siberia. In the last resort the Communist relies not on the consent of the governed; for him it is the machine gun that has the last word.

In his willingness to fall back on war force, which in contrast to police

force kills wholesale and uses mass murder, not in obedience to a neutral tribunal but to a few hysterics in the saddle calling themselves the government, the Communist is one with the militarist who bleats "you-can't-change-human-nature-so-prepare-for-war," and one with a certain type of fundamentalist who chants "there-must-be-war-till-Jesus-comes." All three believe that the way to cure seasickness is to bolt your food: things have to get worse before they can get better. And they take for granted that peace machinery is irrelevant. War is simply inevitable, inescapable, a thing to which one must be resigned. If they are right, then the rabbit should be the emblem of the human race. "My grandfather," sighed the helpless rabbit, "was swallowed by a snake. My father was swallowed by a snake. I, too, must be swallowed by a snake." But there is nothing in the ultimate nature of things that foredooms that pessimistic creature to crawl toward the open jaws and glittering eyes and become a free lunch for his enemy. Has he not legs to take him in the opposite direction?

The Christian as a Christian relies ultimately on an "Unseen Factor," not on the big battalions. He is committed to the assumption that in every situation there is a creative possibility open to those who have faith, a power effective and available which reverences personality and gets results by means which do not cancel out the end. Men are not fodder for a field marshal intent only on making a great collective machine more efficient. They are potentially children of the Father. The touchstone of social reconstruction is the mind of Christ, which unequivocally rules out the war method. While the herd is stampeding, His sanity may seem to be lunacy preached to a planet of hard-headed men. Actually, as George Bernard Shaw in a lucid moment admitted, it is common sense, the only statesmanship that will work. You cannot say with the militarist and the Communist that for the sake of future brotherhood we must have violence now. It was Lenin, not Jesus, who said: "You have got to hit heads right and left, to hit them pitilessly, though in the ideal we are opposed to violence."

The Communists who invite us to a united front no doubt mean well, but their program is based upon the anti-Christian illusion that the end justifies the means. In other words, that is right which helps to put the working class in power; that is wrong which interferes with the working class getting in power. You can kill wholesale, lie or hate, provided such a course promotes the workers' dictatorship.

In contrast to this sentimental Jesuitism of the Communists, Eugene

Debs was clear-minded. He seems to have recognized that "force" was a short-cut leading nowhere. "To the extent that the working class has power based upon class consciousness, force is unnecessary; to the extent that power is lacking, force can only result in harm." On this use of wholesale violence the true Socialist parts company with the orthodox Communist. The Socialist is out to build a society where goods will be shared equitably by extending collective ownership of basic industries and by developing a public spirit. He differs with the Communist in insisting on more freedom and civil liberties. But most of all he differs with the Communist in renouncing the war method. The way of Jesus fits in with the Socialist strategy of coercion without killing but it is not at home and never can be at home with the Communist strategy of "hitting heads right and left" and hitting them "pitilessly."

If truth, as Renan saw it, is a matter of fine distinctions, it is high time for us of the Church to be discriminating and outspoken on this issue dividing Communism from Socialism. We who are ministers have no right to be naïve or to allow our congregations to be naïve about that contrast. Moreover, we are only paving the way for Fascism if we allow the issue to be blurred. For every new Communist in this country produces about five Fascists and every five Fascists means another potential Communist convert.

The Communist is quite willing to capitalize on the public confusion. It gives him a chance to bore from within. When he asks us to join with him in a united front for plausible objectives he is not inviting us to a common struggle for the kingdom of God. His call to a united front is actually a call to a Communist front. *The Communist*, speaking officially for the party in the January, 1935, number, assuming the necessity of "armed action" on the part of the workers, describes the united front as "the main road along which the masses will be prepared for the struggle for Soviet power under the leadership of the Communist Party." A year later I find a sheaf of mimeographed leaflets in my church urging young Christians to join with the Young Communist League in the drive for peace because "Christ was for peace," but I cannot quickly forget that Earl Browder, general secretary of the Communist Party in the United States, two years ago referred to the united front not as a peace pact with the reformists, but as a method of struggle against them.

The real reason why we ministers are tempted to take part in the Communist procession is our terror of being ineffectual. We are like the

student who during the Great War asked a professor of religious education whether he should follow his conscience and go to jail as a pacifist. The professor answered that if he wore striped clothing and ate the food bestowed upon him by a government "based on force" he would be a parasite. If he insisted on being a pacifist the logical thing would be suicide; in any case he would only be throwing away his influence, his usefulness. There was no other choice, said the professor. The student could not bear the thought of exerting only a futile protest. No one pointed out to him that the government is not based on bayonets: it only uses them. It never occurred to him that the highest service he could render his country would be to keep on standing against the war method. To insert sanity into the situation would not be to play the parasite. On the contrary, it would exert constructive pressure beyond anything a bombing plane could accomplish. But the student did not see this. To get into the game seemed then the lesser of two evils. Today he is not so gullible. Disenchanted, he knows there is a higher choice and that is genuinely to love your country and fellow citizens. This, to paraphrase Howard Thurman, means meeting them where they now are and then going on to treat them as though they could be where they should be, as though they really desired the welfare of mankind. In 1917 we were so afraid of being impotent that we overlooked the potency of divine forces.

Today we hear the same old drums to "armed action." This time in behalf not of mythical Belgian children with their hands cut off but of all too actual widows who have been mortgaged out of their homes, and ten million men who cannot buy bread, while ten of their countrymen, as Will Rogers put it, can buy the world. In reply the Communist drum has its allure. But we of the Church have no business to be deaf to "that other Drummer" who refused to go with Judas in a united front. The ardent young Judean wanted to liquidate the enemy and by the war method free the exploited people from the Roman Eagle. Why go the second mile with the Roman imperialists who were bleeding the people white?

But Jesus was inexorably clear about the method of getting results. The Carpenter who died for his mates would march only under the flag of an all-inclusive good will. Plausible as may be the Communists' interpretation of history and the infra-red display of heroism, sacrifice, "realism" and justice, we Christians would better not haul down that flag.

As for myself, I am "against all wars, especially righteous ones." I

am going to march with nobody whose ultimate reliance is the war method, be his purpose never so holy. If I see a Communist beaten up in violation of his constitutional rights I must go to court in his behalf. If the vigilantes brutally railroad a labor organizer out of the community, even if his union is Communist-dominated, I must do what I can to secure justice. But because I must be for a Communist as a man does not mean that I must be for his strategy. It sounds robust of Browning to tell us that the sin he imputes to each frustrate ghost is the unlit lamp and the ungirt loin, but action unguided by the mind of Christ is about as helpful right now as a boat full of earnest people rowing down Niagara River toward the Falls.

If we of the Church crave action free of alliance with Communism, there are tasks at hand, specific and radical enough to save us from the gnawing sense of frustration and unreality that tempt us to go off half-cocked. Our daily bread comes from the system? Well, then, before at least one meal a day we can pray that every ounce of its energy be used to build a new world where all shall have privileges at least equal to our own. As long as a single acquaintance is unaware that during 1934 something like two million four hundred thousand fellow citizens of this planet died of starvation while one million freight car loads of grain were destroyed to keep prices up; as long as no consumers' co-operative on the Rochdale plan has yet been developed in our community; as long as the movement to socialize basic industries and resources languishes for want of active Christian support; as long as garment workers on strike need the encouragement of church representatives on the picket line; as long as Negroes or Japanese imagine they are more welcome at Communist meetings than at white church services—we ministers have no excuse for pitying ourselves as though we could have no significant part in converting the social jungle into a home. But why irrelevantly associate social change with Communism? Does government ownership where it is needed have to go hand in hand with the profession of atheism, trade unionism with the suppression of civil liberties, motion pictures chemically pure of Wall Street and Hollywood motives with the theory that the end justifies the means, public hospital provision for expectant working mothers with the easy dissolution of marriage, the humane treatment of criminal prisoners with one of the largest armies in the world? Extreme wealth brings loss of joy to its few possessors, and instead of putting the rich man *out of* his misery, why not by taxation and other non-violent measures relieve him *of* his misery?

The passion for sharing is no monopoly of Moscow. Jesus carried a union card stained with a deeper red than that carried today by the Communists. Again and again Kagawa, embodying something of His strategy, has tried his soul-force and found it strangely effective. In 1921 an excited mob of strikers were bent on bitter and self-defeating tactics against the Kawasaki Dock Yard in Kobe. Where the ways parted, one path leading to violence, the other away from it, the little bowlegged strike advisor stood in silence. As the workers advanced toward him in mass formation, he looked into the angry eyes and exerted the power of the spirit that to him was power unlimited, praying with his eyes open. "My prayer was answered, for they were checked so suddenly that I knew I was with God."¹ The eighteen thousand or more dockyard workers were diverted from a course of "violent overthrow" that would have set their cause back many years. The Christian labor leader was jailed. But his strategy appealed to the conscience of large numbers of the Japanese people. Christ's alternative effected surprising and far-reaching results. The workers in question did not suddenly come into possession of the machines they tended, but they did get a measure of justice which proved a practicable basis for further progress in collective bargaining. Richard Gregg, experienced as a lawyer in industrial disputes, has written a significant book, *The Power of Non-violence*. Let no one who has not mastered the logic and data of Gregg's study ever dogmatically declare that this technique, personally and collectively used, spells impotence.

Jesus' challenge to the vested ecclesiastical and economic interests had some connection with those profound antagonisms which led Him to His death. Within perhaps five days of His attack on the Temple profiteering He was hanging on a cross. And to the degree that we are against class war, His followers must work for social justice which is an indispensable part of the kingdom of God. Such specific programs of social action as have been suggested are to that great objective what the letters a-b-c are to a poem, not the end but the means which must be used with discrimination to accomplish the end. In that perfection of right relationships every person will sit down at the same great table of life, so fulfilling the creative possibilities within that he will become at home with himself, with others, and thus with God. Nothing short of a new heaven, as well as a new earth, will do.

¹ This incident Kagawa narrated in the writer's church, September 24, 1931.

The Preacher and World Movements

ALBERT W. BEAVEN

IS THERE a Christian point of view which should be contributed to the formation of public opinion on the contemporary world movements? If so, is the preacher the one to do it and is the pulpit the place to say it? Is it part of the duty of a preacher of the gospel of Jesus Christ to aid his people through the pulpit to understand the bearing of the religion they profess upon pending social and international questions? Some will answer unqualifiedly, "Yes!" Others will speak a decided "No!" Others will want to think it through. The rise of the present lay movement in several denominations, which aims to indicate what certain laymen feel the church and pulpit should and should not deal with, makes a new discussion of these questions in point. This article frankly argues for the first answer, "Yes." The approach is from the side of the preaching function.

These are moments of high privilege, of decided responsibility and opportunity when a preacher asks—and for the most part receives—the concentrated attention of his congregation. They who are seated before him have set aside their normal inclinations to debate issues, discuss various points, and sit quietly listening to him. By the nature of the fact that he expects those present to listen, expects them to do so without audible objection, and professes that in his message he is dealing with the great factors of life which come under the head of religion, the preacher is in duty bound to give the best he has and to be sure that he makes his pulpit ministry as worthy as his own strength will permit, and as broad, inclusive, and useful as to him is humanly possible.

In our Protestant churches we give a large place to the sermon. We put the pulpit at the center of attention and the sermon at the climax of the service. Herman Melville said, in *Moby Dick*, "For the pulpit is ever earth's foremost part; all the rest comes in the rear. The pulpit leads the world." Ian Maclaren said: "The most critical and influential event in the religious week is the sermon." While there would be many who would dissent from these judgments of a past generation, there is no question but that the relation of a Protestant minister to his parish offers him the opportunity of molding, to a certain extent, the thinking and the attitudes of his people, if he makes his pulpit work what it should be.

It is one of the fundamental assumptions on which this primacy of the pulpit is based, that the preacher has something to give outside of himself; that in the gospel he sets forth he is proclaiming the availability of a dynamic which can operate to change lives. Though this is the hardest thing on earth, much more difficult than reshaping material or controlling mechanical power, it is the essence of our gospel that man can so contact God through Jesus Christ that the power of the Eternal is placed at man's disposition for the reclamation and redemption of his personality.

Another assumption behind the Christian pulpit is that when a man honestly seeks to know the will of God, in the spirit of one willing to follow its leading when indicated, there comes to him an insight or a wisdom which helps him to grasp eternal truth. Not that revelation and guidance should supplant thought, but that when a man has reached the limit of his ordinary thinking powers, having brought to bear upon a subject all his usual processes of collecting information, the results obtained will be verified or corrected by viewing them in the presence of the universals of which one is conscious when he tries to see any given situation as God sees it. So much of our thinking today is done on a mental island; it is the thinking of a specialist; it is the collecting of isolated facts without the ability to interpret their relation to one another; it is a process "of the accumulation of knowledge without increasing wisdom." The religious man believes that these isolated pieces of truth begin to take meaning when they are framed with reference to the great Eternal Power at the heart of the universe.

The man in his pulpit, therefore, proclaims a gospel which he expects to see take root within personality. When it actually grips the personality it begins establishing right relations between that individual and the eternal God, and in turn it should flow out to others, establishing right relations between that individual and his fellow man. What it does to the individual is perfectly clear; what that individual does in response to its promptings is a matter which reaches far out into human society.

We have frequently attempted to segregate these two results into the "individual" and the "social" gospel, into personal religion and social religion and sometimes to espouse the first and reject the second. This is impossible if we are to preserve the reality of the ideas of Jesus. The two are two sides of one fact; without both, either is unreal.

Obviously, religion must have its first grip on the individual. Unless it roots inside a given personality, it can never affect other individuals who

comprise society. This, however, is a first of two steps which Jesus outlined in His epitome of the commandments, and in some ways the easier and simpler step. Because it is easier and simpler we are at times inclined to take it and stop there. When we are thinking of religion as working in us as individuals it seems very real and near at hand; we can control it; it comes near to life as it is lived. When we think of applying it to the vast world round about us, our purposes seem so hopeless alongside of our possible achievements; it seems so impossible, when we have to depend so completely on others, for us to accomplish much. The tendency, therefore, is for both preacher and individual to draw back from it and to exhaust our interest in the use of religion within the realm of the personal. When this happens religion grows introspective, easily becomes selfish and soon is subjected, and rightly so, to the criticism that it becomes a soporific or an escape mechanism. We rely upon it for comfort; we seek inner peace; we call for its privileges of personal resource. We forget the other implication, which is of the essence of the Christian profession, namely, that a saved man accepts his salvation under the implicit pledge that he in turn becomes a saviour of others; that he receives the power of Christ in order to become the servant of the cause of Christ. A Christian is bound, as Jesus put it, to spread his influence like the salt, which reaches out to preserve, or the yeast, which leavens the other particles. Nothing can be quite so disappointing as a professed Christian who exercises no preserving, regenerating and inspiring influence on the group of which he is a part. Jesus called such persons "salt that hath lost its savor." The New Testament considers it a contradiction to profess that a man can be essentially Christian within himself and at the same time not tend to become Christian in his relation to others. Nobody can put it more plainly than does the Bible where, in the Epistle of John, it says that a man who says he loves God, yet hates his brother, "is a liar and the truth is not in him."

This being true, it is to be expected that out from any group of Christians will go an increasingly powerful influence toward Christlike group action. The larger the proportion of Christians, the larger the influence. If we may imagine good as at one pole and evil at the other, any group in society which had in it one Christian would begin to feel a slight tension in the direction of the good. With the increasing number of Christians that tension would be strengthened.

It was this normal expectation of the influence that would come into

human society through the presence of Christians, which, seemingly, led Jesus to teach us to pray for a time when God's will would be done upon earth as it is done in heaven.

It is obvious, however, to anyone who studies history or who watches personality that the preacher must not only secure the original contacting of the personality with God through Jesus Christ by personal choice, but must realize the duty of leading those who make such a profession to the proper expression of it in social relationships. We have been altogether too confident in our assumption that if a man had made a profession of faith in Christ he would thereafter automatically know what action to take or what attitude to assume toward pending issues in the midst of society. No better illustration can be given of the fallacy of this expectation than to look at the little group in which Jesus inaugurated the Christian movement. The men who followed Him had evidently made their open commitment. They had broken with their families, and in some cases with society, and were His followers. They had left more than most of us will ever leave; they had taken a step that was larger than most of us will ever take. By the test by which we usually measure professed Christians, they had gone farther than do most of the people in our churches; and Peter, of all those who had taken those steps, seemed to be the foremost. He occupied the kind of position in the group which a lay preacher, or a chairman of the board of deacons or elders, would occupy in our average church. Yet the fact that this profession, or commitment, did not automatically work to enable Peter to judge rightly on religious questions is perfectly clear when Jesus Himself said, in passing upon one of the positions which Peter took as to a course of action which Jesus should adopt, "Get thee behind me, Satan; thou mindest not the things of God, but the things of men." Jesus evidently felt that although a man had made the decision to follow Him and had even made great sacrifices to accomplish that, he still needed instruction, needed to be helped to think straight in matters of religion.

That men can profess to be followers of Jesus Christ and yet be so limited in their idea of what that implies in social relationship that they actually twist the Church to their ends rather than change themselves to the Church's ends, is well testified to by the influence which Constantine had upon the Church.

It is therefore clear that when a minister goes into his pulpit he has a

responsibility not only to exercise the function of inspiration and seek for a submission of the personal will to the claims of Jesus Christ, but he has a second function, to help guide his people to think honestly and clearly, as followers of Jesus Christ, on the relationship which they and the Church should hold to the social process of which they are a part.

After all, the Church is an organization of people within society; it both affects and is affected by world movements. If it is to have that power to affect, those who lead it certainly must bear the responsibility of seeing that the effect which it does have is in line with the will of God.

This is no request that our ministers shall constitute themselves embryonic sociologists, economists or internationalists, but it is saying that as preachers we must accept our responsibility for intelligent and constructive leadership on the social side of our message as truly as on the individual side. Even the man who professes that his entire ministry is centered in the individual will find himself, before he knows it, where he has to admit that it cannot be so limited. Doctor Schweitzer once pointed this out in regard to Karl Barth. While Doctor Barth, in theory, held that the Church had nothing to do with the State, in actual practice he found that the State had much to do with the Church, and almost before he knew it and in spite of his apparent doctrine of isolation, he was forced to take a position and exercise a leadership which greatly influenced the whole social process within his nation.

The Church has freely admitted its responsibility along this line in certain areas. One of the destructive world forces which it has attempted to curb and eliminate has been the liquor traffic. Another field of effort in which the Church has frankly attempted to affect world movements has been the foreign missionary enterprise. Christians from the so-called sending countries have invaded great areas of the non-Christian world in order to share there the values which have come to them through Jesus Christ.

Once we admit, however, that the Church has some responsibility in the larger world movements, we are forced to come to a decision upon the major issue: namely, can we present Christianity as an individual matter and yet not go on to try to bring about a situation where it becomes the law for the world as well as the law for the individual. While the individual does not control the rest of the world, his profession of faith in Jesus Christ imposes upon him the responsibility so to shape his own actions and up to

the limit of his power so to affect the public decisions that when these are translated into action they will tend to produce God's will upon earth.

There is no question but that today the forces which are affecting our people are increasingly world forces. All the inventions of transportation and communication have enabled these world forces to play upon us and to shape the environment in which we live. Even though a minister denies responsibility for world movements, those world movements beat in upon him, affect the results of his efforts, and condition the response which his people can make to his message.

We may set up the missionary movement, but the present rise of nationalism, the terrific anti-religious drive of Bolshevism, the secularism to which the Jerusalem Conference referred—all condition the results that can be obtained. The missionary fields have been closed, properties seized, missionaries driven out—not because we wanted it so, but because world movements forced it upon us.

The preacher, therefore, in mapping out his preaching program for the year, should have regularly in mind that he is in a real sense a teacher as well as a preacher. He is helping immature Christians to become intelligent in the application of the teachings of Jesus to the environment of which they are a part. He is building a force which can help shape world movements toward the ends of a Christian purpose. If he does his work well his people will be uncomfortable if they remain ignorant, or if they carelessly take attitudes that forward the wrong and hinder the right.

To do this he should help them to erect within their own thinking standards that grow out of the teachings of Jesus, by which they can test the various proposals and situations which rise before them for their judgment. The first step in acting like a Christian is seeing clearly how a Christian should act. While some writers seem to make it a terribly complex matter to know what Christian idealism implies, it does not seem so impossible unless we get lost in a maze of sophistries. We will find it far easier to secure clear evidence of the way in which we ought to act than we will to act that way after we see it. Much quibbling over Jesus' teaching grows out of our unwillingness to obey those commands that are obvious.

When we think about the message of Jesus, it is amazing how much of it applied to human relationships. In a sense, He is the world's specialist on how personalities get along with one another. We can easily find the great outlines of His teachings in this area and hold them up clearly. The

great motive to which He trusted was love; He distrusted force. He was on the side of good will; He was against hate. He was for service and kindness; He was against greed and exploitation. He was for the use of power for the redemption and blessing of all mankind; He was against every form of the use of power for taking advantage of the underprivileged or the weak. He looked upon the world as stocked with the gifts of God; He refused at any time to take advantage of the control of those gifts for selfish ends. He believed that they should be used for the good of the group. He refused to be dominated by the lust for power, the greed for profit, or the idea of selfish gain. He refused to become a respecter of class, of race, of color, or of sex. He tried to lift men to a plane where they would be above the small, divisive and isolationist tendencies of human personality and would find the Godlike in all of God's creatures. These are but a few of the more obvious positions which He took.

In the light of these attitudes of Jesus a man would be shortsighted indeed who did not see many implications flowing out from such teachings which would guide in our decisions on the world movements of today.

Take these teachings as the guide and approach the tremendous economic and industrial questions through which we are trying to think our way today. We undoubtedly must look to our economists and sociologists for a vast amount of technical information on these subjects. We will undoubtedly secure much data which will come out of experiment; the study of history will cast light upon what has happened in like circumstances before. As Christians we have access to all this material but we must add our "plus."

To the question, What do sociology and economics and history teach? we add the question, How does it look when measured by the scale of values used by Jesus? If we accept His major interest in personality, in human values, and in an abundant life, what would this imply? We cannot come to our decision as to whether we favor a certain proposal till it has been examined in that presence.

If we would do this and get our people in the habit of doing it, how much easier it would be to find the right side and throw our influence there. If we have submitted to us a proposal which seeks first to protect property, at the expense of human life; or one that seeks first to provide profit by exploiting the mass of the people; if we are asked to favor a policy that gives riches to the few at the expense of the abundant life for the many, is

there any question as to where Jesus would have stood or what Jesus' teachings imply for us?

I do not see how there can be, if we are really Christian. To be sure, this will not be easy. But certainly we can never help our people to believe that the way to decide upon the right of a given issue is to follow the way of ease. I am not here advocating a minister's setting up detailed programs of social action, nor urging his leadership for each proposal for Utopia which is presented; though I am frank to admit I could more easily believe that a few mistakes along this line might be more easily forgiven by the Master than doing nothing. The Christian movement is not static; it is dynamic. That is a great sentence in Sherwood Eddy's late book, "Faith is not the ability to believe something in spite of the evidence, it is the willingness to dare something in spite of the consequences." I would rather make a mistake now and then than to be like Meroz of old, who let the battle be fought and only appeared on the field after it was all over. The possibility of a mistake along this line is no excuse for our not standing clearly and helping our people to stand clearly on the side of the solutions nearest to the attitudes of Jesus. It would be a tragedy to claim to be a minister of His and awake to find ourselves leading our people away from His standards. A certain man in a football game on a California field got the ball, but became so confused that he ran in exactly the wrong direction. No minister should dare let himself be put in the position where people can actually raise the question as to the side on which he stands.

Take again the issue of peace and war, on which our conscience is slowly becoming more acute. When we are asked to accept war as the method by which nations shall continue to attempt to settle their disputes, it may look natural enough when examined in the light of ordinary political action. Measure it, however, by Christ's scale of values. There can be no question, it seems to me, that it is about the most unchristian method that could be selected among various possible options. If Christ and Christ's spirit move in one direction, war moves in exactly the opposite. Where Christ's spirit glorifies the abundant life, war glorifies the terrible death. If Christ's spirit teaches men to save and redeem others, war teaches men to kill and to maim others. If Christ's spirit calls for dependence upon love, war calls for a glorification of hate. If Christ's spirit seeks to stimulate confidence and good will, war seeks to excite fear and bitter rivalry. While Christ's spirit teaches men to take God's gifts of intelligence and

inventive genius and use them to make life more worth while, war takes every one of these things and uses them to invent processes of destruction and devastation.

It is as our people come slowly but steadily to see the deadly contrast between what the Christian attitude implies and what war requires that the conscience of the race will be quickened. If that contrast is to be drawn, we preachers are the ones to draw it. When it has been drawn often enough we may hope to have men build up an alternative method to which the nations can turn, a machinery of peace instead of a machinery of war. No preacher who preaches the gospel of Jesus Christ should fail to drag this barbarous war method frequently into the presence of Jesus Christ and let his people see it in all its hideous hellishness; and still further, it would appear that every effort to create instrumentalities for peaceful settlement would automatically have every preacher behind it from the start.

Another contemporary world movement which pushes itself into our life is the craze for nationalism, with its demand for a supine worship of the State and the acceptance of the Machiavellian idea that the State can do no wrong, that it is above conscience, above God, and is subject to no moral laws except those which it creates for itself.

This renaissance of nationalistic self-assertion is sweeping across the world today. While in Germany, Italy, Russia and Japan it comes to its most vivid and dangerous expression, it is now breaking out in Mexico and in Spain, and is not entirely absent in our own and other countries.

But can the Christian minister allow it to go unchallenged? Must he not subject this phobia to the scrutiny of an insight that is Christ-centered? If the Christian is to assume that he must take the commands of the State for the final authority over his conscience then what becomes of a man's supreme duty to God? It is true that Jesus said, "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's," but He also said, "Render unto God the things that are God's. And at no time did He suggest to us to render unto Caesar the things that are God's. He went to His death rather than do that. Those who followed Him all went to their death for much the same reason. No one expressed it better than did Peter, when in reply to the command of the authorities he said, "Whether it be right in the sight of God for us to obey man rather than God, judge ye. We cannot but speak the things that we have seen and heard."

The nationalisms of today have become a disease; nation after nation

has become almost obsessed by it as by a delusion of grandeur. What is needed now is not that those who speak for the Eternal should abdicate their point of view; but there is every reason why this temporary world movement should be faced by and submitted to the larger and more permanently constructive universal for which the Christian religion stands. When the Church becomes the tool of the State, both State and Church lose. After all, it is as great a loss for a State to lose the check on its own policies that comes from the free operation of the conscience of Christian people within it, as it is for a navigator to lose the use of his compass, that instrument which enables him to check his course by the larger forces at the heart of the universe.

Or let us consider another world movement, that conflict between the races. Ministers and churches must decide what attitude they shall take toward the current propaganda based upon race hatred and race fear. We have frequently recurring evidence of our own innate littleness and bigotry in such disgraceful exhibitions as our Negro lynching, or Germany's anti-Semitic inanity, or the sporadic appearance of such movements as the Ku Klux Klan, or the Silver Shirts. Is it not perfectly plain that whatever excuses may be offered for the rising of these fears, or specific situations cited as examples of their dangers, the Christian attitude can never approve actions toward those of another race which cannot square with the attitudes of Jesus or the teaching of the New Testament?

We might cite many other world movements which push into the foreground of our contemporary life and on which we as Christians are almost forced to take sides. The point we make, however, is that a Christian congregation in any community should become a section of the population who not only are thinking but who are subjecting their thinking and action to the harder and more exacting demands of compliance with Jesus' attitudes. If a preacher has succeeded in achieving this in his congregation, his people may be relied on in turn to exert their influence toward the creating of a larger public opinion which, registering itself in various organs of publicity and depositing itself in the votes that ultimately direct public policy, will exercise those tensions in the direction of the good and the wholesome, which might normally be expected as the result of resident Christian idealism. It is not only the minister's opportunity but his duty to aid his congregation in this fashion. Who shall help them to think from the Christian point of view, if not the minister? Who shall speak the word

of moral judgment in situations where right and wrong are involved, if not the minister? Who has been better trained to do it? He is supposed to have had the privilege of an education; he professes to have the qualities of leadership or he would not have entered the ministry; he has had the stamp of the approval of his divinity school, or it would not have graduated him; he has access to as wide reading and comes as near being released, by the nature of his profession, for such investigation, as has any man in the community. It is for these reasons that we urge that the preacher, in planning the balanced rations of spiritual food for his people, shall place within it, in some worthy proportion, such preaching as shall make his people intelligently Christian in the area of world movements.

The human mind easily remains parochial. The native selfishness with which we start life easily clings to us and colors our point of view. The Christian religion, if it operates as it should, should increasingly lift the personality out of the selfish and limited point of view into the broad fraternity of the whole of God's kingdom; but if this is achieved it will be because the minister, in his preaching and attitudes, continually summons his people out of the smallness of their immediate interests into the larger areas of the world interests.

Let me illustrate. If the average congregation is allowed to drift, it will take an interest in the local parish, but only a very limited interest in the work of its own denomination or of the Christian movement across the world. The current expense of the church will be a first claim, and the benevolence or the missionary enterprises will take what is left. If it is ever reversed, it will be because the pastor lifts his people to become Christian world citizens and not merely members of a religious family club in the community. Not only is it true that a minister *should* do it, but he loses a great opportunity if he does not do it. If the preacher is looking to build even the local parish, he will be wisely advised if he attempts to relate it in people's minds to the largest possible project. When people think in small areas, they both give and live in a small way. When they begin to think of themselves as moving upon a larger orbit, attempting a larger task, feeling the lift of a larger vision, they both give, live and think on a larger scale. The man whose preaching continues to turn the person's thought inside himself to seek comfort and peace and satisfaction within the personal life and fails to lift that person's eyes to the great tasks where enterprises should be undertaken, to the tumultuous areas of the world's forces

where the struggles for tomorrow are being won or lost—has lost one of the greatest possibilities in his preaching ministry for expanding and developing his parishioners.

We would emphasize again that whatever Christianity—or Christian preachers—expect to do to world movements, there is no question that the world movements of today are doing tremendous things to Christianity.

Within the past twenty-five years we have seen a nation which has historically been listed among the Christian nations of the world, deliberately step out of that column and move over to head the forces of anti-religion. The Christian Church of that country has been almost totally wrecked; religion has been almost outlawed, at least so completely that the Russian government believes that it can relax its persecution because it has won the battle against religion. We may deny that this is so; we may contend that it is only a temporary defeat, and claim that ultimately religion will come back. Meantime, however, we cannot dodge the effect which this world movement of atheism has already had upon the institution we call the Christian Church within the borders of that nation. Moreover, wherever Russia's influence has gone or is going, it seems to carry with it the same anti-religious bias. The situation in Mexico and in parts of Spain and China today is suggestive testimony to this fact.

It was in large part because the Christian Church in Russia refused to persuade its people to do intelligent thinking, and because the clergy refused to induce their people to think independently as Christians and servants of the common good, but used the Church to bless the social and political injustices of the regime of the Czar, that the Church is today wrecked in Russia.

For us, as Christian leaders, to ignore this solemn warning is simply to put our heads in the sand. There is a world movement which is set for our destruction. If it succeeds, we fail. It has definitely and deliberately thrown down the gauntlet before the Christian Church. Are we to pick it up, or are we not? Are we to cry, Peace! Peace! when there is no peace? Are we to lead our people to feel that religion brings the privilege of personal comfort and personal salvation, and not teach them also to accept the tremendous responsibility for taking their share in the on-going enterprise of the kingdom of God as it is on this earth? It is unthinkable!

The answer to Russia's campaign against religion is not going to be given by men who merely stand in the pulpit and denounce Russia. The

final answer is not going to be made, either, by those who use her as a bogeyman with which to frighten people, who take the terminology of "Red" or "Communist" and hurl it at everybody they do not like. The ultimate answer to Russia's campaign of anti-religion is the demonstration within our so-called Christian civilization that the force of Christianity is able to produce, here, a conscience more sensitive to the public well-being than the forces of anti-religion can produce in Russia. We must prove, in spite of Russia's protestations of desire to protect the under-privileged and give the average man his chance, and to curb those who would exploit the poor, that here in this Christian nation we can and do deal more equitably and fairly with the common man, offer a life which is more worthwhile living, and distribute the products of our common enterprise not to the enrichment of the few but to the enlargement of life for all. In other words, Christianity's answer to irreligion in Russia must be in terms of a Christian world culture built by us here which offers more freely and fairly to all, the things which make life finer than does the culture which Russia builds. One of the obligations of the Christian preacher is to think of himself, his life, his work, and his teaching function within his pulpit, as an effort, first, to make men Christian, and then through them to build a Christian social order wherein dwelleth righteousness and in which God's will is done on earth.

There is a sense in which the whole matter comes back to our idea of the objective and purpose of Jesus Christ. If religion is merely a method of escaping the world, or of enduring it bravely like a Stoic, and ultimately rising from it into some subsequent life, then the thesis of this article is wrong. But if religion is, as Jesus said, something in men which made His disciples "in the world, yet not of the world," to be the "salt of the earth" that savors it, and the "light of the world" that lights it; if they are to go forth to teach people to observe and to do the things which He commanded; if they are to be not only the objects of His salvation but the workers together with Him in the purging and cleansing of human society; if He is divine enough to save the individual and carry him to heaven, and also divine enough to save the world and to weave His followers into a great force for making His divine power felt in the transformation of human relationships—then we are right, and the preacher takes his place among those forces that are working together with God to this end.

"Brookings" Surveys and Suggests

ARTHUR S. FLEMMING

TO A GREATER extent than ever before in the history of the nation, the economic system to which the United States has clung tenaciously for the past one hundred and fifty years is being subjected to scrutiny and challenge.

Ever since the beginning of the economic depression in 1929, national attention has centered upon the country's economic ailments and the efforts of government and business, economists and industrialists, to cure them.

Throughout this period, questions have been constantly on the lips of people of every walk of life concerning specific remedies which have been put forward as a means of ending the depression. The program of the Roosevelt Administration has been the subject of constant and widespread discussion. Share-the-wealth programs, social credit plans, old-age pension schemes, and a wide variety of other suggested remedies have become popular topics for debate in every city, village, and town.

Apart from queries concerning the merits of any particular scheme, however, one very much broader and more basic question is everywhere being heard with increasing frequency. That question is, to state it briefly: Has the economic depression of the past seven years been the result of an economic system which is itself fundamentally defective?

The reasons underlying the emergence of this question into the forefront of public consciousness are not hard to find. For seven years, the American people have watched millions of unemployed tramping the streets while factories remained idle. They have seen millions in need of food while farmers, with the aid of the government, sought to curtail their production of foodstuffs. The paradox of "Poverty amid Plenty" has come to have a very real meaning to every thoughtful citizen. And the question stated above has been the natural result.

To that question, a number of answers have been given. Among them, one of the most interesting and far-reaching has been provided by The Brookings Institution of Washington, D. C., a privately endowed organization which carries on research activities in the fields of economics and government.

With the aid of funds received from the Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation of Pittsburgh, The Brookings Institution has conducted a scientific survey of our present economic system. The results of this monumental undertaking have now been published in four recently completed volumes, entitled respectively *America's Capacity to Produce*, *America's Capacity to Consume*, *The Formation of Capital*, and *Income and Economic Progress*.

In the first volume of the series, *America's Capacity to Produce*, the Institution's economists and statisticians have undertaken to examine the frequently heard assertion that the United States is suffering from excess plant capacity. Their objective during the course of this study has been to find out as nearly as possible just what is the nation's productive capacity, and the extent to which it is being utilized. And, basing their study upon conditions existing during the period from 1900 to 1930, they have reached some exceedingly interesting conclusions.

In the first place, the great mass of data which they uncovered points to the conclusion that at no time during the entire period under investigation has this country produced goods up to the maximum of its capacity. The margin of unutilized plant capacity between 1900 and 1930 did not, it was found, increase, except in the single field of the transportation industry. But throughout the entire period, a substantial amount of the country's plant capacity was not actually being utilized for productive purposes.

Even during the period of prosperity existing between 1925 and 1929, productive capacity was not employed to the fullest possible extent. During the year 1929 itself, the country's industrial plant could have produced approximately 19 per cent more than it actually was called upon to produce. During the entire period between 1925 and 1929, the plant was capable of about 21 per cent added production. Since 1929, of course, the percentage of unused plant capacity has been much greater.

This failure to employ our industrial plant to the extent of its maximum capacity has not been due to any shortage in the supply of available labor. In 1929, the figures compiled by the Institution indicate, there were available almost enough unemployed and partly-employed laborers to man the unutilized plant capacity and bring it up to its maximum possible productivity. Since 1929, with a decrease in plant capacity and an increase in unemployment, the ratio remains approximately the same.

What a 19 per cent increase over the 1929 level of productivity would

mean is graphically set forth in the Institution's study. Such an increase would have meant, in 1929, an added \$15,000,000,000 worth of produced wealth. Such an increase would have made it possible to raise the incomes enjoyed by all families under a \$3,500 per year level by 42 per cent. Or, had the increase been equally distributed among every citizen in the country, it would have been possible to give the equivalent of \$125 to each man, woman, and child.

So, the first of the Institution's studies reveals that even during normal times—even, in fact, during the most prosperous times—the country's industrial plant is not, under our present system, utilized to the full extent of its capacity. But, why is this the case? Is the country's population incapable of consuming the total amount of products which our industrial plant is capable of producing? This second question was dealt with at length in the second study completed by the Institution, *America's Capacity to Consume*.

The results of this second study indicate that America is laboring under no physical inability to consume all of the goods which our industrial plant, operating at full capacity, would be capable of producing. Families whose members make up approximately 70 per cent of our total population have been and are spending virtually all of their incomes for the bare necessities of life. In 1929 only 2,000,000 families, whose members constituted barely 8 per cent of the total population, had incomes in excess of \$5,000 per year. To this 8 per cent of the total went nearly all of the luxury and convenience goods produced. The rest of the population neither possessed nor could afford such goods, but would gladly have purchased them had they been able to do so. Thus, the country suffers from no physical lack of ability to consume, but from the lack of buying power with which to purchase.

In fact, the Institution's survey on this point indicates that the United States has not reached a stage of economic development in which it is possible to produce more than the people of the country would consume, if they had the means with which to do so. On the contrary, our physical ability to consume—although not our buying power—is, at present, greatly in excess of our capacity to produce. This, in turn, would seem to indicate that increased rather than decreased production of goods is necessary.

From the foregoing, the Institution tentatively reached the conclusion that American production can be materially increased by utilizing to the fullest extent our present plant capacity, and that American consump-

tion is physically more than able to account for all goods which we may be capable of producing. The difficulty lies neither in a lack of ability to produce, nor in a lack of ability to consume, but rather in a lack of ability to place sufficient buying power in the hands of the people to enable them to fulfill their consumption desires and needs.

The reason for this difficulty, the Institution believed, lay mainly in a maldistribution of income. During the postwar period, there has been an increasing tendency toward concentration of income in the hands of a comparatively small group of the population. If the great mass of the populace have less than they need for consumption purposes, while a small minority have more than they can possibly use, neither production nor consumption can be as great as it would be were income more equally distributed. This follows from the fact that the small minority having large incomes will put into savings and investments what they do not need to pay for goods. As concentration of wealth and income increases, the proportion saved grows relatively greater, and the proportion spent in consumption relatively less. Hence, there is an ever-increasing proportionate share of national income available for consumption purposes. And since the amount of goods that will be produced is dependent upon the amount that can be purchased, production will decrease also.

In reaching these tentative conclusions, however, the Institution's economists were met immediately by an argument which has been advanced, in the past, by an almost countless number of economic authorities. The relative proportions of the national income which are devoted to spending and saving, so this argument runs, will have no effect upon the extent to which existing productive resources will be utilized. If more money is saved, the argument continues, the proceeds of such savings will be distributed through banks and other investment channels for use in the production of capital goods. Savings generally take the form either of deposits in banks or direct investments in corporate or other business enterprises. Since the banks lend the great bulk of money received as deposits to business enterprises, the result in either case is the same: The proceeds of the savings will be used to construct additional plant equipment and other capital goods (that is, goods which are used in the production of other goods).

If, on the other hand, more money is spent, the advocates of this theory contend, more consumption goods will be produced to meet the increased demand. As more money is spent for consumption goods, how-

ever, the amount spent for capital goods will be proportionately less. Our productive capacity will merely be utilized for the production of more consumption goods and fewer capital goods. But the total amount of production will be substantially the same. In either case, therefore, the effect on the utilization of productive capacity will be the same.

The next task confronting the Institution, therefore, was to examine the merits of this argument, and to determine the exact process through which savings are transformed into new capital goods and equipment. The results of this examination appear in the third study completed by the Institution, *The Formation of Capital*.

At the outset, the Institution's economists point out, it must be realized that the formation of capital necessarily involves an allocation of productive energy. In early days, when each individual produced merely to satisfy his own needs, there was only required an allocation by each individual of his own energies as between the production of capital goods and of consumption goods. In a communistic society, such as that which exists in Russia, the allocation of a nation's productive energy as between capital goods and consumption goods is accomplished by the state itself. In a capitalistic society like our own, on the other hand, there is no such comparatively simple and direct form of control. Instead, the allocation will depend upon the decisions made by a great number of individual businessmen, which are dependent in turn upon a great variety of complicated economic forces.

Now, in respect to the extent to which savings will result in the production of an increased amount of capital goods, the conclusions reached in this study are widely divergent from those entertained by most economists in the past. Under the classical theory already outlined, it is assumed that money savings will always result necessarily in a greater production of capital goods; the greater the amount of money saved, the greater the amount of capital goods produced.

But, according to the conclusions reached by the Institution, savings do not always go directly into the production of capital goods. Savings undoubtedly constitute a fund which may be utilized to produce more capital goods. But actual utilization for that purpose will depend solely upon whether new capital goods, like plant and equipment, can be profitably operated if produced. That, in turn, will depend upon whether the commodities which capital goods produce can be profitably sold. And that,

finally, will depend upon whether there is available a large amount of purchasing power in the hands of consumers with which to take off the market those consumption goods which capital goods normally produce.

This analysis, obviously, differs widely from the older view. The argument made by the Institution is, in brief, that capital goods will be produced at an increasing rate only if, as, and when there is an expanding demand, backed by adequate purchasing power, for consumption goods. The demand for capital goods, far from being independent of the demand for consumption goods, is directly dependent thereon. Therefore, it follows that if too large a share of the national income finds its way into savings rather than into consumption channels, the output of both capital goods and consumption goods will decrease.

In support of their position, the Institution's economists cite the evidence afforded by our past industrial history. Thus, our history shows that capital goods are produced in increasing quantities at times when our consumption is expanding rather than when it is contracting. Too, the demand for, and the prices of, capital goods and consumption goods tend to rise and fall together.

Also of great importance is the fact that our system of banking and credit is extremely flexible. In a period during which both capital goods and consumption goods are being produced in increasingly large quantities, there is an increasing flow of funds into both investment and consumption channels. Thus, there is no fixed amount of funds available, a part for consumption and a part for investment which will result in an increased supply of capital goods. Rather, there is a credit mechanism which makes possible an increase or decrease in the production of both at the same time.

Likewise of importance is the fact that, in the past, the increase or decrease in the production of capital goods has tended to vary directly with the increase or decrease in demand for consumption goods, while no direct connection has been apparent between the increase or decrease in the production of capital goods and the increase or decrease of savings available for investment. Between 1923 and 1929, the Institution's study points out, there was a constantly increasing amount of savings on hand for investment purposes. Yet, during the same period, the amount spent in constructing new plant and equipment remained almost constant from year to year. No matter how great may be the amount of funds available for investment purposes, it is therefore concluded, increasing production of capital goods

will depend always upon proportionately increasing demand for consumption goods.

In the Institution's study, some interesting facts are referred to in connection with the historical development of our capital markets. During the country's early history, the amount of funds available for increased production of capital goods was always smaller than the demand. Businessmen continually found it difficult to obtain capital available for investment which they could utilize in building up their enterprises.

During the period since the Civil War, a great change has occurred. The growth of a moderately wealthy middle class, combined with the development of an elastic banking and credit system, has resulted in a constantly increasing amount of savings available for investment purposes. During the postwar period, particularly, the amount of funds available for investment purposes was far in excess of the amount needed to finance our own industrial enterprise; in fact, it was so excessive that we were finding it difficult to dispose of even by lending abroad. The effect of these excess savings was merely to inflate securities and to promote an unstable financial situation. On the other hand, had a large part of such funds been spent for consumption instead of being placed in savings accounts, the result would have been an increased production of capital goods, and a much more stable financial picture.

The effect of this analysis is, of course, directly to support the tentative conclusions reached by the Institution. At this stage of the study, the picture painted is a clear one. The United States possesses a greater productive capacity than she has ever actually utilized. Consumption is potentially more than large enough to use all the goods which our industrial plant, working at full capacity, could produce. The great difficulty is that, due to the maldistribution of income benefits, consumers have not enough purchasing power with which to gratify their wants and buy the goods which the industrial machine is capable of producing. As a result of this same maldistribution of income, too great a proportion of the national income is saved and too little is spent for consumption purposes. What is needed, therefore, is less saving, more spending for consumption, and increased production.

Having thus defined the problem and indicated the needs, the Institution next proceeds to consider some of the solutions which have been proposed by others, and then to set forth its own program for action. These

considerations as to practicable solutions are contained in the fourth and last volume of the series, *Income and Economic Progress*.

In the first place, the Institution reiterates its belief that increased production, and not decreased production, must ultimately be the road which we must follow if we wish to attain a higher standard of living for all our people. Curtailment of production, in order artificially to bring about a scarcity of products and resultant high prices, may have its advantages temporarily during a period of emergency. But the only method by which we can attain a permanently higher standard of living is through the production of an ever-increasing amount of goods. And we must, in order to achieve such increased production, revamp our system of distribution in such a way that the great mass of our population will have sufficient income to purchase all the goods which we are capable of producing.

The Institution then points out that a number of plans have been advanced for revamping our distributive system in a manner calculated to bring about a balance between production and consumption. It then proceeds to outline and criticize the following solutions which have been advanced:

1. *A Shorter Working Week.* The program to which the American Federation of Labor has committed itself, a thirty-hour week, has in the opinion of the Institution's economists little to recommend it. The underlying theory behind this solution is that if all laborers, employed and unemployed, were actually working on a thirty-hour week basis, they would succeed in producing a sufficient quantity of goods to more than satisfy consumption needs.

Available statistical data, the Institution states, does not support this contention. Although the last few years have shown an increase in productivity per worker, this phenomenon has been due largely to the fact that during depression years only the most efficient members of the laboring class have been employed. All laborers working thirty hours per week could not produce an amount of goods anywhere near sufficient to meet consumption needs. On the other hand, a decrease in the work week would mean permanently decreased production; and what we need if we are to advance to a higher standard of living is increased production.

2. *Share-the-Wealth Plans.* It is impossible, the Institution points out, to share our wealth in a physical sense. Our national wealth stands today at approximately \$300,000,000,000, but it is represented by farms,

factories, railroads, and the like, and not by money. The only method by which it could be physically divided would be through governmental confiscation of all property, followed by the issuance of share-certificates to every person.

Redistribution of income, on the other hand, would be physically possible. But even assuming that the total national income received during the most prosperous year in our history had been equally divided among every citizen, each person would have received exactly \$673. What we need, therefore, is not so much equal distribution of the income which we now receive, but rather an increase in the total income.

3. *Taxation.* The use of taxation as means of redistributing income has gained increasing favor among certain classes during recent years. When the government taxes the wealthy, however, and then uses the proceeds to provide employment through public works projects and the like, the effect on the economic well-being of the nation, over a long-time period, is not a salutary one. The types of projects in connection with which public works programs are feasible do not lend themselves to any resultant increase in the standard of living. What is needed are not more highways, public parks, and the like, but better food, clothing, and conveniences. While certain governmental services are highly desirable and tend to increase productivity, public taxation and expenditures cannot in themselves bring about increased production and consumption along lines that will lead to an increased standard of living.

4. *Wage Increases.* While increases in money wages might be effective as a means of raising mass purchasing power if all business could be persuaded to raise wages at the same time, such a program would be difficult of accomplishment. Under a competitive system, individual businesses hesitate to increase their costs and thus place themselves on an unequal footing with their competitors by raising wages. In addition, only groups which are now collectively organized for bargaining purposes are in a position to demand wage increases. Since the great majority of American workers are not union members, wage increases would be sought with some hope of success only by a comparatively small class of the population.

And finally, after having examined other plans which have been offered, the Institution outlines its own suggested program. That program embodies general reductions in prices.

The fundamental concept underlying the capitalistic system, it is

pointed out, is that under competitive practice each business will constantly seek to cut its costs and pass the advantages on to the consumer in the form of lower prices in order to obtain an advantage over its competitors. If prices are thus cut, while at the same time wages are maintained at existing levels, real wages—that is, the amount of products which wage-earners can buy with the wages which they receive—will increase. Price reductions, therefore, have the same result as increases in money wages. And price reductions, in addition, have the advantages of coinciding with the basic principles of capitalism and of benefiting every class of the population.

Had those who manage our capitalistic system remained faithful to these fundamental capitalistic principles of free competition and ever-decreasing prices, existing difficulties would not have arisen. The trouble has been that, in many lines of business, monopolistic industrial combinations have arisen. These combinations, possessing the ability to control prices and production, have bent their efforts in the direction of stabilizing existing price levels to protect immediate profits without regard to the fact that possibly greater profits, as well as an increased volume of business, could have been secured by constant reduction of prices. Thus, the free play of competition has been strangled and adjustment in price levels impeded.

What is needed, therefore, the Institute concludes, is a realization that price reductions are necessary if the capitalistic system is to operate in the only manner in which successful operation is possible. Capacity for increased production is present. Physical capacity for increased consumption is likewise present. All that is needed to achieve the high standard of living which increased production and consumption will bring is a more efficient distributive system. And the primary requirement for more efficient distribution is a realization on the part of businessmen that, instead of "freezing" prices, they must pass on the benefits of increased productive efficiency to the consumer in the form of constantly decreasing prices.

These, then, are the conclusions reached in one of the most significant surveys of our economic system and the methods by which it can be made more efficient, that has ever been undertaken. The study made by The Brookings Institution may not provide the ultimate answer to the question of whether, and by what means, our present economic system can be made to function effectively. But, without question, it constitutes one of the most important attempts to find that answer which has yet been made.

Prophet Versus Scholar

A Study in Luther and Erasmus

C. C. RICHARDSON

THERE is no greater contrast than that of the scholar and the prophet, and not seldom the comparison is to the detriment of the latter. Since, therefore, we shall be looking often at Luther through the eyes of Erasmus, it may be well to preface our study by some remarks on Luther.

It seems that any true reading of history cannot avoid reaching the judgment of Carlyle. It is of course considered up to date to decry the Reformation, and to paint Luther as the originator of all the twentieth-century bogies—Nationalism, Protestant dogma, and State Religion. We demand nowadays a religion less definite, with fewer duties and obligations. Nevertheless the judgment of Carlyle would seem to be universally true—that there are great men who mold the world's destiny. It is not without a certain justification that Luther's name is inextricably bound up with the Reformation: take Luther out and you take the heart out of the sixteenth century. Luther is no mere element in the Reformation, he *is* the Reformation. To quote Carlyle, "I will call this Luther a true Great Man; great in intellect, in courage, in affection, and integrity—great as an Alpine Mountain." Again, Carlyle speaks of "those soft breathings of affection, soft as a child's or a mother's, in this great wild heart of Luther." There were the breathings of affection, there was the great heart—but it was also wild: that is just what Erasmus could not endure. All its soft affections could never atone for its rugged ferocity.

In comparing Luther with Erasmus we see a man who took himself too seriously and a man who did not take himself seriously enough. Luther was a German who loved his beer, his Bible and his native language, while Erasmus was a humanist who preferred good wine and good Latin, and whose city was the world. Luther, like Wyclif, belonged to the scholastics; he asked the same questions though he gave them different answers; but Erasmus was the child of a new age and of a new way of thinking. Luther was passionate about salvation: if Erasmus was passionate about anything

it was moderation. He wanted to enjoy life, not to be saved from it. Not that he was irreligious; far from it. He, too, loved his Bible, but while Luther used it to arraign the human race, Erasmus presented the Greek Testament for its enlightenment. Luther was never averse to a contest; Erasmus was ready to sacrifice much for peace. Luther wrote battle songs, Erasmus satires. Where the one was abusive the other was witty. If Luther was the wrath of God incarnate, Erasmus was the peace of God that passed Luther's understanding.

From the mass of correspondence left by Luther and Erasmus it seems evident that the course of their relations falls naturally into three parts. The first closes with the memorable date of December 15, 1520, when Luther burned the Papal Bull "Exurge domine." The second ends with the publication in 1527 of the second part of the "Hyperaspites"—the third with Erasmus' death in 1536. Up to 1520, Erasmus, while not openly supporting it, at least remained friendly to the Lutheran cause. But when at that date Luther deliberately revolted from authority the attitude of Erasmus was more guarded; and within four years the growing estrangement broke into open controversy. By 1527 Erasmus had completely abandoned the Reforming Party and to his death remained hostile to Luther.

It must never be forgotten that when Luther published his theses Erasmus was already in his fifty-first year, with a long experience of controversy with monks and obscurantists. Some ten years before, the biting and brilliant wit of his "Adagia" and "Moria" had set all Europe laughing. His Greek Testament had aroused a storm of opposition from the Vulgate worshipers, who accused him of "writing a new Gospel." The doctors of Louvain were constantly accusing him of being the cause of the religious outburst in Germany. In the summer of 1518 he wrote to the Rector of the University of Erfurt, and from his letter we get an excellent picture of his early attitude to the Lutheran cause. He writes:

"Luther has said many things excellently well. I could wish, however, that he would be less rude in his manner. But unless we stand behind him when he is right, no one will hereafter dare to speak the truth."

He evidently perceived Luther's virulence and lack of moderation from the first.

The following year, which saw a growing rift between Luther and the

Papacy, Luther wrote to Erasmus venturing to appeal to him for definite help. He wrote simply and even humbly, paying courteous respect to his wide fame as a scholar. But to Erasmus the request was inconvenient. To identify himself with Luther at this stage of the struggle meant to lose the support of the Pope, which had hitherto been his best defense in the war against ignorance. Above all, Erasmus shrank from anything approaching sedition, which, as he believed, must be avoided at all cost, because it would do more to destroy than to further any reformation. With the authorities on their side, the party of reform might effect something, but only anarchy and confusion could follow on open revolt.

Erasmus, therefore, replied in a guarded letter, urging above all things moderation. He says:

"I suggested (to your detractors) that the subjects on which you have written are not the sort to be declaimed on from the pulpit, and that as your character was admitted to be spotless, denouncing and cursing were not precisely in place. It is of no use. They are mad as ever. They do not argue because they cannot, and they trust entirely to evil speaking. . . . You have friends here, one in particular. I think courtesy to opponents is more effective than violence. Paul abolished the Jewish law by making it into an allegory. It might be wiser of you to renounce those who misuse the Pope's authority than to censure the Pope himself . . . quiet argument may do more than wholesale condemnation. . . ."

That, roughly speaking, is the attitude of Erasmus up to 1520. He is friendly to Luther's cause, but far from enthusiastic as to his method. He feared, and rightly feared, the consequences. To avoid ruining the cause that he was fighting for in Louvain, he avoided reading Luther's books, or making more open overtures to the Germans. In a letter to a Bishop (1520) he wrote these sentences, significant of his entire position:

"I recommended Luther himself to publish nothing revolutionary. I feared always that revolution would be the end, and I would have done more had I not been afraid that I might be found fighting against the Spirit of God."

A year later Luther declared open warfare by burning the papal bull. The rift with Erasmus then gradually widened and Erasmus, on Luther's disappearance after the Diet of Worms, separated himself from a cause which he believed to be hopelessly lost. When Luther reappeared a year later and the turmoil in Europe was about to break into open warfare, Erasmus felt constrained to write against Luther. He had always been contending that the only way to silence Luther was to answer his argu-

ments, and that furious Bulls from Rome and imprecations by the Reformer would alike lead to greater confusion. He had once written, "It is easy to call Luther a fungus, it is not easy to answer him." Finally, stung to exasperation by a scurrilous pamphlet from Von Hutten and by the constant urging of his friends, he wrote the "*De Libero Arbitrio*."

Far from choosing a subject abstruse enough to keep him from any imputation of heresy, Erasmus, as Luther later admitted, alone kept cool enough to aim his shaft directly at the central doctrine of Luther, on which his whole case must stand or fall. Neither this treatise, nor Luther's reply, nor Erasmus' counter-reply can be considered as outstanding works of theology. Neither of them had the philosophic grasp or the breadth of comprehension of men like Augustine and Calvin. But these treatises represent the relative weakness and strength of their two positions; they go down to the fundamental problem that lies below the claims of those who advocated reformation from within or reformation from without. The whole question ultimately turns on a discussion of free will. It is easy, of course, to cut the Gordian knot and to say there is really no problem at all. Doctor Johnson once said, pithily, "All argument shows that our wills are bound, but we know that we are free and that settles the matter." If Luther had had as much common sense, his theology might have been proportionately enriched. His authority, however, was not what he felt, but Holy Scripture—(one far more unreliable and conflicting in this case than feeling!) Erasmus was not slow to see this and fought him on his own ground. Proving his case by a long series of biblical quotations, he upheld the Scotist thesis that though the will of man received a wound through the Fall, making it prone to evil rather than to good, its freedom was not completely destroyed. This is just what Luther denied, maintaining that in his reason and will man is so bound to evil, that he can only be saved by the special grace of God.

The implications of these two positions are obvious. If man is essentially good the spread of truth will bring of itself the required reformation. It will be gradual and within the Church; if only the clouds of ignorance are dispelled, man will see the truth and act upon it. Upon this belief hung the whole case of Erasmus. Everything must be done to discover the truth of Apostolic Christianity and that truth will of itself accomplish any moral and religious regeneration. It is because the monks are so

ignorant that the monasteries are full of immorality; once the pure gospel is made intelligible and accessible to all, the truth will make men, not only free, but righteous. All our modern theory of education hangs on that premise: it is in a word the whole credo of humanism.

The antithesis of this is found in Luther's "*De Servo Arbitrio*," in which he contends that man is wholly corrupt. The bondage of the will to sin perverts his reason and his only hope of becoming righteous is in the ineffable grace of God, which in His due time He bestows on the chosen vessels of His grace. A reformation therefore comes not by the dissemination of the truth, but solely by the grace of God. Thus to Luther his every action was not his but God's: his motto was "*Ich kann nichts anders!*" Consequently he would bow to no authority but the voice of God within him. Even his criticism of Scripture is based on this. When authority crosses the path of a prophet, who feels himself impelled to say, "Thus saith the Lord"—it must be the opposition of Antichrist. With this unwavering conviction, Luther was driven step by step in his ruthless course: to him moderation was cowardice—hesitation self-interest. It is indeed hard for a man so passionately devoted to his cause to be able to understand those who cannot follow with him to the bitter end.

In this controversy on free will, almost all the arguments brought forth on either side are based on Scripture. On the one hand Luther lays stress upon the Epistle to the Romans and disparages the Catholic Epistle of Saint James, and on the other hand Erasmus finds it hard to explain some statements of Saint Paul.

The counter reply of Erasmus to Luther was the "*Hyperaspites*"—the second and more important part of which appeared in 1527. It marked the definite break of Erasmus with the Reformation. The question of the will recedes into the background, and the author blames Luther for the peasant revolt, for the lack of unity in his party and for Luther's dogmatic absolutism. All these evils are, in his opinion, due to his over emphasis on the grace of God, and tend to discount human responsibility: "Conscience," as he had once said not unjustly, "has run mad, and abandoned profligates quote Luther's books as an excuse for their own licentiousness." To a large extent it is the old tale of natural as against revealed religion. To Erasmus there are certain broad principles in the Christian Gospel, which if men once understand, they cannot fail to act upon. To

Luther there are no such principles. It is the Word of God speaking within him which reveals the will of Christ, and he who would think otherwise or oppose him is indeed found fighting against the Spirit of God.

Thus it is that to Luther Erasmus is essentially an enemy of Christ, while to Erasmus Luther is little short of a madman. In fact it is not hard to believe that Erasmus may have been in the right after all, when we read in Luther's *Table Talk* such words as these:

"Erasmus advocates to himself the divinity he would like to take from Christ: he thinks the Christian religion either a comedy or a tragedy, and that the things described in the New Testament never happened but were added as an apologue.

"Erasmus is worthy of hatred. I warn you all to regard him as God's enemy. He inflames the baser passions of young boys and regards Christ as I regard the Court fool."

It is well to remember that Erasmus was then nearly 70 and at Freiburg was writing such correspondence as this:

"You may hold ten diets but only God can ravel out these complications. I can do nothing. . . . I have been ill these three months . . . suffering, sick and miserable."

These remarks of Luther may well be compared with those of Erasmus, who never descends to slander or abusive retorts. Where he reproaches it is with justice: where he attacks it is with a keen but sportive humor. In the heat of the controversy Erasmus wrote thus to Luther:

"How do your scurrilous charges that I am an atheist, an Epicurean and a skeptic help the argument? . . . It terribly pains me, as it must all good men, that your arrogant, insolent, rebellious nature has set the world in arms. . . . I should wish you a better disposition were you not marvelously satisfied with the one you have. Wish me any curse you will except your temper—unless the Lord change it or you."

The same remark he once made in defense of his "Moria" is just as applicable to his relations with Luther:

"I have blackened no individual's name. I have mocked only at open and notorious vice."

He once confesses—and this the master key to the whole character of Erasmus—

"I hate disputing and prefer harmless play."

But he could be serious too. He complained bitterly "of the world besotted with ritual," with its "scandalous monks who ensnare and strangle the conscience of men." "Theology," he said, "has become mere sophistry, and dogmatism madness." He is never tired of denouncing the "infamous priests, bishops and Roman officials."

Luther could never understand Erasmus' belief in the authority of the Church; and that which he could not understand he condemned. Luther never forgot his early veneration for the Papacy, and once he realized its corruptions he displayed all the intemperance of a rebel. To him the Roman Curia was so clearly Antichrist and its tradition derived from the devil, that he could only imagine that base motives of self-interest actuated Erasmus in giving them any tolerance. Erasmus, on the other hand, could never understand Luther's revolt from authority. To him it was nothing short of insanity. It let loose all the devils of Europe—from the thunders of the Vatican to the endless wars of religion. It occasioned worse evils than it sought to cure. With a human insight far deeper than Luther's, Erasmus had once written:

"Luther was sent into this world by the Genius of discord: all admit that the corruptions of the church required a drastic medicine. But drugs wrongly given make the sick man worse."

Above all, Erasmus saw that Luther's revolt from authority would lead to the very antithesis of freedom in religion. He had set himself up as the one sole mouthpiece of God and in place of the dogmas of the Papacy he was building a counter system in his dogma of justification. The new Protestant theology might thus be as intolerant as the Catholic. Erasmus contended:

"The sum of religion is peace: which can only be when definitions are as few as possible and opinion is left free on many subjects. Our present problems are said to be waiting for the next Oecumenical Council. Better let them wait till the vail is removed and we see God face to face."

Erasmus looked for a reformation that was to begin at home. He wrote to Pope Hadrian:

"Discover the roots of the disease. Punish no one. If God forgives many sins God's Vicar can forgive. Then let all the world know and see that you mean in earnest to reform the abuses that are justly cried out against."

Erasmus himself had spent his life in trying to correct those abuses. His

attacks had been directed against the excrescences and follies of the Church—against its stupid monks and even more stupid theological systems—never against the authority of the Church or its creed. In these he firmly believed—honestly and not from motives of self-interest. He longed to see a Church purged of its immoralities and foolishnesses, venerating the writings of the saints and not their old slippers, and trusting more in the simple words of the Gospels than in the wood of the Cross or the unintelligible jargon of quiddities and relativities. He wanted a Christianity free from the imposition of innumerable dogmas upon subjects above human comprehension. His watchword was, "Reduce the articles of faith to the fewest and the simplest."

But Luther saw differently. He could not believe in a reformation founded upon the essential goodness of men, ready to embrace the truth once their eyes were opened. The will of God alone could effect any reformation. Man is impotent to do anything.

"What part is there for free will to play? What is left for us to do? Nothing, absolutely nothing."

"In divine things reason has no authority. In these things only divine authority is valid."

Luther's aim is not to disseminate the reasoned truth of the Gospels, but to yield himself unreservedly to the impelling Spirit of God. This grim doctrine has its roots not so much in his logic as in his religious experience. He was assured, not by reason, but by an inner conviction, that in resisting the authority of the Church he was waging the warfare of God against Anti-christ. The difficulty with such a position invariably is to determine by what authority the prophet acts. How, indeed, can men be certain that his conviction is due not to some human prejudice but to the Spirit of God?

The basic difference, however, between Luther and Erasmus lies somewhat deeper than in their attitude to authority. The contrast between them is fundamentally due to the difference of their religious experiences. It is not so much their doctrine of authority as their doctrine of forgiveness which throws light upon their variances. Luther was convicted of sin, Erasmus convinced of man's natural righteousness. Where Luther was morbid and pessimistic about human nature, Erasmus was confident and cheerful. Overwhelmed by the terror and the power of sin, Luther found every effort of his own toward perfection unavailing—every moral impulse only more self-

condemning. Here Luther was truly Pauline. The same law of conscience, which was the source of Erasmus' confidence in human nature, was the basis of Luther's condemnation of it. Unlike Erasmus, Luther could never feel that

". . . peace above all earthly dignities:
A still and quiet conscience."

Salvation, he was convinced, was not to be attained by the gradual and laborious process of measuring up to the demands of conscience and resting upon human responsibility. Too often his impotent nature had failed—too often he had been faced with moral bankruptcy. His stormy nature needed that one flash of thrilling conviction, wherein sin was forever forgiven and the love of God was once for all realized. Sin was too powerful and overwhelming for man's corrupt will ever to conquer it by patient obedience to the precepts of the conscience. Man had to be made a new creation, and this could only be accomplished through utter self-surrender to Christ in the implicit act of faith. In all the elaborate machinery of indulgences, penance and canon law, that the Church had used in its constant efforts to guard human responsibility, Luther saw but those "artificial pruning, and training, and clipping contrivances of Rome." His attack against indulgences was launched to oppose not so much the financial corruptions of the Papacy, as the very system on which this whole machinery had been built.

Luther's ideas of individual liberty have too often been unfavorably contrasted with Erasmus' conception of the Church. But Luther too believed in the Church and resisted that excessive emphasis on individualism defended by Zwingli and his followers. Where Luther diverged from Erasmus in his idea of the Church was again on the score of human responsibility. The Church, Luther contended, must be upheld by God and not by man. If the Church is to exist at all it will be by the grace of God and not by the effort of man. "We tell our Lord God," Luther says, "that if He will have His Church, He may uphold it; for we cannot uphold it, and even if we could, we should become the proudest asses under heaven."

The ethic of Luther always remained conservative. His emphasis on the Decalogue, his admission of the impossibility of separating the law from the gospel, and his resistance to the Antinomians, abundantly refute the charge of license, which Erasmus once brought against him. "These two sermons," Luther writes, "must continue to be preached in Christendom,

namely: the first, the teaching of the law or the Ten Commandments, and the second, the doctrine concerning the grace of Christ. For if either of these fall it pulls the other with it."

The "daimon" of Luther was the evil genius of indignation. Perhaps here the contrast with Erasmus reaches its height. "I have no better 'work,'" he once said, "than indignation and zeal, for whether I want to compose, write, pray or preach, I must be indignant; then all my blood is freshened, my understanding is sharpened, and every miserable thought and temptation flies away." He had a passion for cleansing Augean stables, and was not afraid of the confusion and disorder that naturally followed. But while he did much to provoke the many lamentable results of the Reformation, he is not to be blamed for them all. Carlyle justly writes:

"Great wars, contentions and disunion followed out of this Reformation; which last down to our day, and are yet far from ended. Great talk and crimination has been made about these. They are lamentable, undeniable; but after all what has Luther or his cause to do with them? It seems strange reasoning to charge the Reformation with all this. When Hercules turned the purifying river into King Augeas's stables, I have no doubt the confusion that resulted was considerable all around; but I think it was not Hercules's blame; it was some other's blame!"

Erasmus, with his clearer but less heroic vision, foresaw this inevitable confusion. His conciliatory nature dreaded the havoc of revolution. He even wrote:

"The corruptions of the Roman Court may require reform extensive and immediate, but I and the like of me are not called on to take a work like that upon ourselves. I would rather see things left as they are than to see a revolution which may lead to one knows not what. Others may be martyrs if they like. I aspire to no such honour."

In the comfort of our armchairs we may easily denounce such sentiments as ignoble, but to applaud the hero and the martyr is a far easier thing than to suffer their fate. Furthermore, it is by no means certain that the way of Erasmus might not have triumphed as gloriously as the way of Luther. In wars and disunion Erasmus saw the ruin of all religion, which for him could be summed up in the one word, peace. To Luther the gospel above all things meant faith; to Erasmus it meant hope and charity.

Vilfredo Pareto

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

UNTIL two years ago the very name of Vilfredo Pareto was unknown in America save to a few cloistered scholars. In that year Bernard de Voto began to write in *The Saturday Review of Literature* and *Harper's* about strange ideas he had gleaned from a Harvard seminar. Here and there further mutterings were heard and then in the spring of 1935 there sprang full-armed from the head of Jove (assisted by Arthur Livingston, translator) four volumes, which presented the *Trattato di Sociologia generale* in English as *The Mind and Society* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company), by Vilfredo Pareto. Suddenly the intelligentsia became readers, followers, adorers of Pareto. All of the journals that published book reviews had long and, for the most part, adulatory accounts of the book. It was hailed as a work of genius, a masterpiece, a radically original and unique contribution to sociology and philosophy.

Here was indeed a phenomenon: a man who had not been deemed worthy of an entry in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (there are only two casual allusions to him in the current edition), and who is not even mentioned in most works of reference, a man who died in 1923 and whose massive work, published in 1916, was not translated into English until 1935! Such a man, to say the least, arouses curiosity. Pareto was an engineer turned sociologist. He is sometimes called the philosopher of Fascism, although an occasional remark of his might give Mussolini an ill turn. His very verbosity—2,033 pages in the English—is an astounding feat of engineering, closing the mouth of all who read less than 2,033 pages. What can one make of this Pareto? The first step is obvious: read the 2,033, all of them—a step which your reporter on Pareto took during the summer of 1935. Having taken it, he believes that he has performed a vicarious act which may save others from the same fate, for he does not believe that it is worth the time of the average educated man to read Pareto full length.

Pareto left with his heirs, according to the translator (Vol. I, p. ix), explicit directions prohibiting "any introduction that should attempt to summarize, epitomize or otherwise interpret his thought." This prohibition

applies presumably only to the translator. Since others have not heeded it, why should we? Yet the inaccuracy and inconsistency of the use of fundamental terms, the total lack of definitions for some of the chief concepts, and the needlessly complicated and artificial nomenclature render any sort of precise summary all but impossible.

If Pareto's thought had been expressed in the terms of ordinary philosophical and psychological language, he would have called himself a positivist, although speaking ill of Comte (613; this reference and all following ones are to sections—not pages—in the English translation), who is guilty in his eyes of selecting facts to confirm preconceived theories. As a positivist, he would have said knowledge is restricted to scientifically observable facts and logical inferences from them. Most so-called knowledge, however, has no scientific basis, but is simply what psychologists call a rationalization of our instincts, desires, and impulses. All metaphysics, religion, and ethics belong in this category, and are therefore to be rejected. It is useful to know their roots. The practicing sociologist will be aware of the predominantly irrational bases of human beliefs and behavior. That is the gist of his principles in fairly plain English.

Let us now translate the foregoing into "Paretese," as we may call it. The logico-experimental method is the only method of science. Most so-called knowledge consists of derivations, which are variable elements in non-logical actions, "derived" from residues, which are constant elements that correspond to sentiments (instincts, sensations, preconceptions, inclinations). Pareto develops these concepts inaccurately and at great length. Volume I offers a rambling survey of non-logical conduct in general. Volume II divides residues into six classes, each with manifold subdivisions, and heaps up illustrations of each type, chiefly from Greek and Latin literature. The innocent term "combination" appears under Class I of the residues in the "instinct for combinations" in a sense so obscure as to drive the translator to a footnote explanation of it as meaning "the inventive faculty," "ingeniousness," "originality," "imagination," and the like (889a). Pareto's zeal for classification in this volume even leads him to invent a "prohibitionist instinct," which sounds much like explaining falling bodies by their propensity to fall. Volume III is devoted to the theory of derivations (in English, the rationalizations of the desires labeled residues); it also consists chiefly of interminable illustrations from classical and other literature. Volume IV, called *The General Form of Society*, seems to promise a con-

structive sociological theory, but actually is a ramble through history which comes to a stop that is really no end, with a treatment of Byzantine organization.

The first thing that strikes the reader is that Pareto not only has devised new terms which he uses with unexampled looseness, but also that he almost totally disregards the work of other sociologists and psychologists. If he is to support his conclusions soundly, he must furnish proofs by his logico-experimental method. The fact is that he manifests no knowledge of experimental psychology, takes no account of the established methods and results of social psychology or of sociology, but instead heaps up selected facts to support his thesis, ignoring unfavorable items and giving his data an entirely unmerited aura of scientific sanctity by stating them in a quasi-mathematical form, from which no concrete deductions can be drawn. That form, far from being the result of empirical and statistical investigations, is in fact no more than an abstract restatement of Pareto's theories which adds nothing to the theories but a cloak of impressiveness. The book reports no experiments, despite its "experimental" method.

Elsewhere the reader may find fuller accounts of Pareto's thought. The distinguished scholar, Professor Lawrence J. Henderson, of Harvard, has written a manual for believers in Pareto, which is compact and instructive, under the title, *Pareto's General Sociology: A Physiologist's Interpretation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935). But one will look in vain to Henderson for criticism; as well consult the New York reviewers! Henderson's unrestrained enthusiasm is all but incomprehensible to those who know his scholarly attainments. Fortunately, however, excellent criticisms are available. The best and briefest is that by Professor Charner Perry in *The International Journal of Ethics* for October, 1935 (pp. 96-107). Further, a large part of Vol. I, No. 1, of the new *Journal of Social Philosophy* (October, 1935), is devoted to Pareto. In it, William McDougall shows Pareto's unsatisfactoriness as a psychologist. Carl Murchison analyzes him from the standpoint of experimental social psychology. James H. Tufts, writing of Pareto's contribution to the solution of our problems of social ethics, says, "Pareto offers little." Floyd N. House deals with Pareto's place in modern sociology. All four writers are critical, warning against overestimation of Pareto.

The remainder of the present essay will be devoted to a consideration of the ideas of Pareto as they bear directly on morality and religion. It

should not be inferred from what has been said that Pareto is wholly wrong and has nothing to contribute. On the contrary, his reiterations of the contrast between the rational and the irrational constitute a useful and timely warning. It is indubitable that there is a widespread natural human tendency to "wishful thinking," or, as Henshaw Ward has called it, "thobbing." The moral and religious classes need to be prodded into objectivity. Without knowing it, F. H. Bradley, the British idealist, was anticipating Pareto's "derivations," residues, and sentiments, and also coming perilously close to betraying his own cause, when he wrote that "metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct." Again, perhaps Bradley was a pre-Paretian Pareto when he wrote that "where all is rotten it is a man's work to cry stinking fish." Neither Pareto nor Bradley actually believed that everything is rotten; in fact, each was fairly sure he has some good fresh fish in stock. But each was determined to expose fallacies, insincerities, and unrealities in human thought and behavior. In so far as Pareto was a savage denouncer of all "rationalization," we have all reason to be grateful to him, and to count him a Saul among the prophets. It is necessary for the student of human nature to be aware of the irrational motives that bind men into society. But while this is true, and well to have emphasized, it is no novelty. Borden Parker Bowne pointed out in 1892 (in his *Principles of Ethics*, p. 128) that "there is no political association held together by a rational grasp of principles. The bond is of a non-rational sort." In a realistic aside, Bowne remarked that "all whoop-'er-ups and stand-patters build on this sub-rational element." If Pareto really is the philosopher of Fascism, he is an odd illustration of Bowne's point. But Pareto is himself no "whoop-'er-up"; he aims in principle only to view social phenomena with the cold eye of a scientist. The ardent spirit of the religionist and the moralist needs just such inspection and analysis as Pareto bestows on it.

If only Pareto had lived up to his own principles! One must do as he says (when he speaks clearly), not do as he does. To show how his example breaks the force of his precepts let us look at his treatment of Hegel. Pareto is utterly opposed to metaphysics, although, like many another of its foes, he shows no comprehension of its problems and aims. In order to refute metaphysics under these conditions he attacks Hegel. A tyro knows that Hegel is a fairly difficult thinker to master and to refute. Pareto's method with Hegel is to concentrate on the one admittedly weakest spot in Hegel

and hammer away on that, namely, the "Philosophy of Nature," which is the second part of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. Any elementary student could have told Pareto that the "Philosophy of Nature" was Hegel at his worst; but one suspects that he did not want to be told. It is a maxim that no thinker is refuted unless his ideas are considered in their best form. Pareto made no effort to quote the best works of Hegel or to state that thinker's principles logically, but dwelt on the "lunacies" (111) of this one work. In short, he was no objective realist in his treatment of Hegel. He was simply a special pleader. But it is not alone in dealing with Hegel that sentiments and residues bred derivations in the mind of Pareto. One can hardly read a half-dozen consecutive pages without finding virulent expressions of the author's emotional antipathy to this or that man or cause; to Tolstoi, to disarmament, to abstinence from alcohol, to restraint in "amorous pleasures," to censorship and all who favor it (especially Senator René Bérenger), and to all forms of religious belief. His favor extends almost exclusively to Machiavelli. An atmosphere of intense feeling is present throughout the four volumes. Sentiments and residues control him!

What light, if any, can such a writer shed on the problems of morality? Let us not take the word of Professor Tufts, but examine Pareto for ourselves. If there is any single foundation of morality, it is the principle of obligation, the ought. In a world in which there is nothing that one ought to do, there is no morality at all. Pareto has a hard time with what ought to be. "This," he says, "is a class of relations that may lie entirely beyond experience." The term "ought," "does not correspond to any concrete reality" (518). Kant himself might have spoken thus. But Pareto means it in no Kantian sense. He means rather to exclude ethics from the realm of the "logico-experimental" when he says of it that "there is no trace of any experimental verification of any sort" (520). He sets "theories that allow themselves to be guided strictly by the facts" over against those that "try to influence the facts" (521). At best, "ought" lies in a realm of faith with which experimental science joins no issue (1996). He cannot frankly reject "that blessed term 'ought'" without abandoning more than he is willing to; yet he cannot accept it without a surrender of his positivism. Perhaps the logical positivists of today confront the same dilemma.

When it comes to practical issues, however, Pareto's own sentiments and residues allow him to entertain faiths about what ought or ought not

to be. He is bitter in his attacks on total abstinence, which he classes with asceticism (1164). Curiously enough, he regards the prohibitionist argument against alcohol on the ground of its ill effects on physical health as not valid, for it implies that man "should think of nothing but his health" (1168¹). Pleasure is more than health, he broadly hints. It is interesting to note that this ethics of indulgence is possible precisely because of his theory that what is not susceptible to logico-experimental treatment belongs to the non-logical sentiments. In the field of conduct he would "let nature caper." In connection with his discussion of prohibition he pays tribute to American Methodism by mention of "a certain Mr. Cannon, an American," who "turned ninety-seven preachers loose upon his countrymen during the Christmas season of the year 1911 with the idea of persuading them to abstain from women and wine" (1198¹). This, as his only allusion to Bishop Cannon and to Methodism, is, if possible, even less adequate than his exposition of Hegel.

Another instance of his intense feeling about moral issues, without any well-considered ethical basis, is his aversion to attempts to regulate the expressions of sex. He admits that sex promiscuity would ruin society, yet he calls sex-reformers "the most perfect idiots of whom human history makes mention" (1552²). His detestation of these reformers is so great that he brings in irrelevant attacks on one of them, the above-mentioned Senator Bérenger, in the midst of his most fundamental definitions at the start of the book (6), calls his views a "sex religion" (570), and repeatedly denounces him in other connections. In this regard, at least, we have no objective realist in Pareto, but a man dangerously like a fanatic, even if those whom he attacks are also fanatics.

Occasionally, although very rarely, Pareto evinces a disposition to apply rational norms to a moral problem. At any rate he attacks the inconsistency of reform governments who continue to conduct the lotteries which they had condemned in their less virtuous predecessors. He ridicules judges who penalize gamblers "in the name of a government that derives an annual income of tens of millions from the lottery" (1823). Yet one may humbly suspect Pareto of a greater desire to attack the critics of gambling and lotteries than to defend the need of rational consistency in moral matters, especially as his zeal for such consistency is so rare a phenomenon.

The most interesting question about Pareto's ethics is that of his relation to Fascism. It is said that Mussolini regards him as an authority.

Yet Pareto makes some remarks which are not fully in harmony with Fascism. He speaks of despotism as governed not by law, but by whim and caprice (466). Perhaps a Fascist would grant to Pareto that "to imprison or burn a man is not, unfortunately, a logico-experimental demonstration" (441); but Pareto manifests no enthusiasm for the Fascist method at this point. He attacks a "state-worshipping mysticism and a morbid patriotism" (2553), terms which would certainly displease a Mussolini or a Hitler. Indeed, Pareto seemed to foresee what was coming and to discount it when he predicted that force might be "in the saddle tomorrow, be it only for a brief ride" (2328).

But the main bent of Pareto's thought is in the same direction as Fascism. Machiavelli, as we have seen, is almost the only thinker he mentions very favorably (1975). He attacks the pet aversions of Fascism, such as pacifism (1818) and humanitarianism (2187), which latter has the effect of causing spinal columns utterly to rot! He has no good to say of democracy (585, 2259), which he sees falling into the hands of demagogues and plutocrats. He hints that the democracies of France, Italy, England, and America might be on the way to revolution (2257). Freedom of thought, which he exercised freely, he viewed with a certain scorn (1852). It may not have taken a great seer to observe in 1916 that the institutions of democracy were being challenged; but there were not many at that time who perceived as clearly as did Pareto the increasing influence of the principles that were to develop into Fascism. However, he explicitly disavowed any political aims (he once ran for office and was defeated) and he had no intentions of reforming the world (87). Most of his writing is irrelevant to questions of government, and his eminence as a Fascist authority is hardly deserved.

What, if anything, does Pareto have to contribute to religion? In a superficial sense he appears to solve the conflict between science and religion. Science is the realm of the logico-experimental. It consists of verifiable facts. Religion, on the other hand, is based on the residue of the sentiment of love (941). What flows from residues and sentiments is totally different in kind from what can be experimentally tested. A recognition of this, he says quite explicitly, does not impair Catholic doctrine. But the independence of religion thus purchased is a purely psychological independence. It does not mean that religion and science are both true, although Pareto verbally (like Voltaire) recognizes the possibility of divine revelation as a

source of truth (16). It means rather that only logico-experimental science furnishes proof (42). To be explicit: science relies on proof, religion on exhortation, passion, sentiment, vagueness. Any debate between a believer and an unbeliever, therefore, is simply making round holes in the water (43). There is no way of convincing the unbeliever that religion is true. There may be authoritarians to whom this bifurcation of experience will be welcome. But if it be welcomed, it is at the cost of having an incurable dualism within the mind. When Pareto allows at the start that there are other methods than his (5), he plainly does so with his tongue in his cheek as regards religion. Religious beliefs consist entirely of what we commonly call wishful thinking and rationalizations. God, immortality, and all other tenets of religious faith are plainly incapable of logico-experimental verification. Religious beliefs are phenomena with which the sociologist must reckon, but which he must regard as like all other derivations in being a mere rationalization of human instinct. If there is any other method than his own, Pareto gives us no hint of its nature, and his contempt for metaphysics seems to preclude any possibility of his recognizing the rights of philosophical investigation.

Pareto undoubtedly amassed a great many facts. He manifested amazing industry and covered a wide range of literature. His pages contain many sage and scorching remarks directed against all forms of hypocrisy. But he has been very greatly overrated. In all his clumsy and unusual terminology there is not a single idea that is new to a student of philosophy and psychology, not a single principle that is not stated more clearly and cogently by other thinkers. While avowing the logico-experimental method, he overlooked the fact that experimental science has been built up only by co-operative work among thousands of laboratory men; but he undertook, without regard to the investigations of other sociologists and psychologists, to construct an entire system single-handed. The time for such a *tour de force* passed many centuries ago. But if a system is to be constructed thus, it is of the utmost importance that its author should define his terms clearly, use them consistently, and abide by his own principles. On the contrary, with Pareto we find not only inadequate definitions, but inconsistencies of thought which are admitted by his most ardent admirers. In a great thinker these idiosyncracies would be condoned for the sake of the substance of his thought; thus, for instance, Whitehead is regarded by competent critics. Pareto, however, did not show himself in this book to be a great thinker.

The only contributions he made were the creation of a barbarous terminology, and the invention of overlapping and unenlightening classifications. He has completely failed to furnish a method whereby others could continue his work. On the one hand, he left the meaning of the logico-experimental method too hazy to be useful; on the other, he furnished classifications which are no more than pigeon-holes for arranging his data. In a very real sense, Pareto's work represents the inevitable breakdown of a purely empirical method which amasses facts without sufficient attention to method, interpretation, and self-criticism.

Pareto is inadequate. His oblique attack on religion and morality breaks down of its own weight. But it would be manifest error to suppose that the failure of Pareto means that the cause of religion is secure and that its wars are now won. Let those who think so remain asleep in Zion or wherever they chance to be located. Those who are awake, however, know that the intellectual battle for religion has only begun. It must be waged in no spirit of complacency, no false optimism derived from an easy victory over this or that Pareto. *Haec fabula docet*: let Pareto be a warning. One may work hard, labor long, either against religion or for it, and bring forth a mouse. And cats are numerous and hungry in these days.

Book Reviews

The Fatherly Rule of God. By ALFRED E. GARVIE. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$1.25.

It is needless to remind informed students of theology and ethics that Doctor Garvie is a learned and accomplished scholar and thinker whose previous books have raised expectations which the volume before us, *The Fatherly Rule of God*, amply fulfills. Many American clergymen and laymen have profited by the doctor's first-rate book, *Can Christ Save Society?* published in 1933. Those of us who have been interested in the Ecumenicals which began with the Stockholm Conference in 1925 are also aware of his valuable services for the reintegration of Christian forces in order to reinvigorate and preserve Christian civilization. Since the main subject of this, his latest work, is the relation of the State and the Church, it is a fair inference that its content has been measurably inspired by the doctor's experiences at Stockholm and Lausanne. Its complexion is decidedly theological, if only for the reason that he is an acknowledged authority upon the sacred science, and also one convinced that whatever may be the problems involved in the relation of the State and the Church, they must find their final solution in man's realization of his Maker's purpose for the social order of the race.

The first chapter is concerned with the Christian concepts of God, of man, of conservation or providence, of revelation and redemption, as a firm foundation for the concise argumentation and lucid statement which follow in the seven remaining chapters. Doctor Garvie

is as strongly opposed to pantheism, which tends to identify the Creator with His creation, as he is to deism, which tends to separate God from His own realm of activity. Against the first he affirms the Divine transcendence; against the second, the Divine immanence. He confesses it is not easy to hold the balance even. Yet if God is Love, as the New Testament Faith declares, assuredly His primary relation to man is paternal, and creation as a whole is to be regarded as His self-expression and self-communication, subject to the conditions of its derived existence.

This exposition of the vital doctrine of all true religion should be carefully read for its adequate appreciation. It is an impressive portrayal of our Lord's revelation in which He completed the prophetic teachings of the Old Testament.

Doctor Garvie believes that the Creator is capable of redeeming His creation, whatever man's sin should attempt or achieve. In the confidence this belief inspires he proceeds to discuss "The Necessity and the Nature of Society," and "The Functions of the State." Chapter Four, upon "The Mission of the Church," contains an illuminating treatment peculiarly applicable to Protestantism as the historic source of modern nationalism. Plainly no political organization can instill in individuals or in society that loyalty to the Eternal Will which is the creative source of social justice and security. On the contrary, the purely political spirit is inclined to give the demand for truth and accurate reasoning a minor place. Moreover, the

proposals of the State are too often shaped by fortuitous circumstances. Behind their flattery of fallacious hopes is a congenital impotence repeatedly exposed in crucial eras. For no secular administration can lift human nature above itself, or subject its rebellious proclivities to the divine law. Where is there in the Europe or America of our day statesmanship equal to a solution of the problems the late war has left on every nation's doorstep? For the enforcement of that divine law and the solution of these problems the Church will have to fearlessly proclaim the life-giving Evangel of her Lord.

It is the surpassing merit of the book before us that it emphasizes with grateful clarity and considerateness the indefeasible obligation of the Church to do this her first work. The author's verdict is that the Christianity of Christ, which condemns armed violence and ordains race fellowship, can be no other than the irreconcilable foe of physical supremacy and its inevitable tyrannies. His challenge of secondary methods in the Church and of pagan militarism in the State is the more resonant because of its keen recognition of the manifold issues involved.

No English clergyman better understands the German people than does Doctor Garvie; and also the underlying causes of that country's distressing condition. He observes that in the widest sense freedom is essential to the cultural life, and therefore "as dangerous and disastrous as the assault on the Church in Germany is the attempted subordination of all cultural interests to the policy of the State; the treatment of eminent scholars and thinkers in the universities for political reasons is a shameful abuse of the power of any government."

Similarly comprehensive and thorough

surveys of "The Co-operation of Church and State" and of "Universalism and Internationalism" conclude a volume which is indeed "*multum in parvo*" and should have the very wide circulation its candor, its learning, its sympathy, its understanding and its intellectual, ethical and religious elevation richly deserve.

S. PARKES CADMAN.

Brooklyn, New York.

Henry van Dyke. By TERTIUS VAN DYKE. New York: Harper & Brothers. \$3.50.

THIS is an authentic story of an unusual man, told in gracious fashion by his son. Few sons could be trusted to tell the truth about their fathers. With the best intentions in the world, they would be swayed either by excess of affection to overdo the picture, or by excess of caution to be less than fair. Mr. van Dyke holds the balance admirably, and shows us Henry van Dyke as he was, gifted, sensitive, high-minded, impatient, brilliant, rash, and deepest of all, religious. The religious motive ran like a strong and lovely melody through all he wrote, and was, and did. Not that he was always preaching, though he loved to preach even more than he loved to fish. His artistic sense was too fine and real to let him preach when the poet and essayist in him was at work. But it is seldom that one fails to find in what he wrote some flash of faith, some bit of the golden thread of the love of God and man which is religion.

One who has served more than a score of years as minister in the church in which this man served with rare distinction is able to appreciate the lasting quality of his influence as preacher and pastor. The Brick Church is still very much what Henry van Dyke led it to be,

and still remembers him with deep affection, though his pastorate ended more than thirty-five years ago.

His service to the church at large, in the interest of tolerance, reality, and beauty of worship, deserves high honor, and is well set forth here.

The book is a sincere, accurate, winsome portrayal of one of America's great souls, a book worth reading about a man worth knowing.

WILLIAM PIERSON MERRILL.

The Brick Presbyterian Church,
New York City.

Prayers for the Christian Year.

Committee on Public Worship and Aids to Devotion, Church of Scotland. London: Oxford University Press. 3/6.

THIS book of prayers, coming out of the Church of Scotland, ought to have a wide use among the churches of America. The complaint is frequently made that the public prayers in non-liturgical American churches are dead spots in the service. A prayer, of course, is not a literary effort, but unless it lifts the heart in worship, it has no place in the service at all. There is a language which gives prayer wings, and unfortunately there are languages which are dead weight on the aspiring spirit. Careless, repetitious, trivial, racy language can rob a public prayer of the spirit of reverence which is its very life-blood. The Scottish churches have a fine tradition in this regard. This volume, prepared by the Church of Scotland's Committee on Public Worship and Aids to Devotion, by order of the General Assembly, is a collection of prayers from many sources. All of them move on a high level, combining richness and clarity of thought with the dignified but straightforward

English which is appropriate as the vehicle of man's outreach toward Almighty God.

It is significant that these are prayers for the Christian Year. One of the losses sustained by non-liturgical churches at the time of the Protestant Reformation was due to the general abandonment of the practice of following the Christian Year in the church's worship. More recently there have been attempts to regain what in excessive fear of Papacy was too easily discarded. Christmas has been generally reclaimed, although it is still more pagan than Christian in popular observance, and services in Protestant churches on Christmas Day are anything but universal. Of late, the seasons of Lent and Advent have been more widely observed. Now comes this book from the Church of Scotland with prayers for Epiphany, Ascension, Whitsunday, Saint Andrew's Day, Peace Sunday, etc., as well as for the great days of the Christian Year. The advantage of the observance of the church calendar is that it enables a local church to vary its mood, and to emphasize in succession the great Christian affirmations for which the days and seasons stand. Ministers who have learned the value of this will find this little volume a helpful ally in the preparation of their services.

The book is so admirable for purposes of worship that one hesitates to point out what seems to this reviewer, at least, to be a serious omission from the standpoint of historical accuracy. Aside from general acknowledgments in the preface, there is no indication of the authorship of any of the prayers included in the volume. There is so much confusion in the whole realm of devotional literature, due to the common custom of printing prayers without any designation of authorship, that it is to be regretted that the compilers of this collection did not include a

list of sources. The primary purpose of a book of prayers is of course to be an aid to devotion, but there is no more reason why the authorship of a prayer should be unrecorded than the authorship of a hymn or a sermon. And some people may find it an aid to devotion to know whether, in a particular form of words, they are praying with Augustine or John Hunter or a contemporary wayfarer on the high-ways of the spirit.

MORGAN PHELPS NOYES.

Central Presbyterian Church,
Montclair, New Jersey.

The Great Evangel. By LYNN HAROLD HOUGH. Nashville: The Cokesbury Press. \$1.50.

AGAIN Doctor Hough, in *The Great Evangel*, allows us to share the growing wealth of his mind and heart. Beginning with man's age-old dream of the City of God, he draws a fascinating picture around the message, the stalwart reasonableness, and the high function of the Christian religion.

Here, on one side, is his revolt against modern Messiahs. And yet the whole savors very little of revolt. It is above everything else a positive contribution to the coming age. From a world full of illusions—illusions of a "messianic naturalism," a messianic utopianism, a messianic moralism—he marches straightforwardly for the heart of the gospel in the quest of an adventurous God for the human soul.

From beginning to end there are intriguing flash-backs to history and literature, as one would expect from Doctor Hough; clear insights clothed with brilliant epigram and beauty of diction; a thorough-going moral and intellectual sincerity; a passionate zeal for social righteousness; and a remarkably unerring

sense for the first things that come first in the life of the Beloved Community. He heartily explodes many a persistent error on the way, sometimes with humor, never cheaply nor with bitterness; sets his sane and balanced thought firmly in the midst of our modern chaotic mind, as only one can who has been busy blazing his own trail; and writes as he loves to write, *sub specie aeternitatis!* Until at last it would seem that indeed, in his own words "[the Great Companion has come to be the soul of every question]; the center has found its circle; the universe has been presented to the man who could not find a place in this tiny planet; the capital without a country in time, has found a country in eternity."

Preachers and laymen alike will find this book both a guide and a challenge that cannot be lightly side-stepped. Especially should the last chapter be commended to those of our present day who in their too facile social enthusiasms have lost sight of the pivotal significance of the individual in human society, and grown confused in their thinking with regard to the place and purpose of the Christian Church. If there is something left to be desired—and when is there not?—it would perhaps be another book from the same pen expanding these final sections, and pointing up in somewhat greater detail this great evangel for the whole of life.

PAUL SCHERER.

The Lutheran Church of
the Holy Trinity,
New York City.

An Interpretation of Christian Ethics. By REINHOLD NIEBUHR.
New York: Harper & Brothers,
\$2.00.

IN this new book on ethics we have another challenge from one of the Chris-

tian pioneers of today. Like all pioneers, Niebuhr achieves some clearings, and leaves great forests untouched; he is no road-builder, no map-maker. But he blazes new trails and marches into the jungle of civilization with only the stars to guide him.

Niebuhr has written no system of ethics, yet he has made real advances in dealing with the Christian ethic of love and with the place of reason in religious thought.

In previous writings it has seemed that Niebuhr was compromising the pacific ideal of love in the interests of the class struggle. He now affirms unreservedly the absoluteness of the Christian teaching of love, repeating his former conviction that it is impossible of realization. But the gap between the impossible ideal and the possible real is less wide than it was. Much is made of approximations to the ideal in the actual conflicts of life. More than once it is said that the impossibilities are really possible. Pessimism about immoral society is colored by a recognition of the relevance of Christian love in a sinful and violent world and by the hope that love may affect the course of events. That hope, it is true, depends upon "dissuading the imperiled wielders of power from a violent defense of their social position."

A similar change is observable in the author's attitude toward reason. It is true that he continues the almost ritualistic attacks on modernity, liberalism, and rationalism, without precise definitions, to such an extent that the reader feels at times that reason must be something quite wicked. Dionysiac and daemonic forces stir in the soul of Niebuhr. Nevertheless reason is not rejected. Niebuhr asserts that "obligation can be felt only to some system of coherence and some ordering will." He perceives "an ulti-

mate perfection of unity and harmony" in which every moral value and standard is grounded. He explicitly laments the failure of many schools of Christian thought to do justice to the contributions of reason. While still denying that myth can be completely rationalized, declaring that it is coherent without being rationally coherent (a somewhat oracular insight), he nevertheless avows clearly that high religion endeavors to bring "the whole of reality and existence into some system of coherence."

Here we have a man who feels acutely the dualistic tensions of time and eternity, but who seeks a unity—a love that will tame violence, a reason that will interpret the irrationalities of experience. If he seeks unity vaguely at times, he refuses either to surrender his search or to find his goal cheaply. This book, with its note of "the immediate possibilities of a higher good in every given situation," is one of the most hopeful as well as one of the most penetrating to come from Niebuhr's pen. It should be widely read.

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN.
Boston University.

An Introduction to the Books of the Apocrypha. By W. O. E. OESTERLEY. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$3.75.

THIS volume is the solo production of Doctor Oesterley, who explains in the preface that his usual collaborator, T. H. Robinson, did not feel adequately qualified in this particular field. Of the author's own qualifications there can be no doubt, for he is our first authority on all matters pertaining to later Judaism; this province he has made his own and here he moves as a master in Israel.

The book, moreover, is timely, for there is a new interest in the period and a

very definite desire to investigate the Semitic background and the Hebrew heritage as it is revealed in the pages of the New Testament. Thus the author has a valuable chapter on "The Importance of the Apocrypha for the Study of the New Testament." This book is indispensable to the student of the New Testament and should send many a man back to a study of the Apocryphal books.

The work is divided into two main parts. In the first part the writer considers, under Prolegomena, the character and general content of the Apocrypha, proceeds to evaluate the books as literature, and sets the books in their chronological order. He next discusses the historical background of this rather motley collection of books, and follows with chapters on the Wisdom Literature and Apocalyptic. A full analysis of the Doctrinal Teaching of the Apocrypha is perhaps the most fascinating part of the book. This section concludes with a useful chapter on "The Apocrypha in the Church."

The second part forms the Introduction proper and here each book is fully discussed and a valuable bibliography is given for each section. Doctor Oesterley deals with many debatable issues, questions of date and authorship and authenticity, and moves with a sure tread and sound judgment through a maze of difficulties. While all his conclusions may not win universal assent one cannot but admit they are based on a searching examination of the evidence and characterized by critical insight.

This book is not a new edition of his former work, *The Books of the Apocrypha; Their Origin, Contents and Teaching*, published in 1914; this is a new book and it will remain as our best authority on the subject of the Apocrypha.

JOHN PATERSON.

Drew University.

A Portrait of Peter. By J. ALEXANDER FINDLAY. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$1.25.

WHILE portraying the Apostle, Doctor Findlay photographs himself. Not, of course, as if *he* were an apostle: far from it. He takes Peter as one of "the common people," so many of whom God must like, Abraham Lincoln said, else He would not make so many. Of such common material Jesus could make a prince among men, the leader of His Church. Like a good Methodist, Doctor Findlay can narrate movingly his own experiences, first as an ardent evangelist, then as chilled to the bone in the petty side of ministerial work; later, after a five years' grind at the Synoptic Gospels, at Rendel Harris's advice, he recaptures the first rapture, falling in love with Peter and, like Peter, prostrating himself before Christ till traveling days are done.

Doctor Findlay shares with us the fruits of his intensive study of the Gospel which has produced several striking books already. We stand at his side as he unfolds Peter's development; we are given fresh interpretations of many texts; the variant readings in the margins of Nestle's text often reveal new and surprising things. Again and again we pull up, and question what Findlay is saying; but we cannot ignore his reasons. Though he may fail to persuade us, yet the point sticks in the mind. And often we are in sight of a new sermon on an old, worn text. Many things are discussed besides Peter's career and an illuminating running commentary on the First Epistle of Peter. The Oxford Group Movement, the difficulty of meeting the new discipleship with the old-fashioned methods, the skillful spiritualizing of the miracle of Peter's walking on the sea—these arresting sidelines get light from

Peter's experience. And graphic pictures from travel in Palestine make the story real.

In his enthusiasm Doctor Findlay sometimes seems to go too far. The "new" often overbalances the "old" view because of its novelty. When, for instance, he deals with the famous phrase, "on this rock I will build my church," he does not allow enough for the "rock" being not the confession, nor the faith of Peter, but the divine revelation: "flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee." In other words, Peter, by revelation, had glimpsed how Heaven viewed Jesus. Again, Findlay prefers to say, "Take up the 'yoke,' " not "cross." In fact, at times Doctor Findlay seems almost to sing paeans of praise to Peter as Roman Catholics do! And suggestions that John and James tried to oust Peter from primacy, that Paul might have rebuked Peter privately, instead of before them all, savor a little of partisanship. But for all that, the insight into Peter's spiritual development is a deep reading of the human heart, a searching scrutiny of every minister's conscience. And Christ's power to make beauty out of common timber is gloriously manifest in this fascinating volume. R. BIRCH HOYLE.

Guest Professor at
Western Theological Seminary.

A Man in Christ. By JAMES S. STEWART. New York: Harper & Brothers. \$2.50.

THIS luminous and comprehensive book raises its young writer to the front rank of expositors of Paul. It is characterized by that freedom from theological jargon and that lucidity of style which we have become accustomed to expect in Scottish theological writers. The Scottish theologian anoints his head

and washes his face that he appear not unto men to be learned, but he usually has a great deal of goods in the back end of his store. The book is enriched by quotations from a wide range of modern scholars and theologians.

Stewart repudiates the idea that Paul's mysticism is a reflection of the Greek mystery cults of his day. "Rome was hospitable to these mystery religions. When Isis and Cybele came to Rome they were welcomed with open arms. When Jesus came to Rome, Rome girded herself to fight him to the death." It was the startling novelty of the evangel of Jesus, not its conformity to the fashionable cults, that impressed the Greek world. These men that have turned the world upside down have come hither also.

Theologians have emphasized Paul's doctrine of justification to the neglect of the inner experience of oneness with Christ which is the heart of his evangel. He quotes Canon Gore as saying, "The disposition to stress what God does for us to the neglect of what he does in us, is a fruitful source of error." An atonement that does not lift men into moral and vital oneness with God is merely make-believe.

Karl Barth is so disgusted with sentimental mysticism that he has gone to the opposite extreme and leaves the sinner prostrate and trembling before the "wholly Other." He forgets that this is only the first stage. Barth would have the moral leper keep on crying, "Unclean, Unclean," after Christ has said, "I will; be thou clean." The goal of salvation is conscious and joyful union with Christ. In this union all blessedness is embraced. The man who apart from God thinks he is "seeing life" beholds it from a funeral procession which is marching to dissolution. There is something in this possession of eternal life through Christ, which

always inspires an immortal hope. Indeed, a real experience of God is marked as genuine only when it begets an upspringing hope for infinitely more of life and vision than we now possess.

It has been the tragedy of Christian theology that like the pagans it has allowed itself to use language that suggests that the sinner must do something to reconcile God, rather than submit to be reconciled to God. But while God always takes the initiative in saving a man the very fact of union with Christ begets huge energy. "The struggling stream of duty which had not volume enough to bear him to his goal, is suddenly re-enforced by the immense tidal wave of sympathy and emotion."

ROLLIN H. WALKER.

Ohio Wesleyan University.

Modern Mystics. By SIR FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc. \$3.00.

THE crucial point to be decided by all embarking on life, writes Sir Francis, is whether the universe is friendly or indifferent, ordered by Mind or a pitiless mechanism, whether it exhibits world-processes that drive toward the ultimate perfection of man or the final extinction of man.

The mystic believes that goodness is the foundation of things, that the universe is friendly, and "a coherent whole of diverse parts interdependent upon each other and manifesting the existence of a Personality directing all." He also is assured that he has "direct correspondence" with the Power behind all creative activity—with God, and is convinced that world-processes have as their goal the perfection of all; a movement whose progress in human life is neither automatic nor inevitable but is

achieved through the co-operative agency of those who have a persistent experience of God as love and of His regenerating presence in life and in character.

The supreme ambition of the majority of the mystics, continues our author, is to share their experience of joy and peace, of spiritual insight and spiritual power, of religious fervor and moral energy with others and to promote an ethical ideal of conduct that will cleanse life of its evils and injustices.

In *Modern Mystics* Sir Francis has illustrated his theme with examples of Hindus, Mohammedans and Christians, some of whom were married, others were not; some had trances, visions and ecstasies, others did not; some were well versed in science, philosophy and history, others disregarded these; some withdrew to solitude, others wrought out their experience in the midst of the ordinary duties of life; some were highly emotional, others very much restrained. These differences in reaction to the experience of God are traceable to race, culture, environment and emotional organization. Monastic celibacy is not essential to the Mystical experience and marriage offers no obstacle to its attainment. In serenity of soul, singleness of purpose, love of others, devotion to prayer and meditation, in union of practical social activity with a clear technique of contemplation, and in certainty of God, these men and women closely resembled each other.

A careful analysis of the majority of mystics, declares Sir Francis, will discredit any charge of their aloofness from the sufferings and struggles of life, that these holy souls were self-centered, and that their experience is but another form of subjectivism. He holds that "mental states are produced by outside stimulus as well as internal urge"; that emotions do

not create ideas but that ideas arouse emotions.

The modern mystic, insists our author, will not disregard the accumulations of experiment and knowledge, as some have done, neither will he retreat from the terrible and inhuman injustices of life, but will realize God in the strife and the struggle for truth, for purity, for freedom. Moreover, he will avoid "the danger of feeling without reason and the chill of reason without feeling" and ever seek to provide a leadership as intellectual as it is spiritual.

It is most unfortunate, writes Sir Francis, that our universities offer almost no training in the science and technique of mysticism. These men, "enthralled by God but not absorbed by Him," are left to grope their way blindly in search of a method of life whereby the technical skill and knowledge of the laboratory may be combined with high spirituality in building a civilization, rich, pure, loving, and just, whose ideals and social practices will embody the truth and goodness of the Divine.

JOHN W. HOFFMAN.

San Marino, California.

Makers of Christianity. *From Alfred the Great to Schleiermacher.* By JOHN T. MCNEILL. New York: Henry Holt & Company. \$2.00.

LEGEND or truth, there is a priceless story about a youngster who was asked who the saints were. "I know," he said, remembering shining hours in rooms where rainbows were. "They're the men the light shines through."

That youngster may well have been John T. McNeill in the naïve days before his Ph.—Deification, and that incident may well have been the genesis of his book, *Makers of Christianity from*

Alfred the Great to Schleiermacher, a companion volume to Shirley Jackson Case's *Makers of Christianity from Jesus to Charlemagne*. In any case some such flash of insight as that, confirmed and deepened by hours of research and reflection, must have dictated not only the subjects of his biographies but the equally luminous categories in which he sets them: "Leaders out of Chaos"; "Apostles of Monastic Piety"; "Brothers and Sisters of the Poor"; "The Glorious Company of the Teachers"; "The Noble Army of the Heretics"; "The Goodly Fellowship of the Reformers"; and "Inspirers of Modern Piety." That is an apostolic succession ardent enough to carry the covenantal gleam down the ages and through the windows of the mind into the lives of modern readers.

History through short biography is a dangerous literary or pedagogical expedient unless it is done, as Doctor McNeill does it, with extreme discrimination. He refuses to romance about his ecclesiastical heroes, however much he admires them. He also will not let them say things for which there is merely legendary rather than documentary evidence. The method makes them thin and shadowy at times, but it keeps them real. More important yet, it doesn't allow them to outgrow the larger movements of which they were integral parts. They are not just individuals. They are individuals in social relations and historic connections. Their ministry moves in concentric but expanding circles until they have so impressed their personalities upon their communities and that larger, more "Beloved Community," which is the Church, as to deserve the accolade the author gives them, "Makers of Christianity." Accordingly as one reads about them, they leave, not the memory of close-ups—detached, stark, monstrous—but the full-

bodied flow of men, moving together and always forward, against a background which they are themselves transforming. All of this is only another way of saying that Doctor McNeill is not concerned about the impact of stray sunbeams upon kaleidoscopic bits. He seeks rather to catch and reflect the One True Light shining through many men and movements with a rainbow radiance which spans centuries, continents, and oceans. And for this reviewer, speaking for himself, he does just that, and he does it magnificently.

This is not to say that the subjects of Doctor McNeill's biographies do not come alive as individuals apart from arguments for a thesis. They do, very definitely, even unpleasantly sometimes. In his capable treatment, Alfred the Great ceases to be an uncouth Galahad who let the biscuits burn, and becomes a wily young fox, astute enough to outwit and outfight the Danes and subsequently to confess that not war, but learning and goodness should be the business of kings. Francis is not only "God's merryman," laughing at leprosy and condoning Friar Juniper's coarse jests, but he is also the avenging fury who curses his disobedient brothers and literally tears down the house they have built in violation of his orders. Abelard, at the zenith of his intellectual brilliance and spiritual insight, "looses the rein to lust," and, like "a ravenous wolf," brings ruin on "a tender lamb," Heloise. John Wesley is "a human gamecock," who "played a little tennis and wrote some frivolous verses" before the reading of certain classics of piety persuaded him to "part company with Leisure" and become one of the "Bible Moths" or "Methodists" in the hallowed circle of "The Holy Club." These are, of course, historically and artistically, the gargoyles on the

Cathedral, the leaden tracery around the panes the light shines through.

Doctor McNeill deserves added commendation for lifting out of the shadow such forgotten, or less widely known heroes of the faith as Elizabeth of Thuringia, Catherine of Siena, Marsiglio of Padua, and Peter Waldo; also for seeing that Leibnitz's vision of "a best possible world" through individuality-in-sociality blazed the trail for Loyola's "Society of Jesus," John Wesley's "World Parish," and Schleiermacher's "Prophet-Citizenship in a later world," in which all who, like him, "belong to the future, are drawing toward each other in love and hope, and each in his every word and act cements and extends a *spiritual bond* by which we are pledged to better times."

EARL MARLATT.

Boston University.

I Discover the Orient. By FLETCHER S. BROCKMAN. New York: Harper & Brothers. \$2.00.

IN the welter of world changes through which we are moving, and as a result of which many familiar landmarks are disappearing, it is of distinct advantage to get clear perspectives concerning distance and direction of motion. Dr. Fletcher S. Brockman, for years a Christian leader among students in this country, and for a still longer period a central figure in the Young Men's Christian Association movement in the Far East, makes just such a contribution in his book, *I Discover the Orient*.

Born into a planter's home, his mother a Southern Methodist, his father a Southern Baptist, and early identifying himself with the Church, at Vanderbilt University young Brockman came in touch with the Student Volunteer Move-

ment for Foreign Missions. During his junior and senior years he visited all the colleges of Tennessee in the interest of missions. Thereafter, for seven years, as a national secretary of the Student Young Men's Christian Association he moved widely among the colleges, especially in the South. The picture he draws of his own concepts of the non-Christian peoples and faiths, and also of the missionary outlook even of the great conventions of the Student Volunteer Movement of that period, is a bit devastating. At any rate, he is ruthlessly realistic.

Beginning in the autumn of 1898 the scene shifts to the Far East. Enroute to Shanghai, Mr. Brockman heard of the dethronement of the Emperor of China. Thus, his arrival synchronized with the opening of a great act in the tragic drama of that nation. Thereafter for a third of a century the author watched this act unfold. He has known many of the outstanding personalities; he has had intimate knowledge of many of the great episodes as these were in process; through it all he has meditated deeply on the meaning and value of the Christian approach to this great Oriental people.

His ministry to the literati in the early days of his life in China led him to an appreciative understanding of the moral heritage of the Chinese race mediated through their classics and interpreted by their scholars. To a race schooled only in the ancient traditional learning there must needs come both the Christian message and modern science. How these two transforming influences have been working in China during this century and what his own participation in the process has done to his ideas of race, religion and righteousness, is the theme of the book. The implications for the method and the spirit of approach on the part of missionaries from the West are

shown to be very far-reaching. Doctor Brockman, however, has not been the only interpreter of Christianity in the East who has been going through a basic personal transformation during this period, though this book is doubtless one of the ablest accounts we shall have of the process. In fact, although his modesty would quickly lead the author to disclaim any such inclusive value for his book, it might even have been called "Christians of the West Discover the Orient."

That discovery is a continuing experience. Together with the effects of widespread economic distress in the Occident and the development of rampant nationalism in many parts of the world, it is leading toward a radically reconstituted missionary enterprise.

CHARLES H. FAHS.
Curator Missionary Research Library,
New York City.

The Church Architecture of Protestantism. By ANDREW LAN-DALE DRUMMOND. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$6.50.

THE author of this ambitious work is a minister in Scotland, who holds, in addition to his Edinburgh degrees, one from the Hartford Theological Seminary in the United States. A part of this book was given as lectures in the Auburn Theological Seminary, and the foreword by Professor Gaius Glenn Atkins is high praise worthily bestowed.

The book strives toward the as yet unattainable but possible goal of a creative Protestant Church architecture. The author shows a broad scope of knowledge and exercises great fairness in the discussion of mooted positions. His praise of Gothic architecture would satisfy as

eloquent a protagonist as Ralph Adams Cram, but his catalogue of the inadequacies of present-day Gothic might make followers of Doctor Cram rub their eyes in amazement and the advocates of classical or Romanesque ideals gleeful. Doctor Drummond's conclusion is that a creative Protestant architecture should best follow the early Roman basilica models, modified by Romanesque. He feels that these have a certain "advantage over Gothic in their somewhat unfinished appearance which suggests further development and free treatment . . . the basilica type of church with apse and aisles but no transepts, is admirably fitted to the needs of congregational worship, as the ceiling or flattish roof facilitates acoustics." The author also would have more attention given to galleries, with the theatrical type of construction (going back to the Greek theater as a basis) to better stress the Protestant tradition of preaching. He advocates horizontal rather than vertical lines. Most of this is now quite outmoded in the United States. He further would banish altar and altar rail, or anything that separates a chancel, as a holy of holies, from the congregation. This again runs counter to present architectural currents in the United States.

To sum up, the author's objection to Gothic is its cost, inadaptability to small churches, acoustical difficulties, and vertical lines. "We want," he says, "a wide nave, verticality demands a narrow one; we need few columns wide apart, it calls for many crowded together; we ask for an interior as low as beauty of proportion will allow, it insists on one as lofty as means will possibly admit. We aim, in short, at breadth, space, and largeness of parts, and where these exist, a very inspiring and vertical form of Gothic is impossible." At one blow he

demolishes aspiration of soul through architecture in favor of accommodation of congregations! Such recent Gothic churches in the United States as Riverside Church, New York, or Epworth-Euclid, Cleveland, or Wesley, Worcester, or Trinity, Albany, seem to belie his contention that Gothic cannot be well and creatively adapted to both worship and preaching, aspirations and congregations, acoustics and costs.

Two of the most helpful chapters in the book are nine and ten, one dealing with symbolism and the use of the arts, the other with guiding principles for alterations, in rural, town and city churches. He treats the first subject philosophically, historically and broadly. He makes lists of symbols most appropriate for Protestantism and of personalities representative of the Christian faith, which might well be symbolized. He does not hesitate to include, as does Riverside Church, representative scientists, philosophers, teachers, social idealists, artists and litterateurs. Field, forge, laboratory, mine, are categories commended for depiction, as has been done by Ogden Vogt in the First Unitarian Church, Chicago. But he does condemn, as going too far, the Sports Window in the Cathedral of Saint John the Divine, New York, and the Golfer's Window in a Liverpool church, though he quotes Johnston Ross, "that men are beginning to feel that God our Father loveth all that he hath made, and is interested in all our work and all our play." He commends what he calls the happy binding of past, present and future in the twenty-four aisle windows of Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church, Springfield, and describes these windows in detail. But he protests against the use of Lindbergh in a window, not because he is living but because "he is not a great enough figure

to be canonized." Doctor Drummond fails to realize that in 1930 Lindbergh was already a symbol of the ideal of American youth, and as well a symbol of international good will. The window in question is not a canonization of Lindbergh, and not even a Lindbergh window. It is rather dedicated to the experience of good will, and is in the Good Will transept of the church. The medallion of the window completes the idea by showing Kellogg, Briand and Stresemann, signing the Peace Pact, outlawing war. Doctor Drummond thinks a statue of Einstein highly appropriate as a symbol of science, in the Riverside Church, but objects to the portrayal of Gandhi teaching the New Testament in the medallion of the "Enlightenment" window of Trinity. He calls it an irrelevant symbol of Enlightenment. That may be an English point of view!

Doctor Drummond's historical survey is illuminating and covers much new ground. He reaches the heart of the matter in saying that we cannot hope for any intelligent application of Art until there is "a broadening of the curriculum in theological colleges, so as to develop the appreciative as well as the critical attitude." The average divinity student, he declares, is graduated "a cake half turned," the emotional side of his nature being starved. One other condition that he considers essential is the establishment of denominational committees on church architecture. We have done better in the United States in establishing an Interdenominational Bureau of Church Architecture.

Some of the shortcomings of this intriguing volume are: the narrowing attempt to form a criterion for Protestant Church architecture, rather than for Christian Church architecture; the failure to refer in the text, by way of iden-

tification, to any of more than a hundred illustrations of churches; and the lack of a glossary of terms one has a right to expect in any work on architecture as pretentious as is this. But in spite of these defects there is not a dull page in the book.

FRED WINSLOW ADAMS.

Boston University
School of Theology.

Adventures in Happiness. By S. PARKES CADMAN. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$1.90.

I REMEMBER reading somewhere of the sheer super-abundance of vitality of one of England's poets. As I now recall, this poet would be so caught in the stream of his own poetic thought that he would run on the hills of his country home, shouting with the excess of energy which his visions had called forth. I do not know that Doctor Cadman ever has to resort to running to find vent for his vigor, but surely this last book of his is a dash on the hills—hitting the high places. I read the book through—every word of it—almost at a sitting and feel yet the tingle of its rush.

Doctor Cadman is a veritable fountain and spring of all varieties of human vitality. What man in our generation has been anywhere near his match in the volume of sheer physical effort he has put forth in speaking practically to all this nation? In miles traveled in preaching and lecture tours, in the number of books read and pages written, in the thousands of interviews necessary in the pastorate of a great city church, in the multitudinous response to demands made by the bereaved and distressed, in the length of his service as a radio preacher and in the correspondence which that service has made necessary—in these and other ac-

tivities literally too numerous to mention, Doctor Cadman has for well on toward half a century poured a tide of life upon eagerly waiting souls which cannot be measured. Thousands of listeners every week turn on their radios to catch a torrent of mental and moral and religious energy which cleans them up, and braces them up, and carries them along almost in spite of themselves. When I was a boy it used to be fine sport to swim in a mill-race which I knew. The sport consisted in the fact that if one plunged in one had to stay in till the end of the course.

It is not by volume alone that this man's make is to be judged. There is a fineness of quality which in these days of journalistic public utterance we do not find often enough. Let any one read in this book the story of the author's feeling as he heard the massed bands in an English park play Handel's "Largo" or the incident of the interview with a sailor on shipboard about the sunset at sea, or catch the finer shades of artistry in sentences here and there, if the nerves of one's appreciation of beauty have become a little jaded.

Doctor Cadman reads enormously. He quotes from so many books that the effect at times is almost bewildering. Yet the examination of the context of the passages quoted is not likely to reveal slipshod or slap-dash workmanship. In doing some work on John Wesley, I once went carefully through Doctor Cadman's *Three Oxford Leaders*. The section on Wesley in that book called forth the praise of the late Professor T. M. Lindsay, the celebrated historian, for its having made Wesley a genuinely living figure. I do not know any study of a historical character which in the same compass refers to so many judgments by other writers. What I started to say was that I went

carefully over all the references and, except in the case of one or two that I could not trace, found that they were true to the intent and meaning of the various authors, and that generalizations based on surveys of authorities on the times of Wesley were soundly conceived and fairly stated.

Adventures in Happiness comes out of a vast range of actual human experience as well as out of familiarity with the world's mightiest thinkers about life. It is the distillation of years of intense and fine living. It is hopeful in its view of men and the universe. Some thinkers become skeptical as they grow older just because they are tired or sick. An older teacher of mine used to say that too much doubt is a bad mental sign—that sick minds like sick stomachs can keep nothing down. There is no such weariness and squeamishness about the book before us. We are not dealing with the work of an innovator but of one who looks out upon the essential judgments of the human race as to standards of living in the home, as to the worth of friendships, and as to the worth of service of our fellowmen and finds them, not perfect indeed, but fundamentally healthy. Some readers will feel that changes ought to come more speedily than the processes of ordinary growth bring them about, but all such need to be reminded that many features of our experience, especially of our social experience, are the outcome of ages of the common man's judgment on life and its problems, and therefore are to be changed only after the most thoroughly moral as well as scientific preparation. If institutions endure because they meet needs, the best way to change them is to seek for something which will meet the needs more adequately. In all social progress a healthy moral instinct is a most important factor

and Doctor Cadman is set immovably against any program which has a moral taint. It is bad enough when our social endeavors get sicklied o'er with a pale cast of thought, but much worse when the pale cast comes of moral flabbiness or insincerity or self-seeking. Of course this holds not only for some advocates of change but for some advocates of no change. Some modifications of our modern institutions, Doctor Cadman manifestly would not approve. Some others he heartily endorses. It may astonish some readers for whom labels are all-in-all to see this book admit that some of these desirable changes belong to the milder forms of socialism.

We have to take a book for what it is and judge it for what it aims to do. *Adventures in Happiness* is a self-expression of abundant life seeking to share itself with other lives. It moves among lordly landscapes of mankind's experience just to behold them and to appreciate them and partake of their mystic secrets. It is not concerned chiefly to make the landscapes over, and it does not approach them with a geologist's hammer or a surveyor's chain. These are good enough in their time and place, but they are not always, or often, the best. There are more excellent ways to study landscapes, and this book tells about them.

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DOCTOR LEWIS AND DOCTOR WIEMAN

In my review of Wieman, *Normative Psychology of Religion*, in the last issue of RELIGION IN LIFE, I gave as Doctor Wieman's definition of God the words, "God is meaning," and put them in quotation marks. The three words were not a direct quotation from the text, and were not intended to be so understood. Doctor Wieman's actual statement was "God is growth of meaning." In trying to understand this statement for myself, I re-phrased it to read, "God is meaning in process of growth," or "God is meaning growing," or "God is increasing meaning." I supposed the genitive was of a kind to permit this re-phrasing without changing the idea. It appeared to me to be plain enough that Doctor Wieman was saying, "God is meaning," and then that he was qualifying "meaning" by the idea of "growth." This qualification I took to be not particularly significant. I fastened on what was undergoing the "process," namely, "meaning," rather than on the process (or "growth"). Therefore I was not conscious of any misrepresentation in shortening the expression to "God is meaning," or of any ethical impropriety in putting it in quotation marks, and dealing with the definition accordingly. Doctor Wieman, however, thinks otherwise; and since he must be the judge of his own mind, I can only express regret at any annoyance I may have caused him. I have had pleasant enough relations with Doctor Wieman in the past, and while I profoundly disagree with him in his idea of God and at other vital points, I should wish to disagree as a gentleman. I am compelled to add, however, that the change of wording in nowise affects the tenor of my criticisms. Whether one say, "God is meaning," or "God is growth of meaning," that is, whether one equate "God" and "meaning" or "God" and "growth of meaning," one is at an equal remove from the uncompromising personalism of Christian Theism, and it was with the profound difference of Doctor Wieman's purely abstract view of God (as it seems to me) from the Christian view that I was primarily concerned.

EDWIN LEWIS.

Bookish Brevities

BYRON spoke of people who had just enough learning to misquote.

Dr. Albert Peel, the eminent British authority on religious books, ranks T. R. Glover's new book, *The Ancient World*, as the best he has written.

Read not to contradict and confute, nor to believe and take for granted, nor to find talk and discourse, but to weigh and consider.—Francis Bacon.

The article, "Jesus, Son of Man," by Harold Cooke Phillips, has the enhancing significance of having been delivered at Berlin to the Baptist World Congress in one of the most tense periods of the Nazi regime.

The quality of Professor H. H. Farmer's new book, *The World and God*, registers the loss to American Christian scholarship when he was allowed to leave Hartford to follow Dr. John Oman at Cambridge University.

In 1854 Harvard was first among American libraries, with more than fifty thousand volumes. In 1935 Harvard maintains its continuous leadership, with 3,602,040 volumes. Contrary to common opinion, the chief college libraries have consistently grown throughout the depression.

Ellery Sedgwick, formerly Editor of *The Atlantic Monthly*, holds that the

three characteristics of a successful magazine editor are adventurous curiosity, imagination, and sympathy with people. People he must like; he may get far from literature, but never from human nature.

The London Observer proposes a book-returning week. A Boston paper counters with these lines from the flyleaf of a copy of Aristotle, dated 1678:

"This boke is one thing,
The halter is another,
He that stealeth the one
Must be sure of the other."

John Galsworthy was hazy in his religious ideas, but he had an instinct for human understanding and he was resolute to defend the weak. Since his death it has been disclosed that he gave away every year half of his income to brother authors in distress.

John Dewey, Charles A. Beard and Edmund Weeks drew up, without consultation, a list of the most influential modern books. It is astonishing that the same four lead each list—Marx's *Das Kapital*, Bellamy's *Looking Backward*, Frazer's *The Golden Bough*, and Spengler's *The Decline of the West*.

The Bishop of Winchester believes that "neither in the days of persecution by the Roman Empire, nor when Arianism struck at the heart of the Christian faith, nor when Mohammedanism

threatened to overwhelm Christendom, has the Church been exposed to dangers so great and attacks so fierce, as those which menace it today."

Dr. W. F. Howard of the Advisory Council of RELIGION IN LIFE is certain that some of the papyri which have recently been discovered confirm the existence of the Gospels at an earlier date than had been supposed. One of these papyri, which Doctor Howard describes as priceless, is a fragment of Saint John's Gospel, and dates about 130 to 150 A. D.

Sinclair Lewis writes that one might almost declare that books do not sell any more. Many novels which in 1920 would have sold 50,000 copies, in 1935 sold only 10,000 copies. The movies, the automobile, the road-house, bridge, and, most of all, the radio, he adds, are the enemies of magazine reading, book reading and homicidally the enemies of book buying. In all of which there is some truth, but one wonders whether his statement does not reflect a decline in the sale of his own books, due to a change in the public attitude.

It is estimated that the writing incomes of American authors range from \$100,000 a year to \$800. One per cent receive around \$70,000 a year, twelve per cent \$15,000 and eighty-seven per cent from \$5,000 to \$800. In 1934 the books of fifteen American authors sold 50,000 or more copies. Bliss Perry is of the opinion that our concern with materialities has prevented literature from keeping pace with the commercial and scientific advances which have been

much celebrated. He hopes that some unknown author may publish tomorrow as good a book as *Moby Dick*, *The Scarlet Letter*, *Emerson's Essays*, *Walden Pond*, *Leaves of Grass*, or *Huckleberry Finn*, but he suggests that we have been waiting too long for it.

Henry van Dyke is quoted by his son, Tertius, as saying on the only occasion where he spoke publicly of himself:

"I should wish to see every page that I have ever written blotted out and burned rather than that one man should turn from what I have written with a mind degraded or defiled or weakened, disheartened and discouraged; and I should be most grateful if from any page of any verse that I have penned a man should draw something that would make it easier for him to meet life's vicissitudes and to do his duty and to love his fellow-man, to rejoice in the world in which he lives and in the life which has been given to him."

RELIGION IN LIFE goes regularly to these countries beyond the borders of the United States: Canada, Straits Settlements, China, Sweden, Japan, Australia, Hawaii, Uruguay, Belgian Congo, India, The Argentine, Peru, Newfoundland, Belgium, Brazil, Latvia, England, Siam, Wales, Arabia, Mexico, Chile, Scotland, American Samoa, Turkey, New Zealand, The Philippines, Canal Zone, Ireland, Burma, Egypt, Borneo, Federated Malay States. Among the interesting names of places it reaches are God's Lake, Canada; Pago Pago, American Samoa; Merton College, Oxford; Aberystwyth, Wales; and libraries in China, Japan and India.